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resumo 
 
 
A renovada preocupação na avaliação dos riscos e consequências dos perigos 
tecnológicos em zonas industriais e urbanas continua a enfatizar o 
desenvolvimento de modelos de análise de consequências (AC) à escala local, 
capazes de simular episódios de poluição de curto prazo e seus efeitos na 
saúde humana e ambiente resultantes da exposição em situação de acidentes 
com substâncias perigosas. 
Neste sentido, o principal objecto desta tese é o desenvolvimento e validação 
do modelo Efects of Released Hazardous gAses (EFRHA). Esta ferramenta foi 
desenvolvida para simular a libertação e dispersão atmosférica de gases 
perigosos pesados e passivos em ambientes de topografia complexa e 
edificados, bem como, estimar as consequências da exposição a episódios de 
poluição de curta duração de acordo com limites de segurança e controlo. 
O modelo é constituído por cinco módulos principais: meteorológico, fontes, 
terreno, dispersão e efeitos. Diferentes estados físicos e tipos de acidente 
podem ser analisados. Considerado o elemento principal da ferramenta, o 
módulo de dispersão é baseado na modelação ‘shallow layer’, que permite 
considerar a influência de obstáculos na dispersão de gases perigosos. 
A validação do modelo inclui métodos de análise qualitativa e quantitativa 
através da comparação dos principais outputs com bases de dados medidos 
ou simulados. A análise preliminar dos módulos meteorológica e fontes 
baseada na comparação com resultados de modelos também validados 
demonstra a correcta descrição das condições ambientais e da variação das 
características da fonte ao longo da libertação. O módulo de dispersão é 
comparado com resultados de medições experimentais considerando 
diferentes condições de libertação e dispersão atmosférica. Em geral, os 
critérios de qualidade estimados encontram-se dentro dos limites de aceitação 
para modelos ‘non-CFD’, demonstrando a capacidade para simular 
razoavelmente a libertação e dispersão atmosférica de gases pesados 
perigosos em ambientes industriais e urbanos. 
O modelo EFRHA também foi aplicado a um caso de estudo, o Complexo 
Químico de Estarreja (ECC), com base num conjunto de cenários de libertação 
acidental, no âmbito de um estudo de AC. Os resultados demonstram a 
potencial magnitude dos efeitos na área envolvente ao ECC, bem como a 
influência das condições meteorológicas e tipo de acidente. De um modo geral, 
a presente tese demonstra a aplicabilidade do modelo como ferramenta para 
estudos de CA, bem como no suporte à decisão e preparação de resposta de 
emergência em situação de libertação acidental em zonas urbanas e 
industriais. 
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abstract 
 
The renewed concern in assessing risks and consequences from technological 
hazards in industrial and urban areas continues emphasizing the development 
of local-scale consequence analysis (CA) modelling tools able to predict short-
term pollution episodes and exposure effects on humans and the environment 
in case of accident with hazardous gases (hazmat). 
In this context, the main objective of this thesis is the development and 
validation of the EFfects of Released Hazardous gAses (EFRHA) model. This 
modelling tool is designed to simulate the outflow and atmospheric dispersion 
of heavy and passive hazmat gases in complex and build-up areas, and to 
estimate the exposure consequences of short-term pollution episodes in 
accordance to regulatory/safety threshold limits. 
Five main modules comprising up-to-date methods constitute the model: 
meteorological, terrain, source term, dispersion, and effects modules. Different 
initial physical states accident scenarios can be examined. Considered the 
main core of the developed tool, the dispersion module comprises a shallow 
layer modelling approach capable to account the main influence of obstacles 
during the hazmat gas dispersion phenomena. 
Model validation includes qualitative and quantitative analyses of main outputs 
by the comparison of modelled results against measurements and/or modelled 
databases. The preliminary analysis of meteorological and source term 
modules against modelled outputs from extensively validated models shows 
the consistent description of ambient conditions and the variation of the hazmat 
gas release. Dispersion is compared against measurements observations in 
obstructed and unobstructed areas for different release and dispersion 
scenarios. From the performance validation exercise, acceptable agreement 
was obtained, showing the reasonable numerical representation of measured 
features. In general, quality metrics are within or close to the acceptance limits 
recommended for ‘non-CFD models’, demonstrating its capability to reasonably 
predict hazmat gases accidental release and atmospheric dispersion in 
industrial and urban areas.  
EFRHA model was also applied to a particular case study, the Estarreja 
Chemical Complex (ECC), for a set of accidental release scenarios within a CA 
scope. The results show the magnitude of potential effects on the surrounding 
populated area and influence of the type of accident and the environment on 
the main outputs. Overall the present thesis shows that EFRHA model can be 
used as a straightforward tool to support CA studies in the scope of training 
and planning, but also, to support decision and emergency response in case of 
hazmat gases accidental release in industrial and built-up areas. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although we cannot eliminate the risk of industrial accidents in modern societies, we can strive to minimise the 
risks of such accidents happening and to mitigate their consequences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Public awareness on risks posed by the use of hazardous materials/substances (hereinafter named 
hazmat) increased markedly over the last decades due to the expansion and scale-up of 
reported severe accidents/disasters, in particular since the 1960s and 1970s. The attention to 
this problem is continuously brought worldwide by examples of ‘major disasters’, either they 
have a natural or man-made (technological) origin. Technological disasters, such as major 
industrial accidents (MIA) or terrorist attacks are not rare events and consequences on humans 
and the environment have been extensively discussed in the literature [e.g. Lees, 1996; 
Kirchsteiger, 2001; Nivolianitou et al., 2006; Gunn, 2008; European Environmental Agency 
(EEA), 2010]. Moreover, the extensive industrial development next to (progressively more 
densely) populated areas, clearly leads to the possibility of accidents causing mass casualties 
and a dramatic escalation of potential financial, social and environmental repercussions of 
such events [Lari et al., 2009]. Despite the growing understanding and significant efforts on the 
mitigation of technological hazards, the assessment and reduction of related risks and impacts 
continues to challenge scientific, safety and regulatory prone communities [Tyagunov et al., 
2005]. Consequently, the attempt to control and predict such hazards and potential 
consequences has become a recognized strategic goal component of emergency planning and 
response, risk analysis and safety regulatory instruments [Durham, 2003]. 
1.1 Industrial accidents involving hazardous materials 
Industrial development provides prosperity, high standards of living and is considered a key 
measure of progress but, as all physical human activities, industrial activities involve risks to 
humans and the environment. Production, storage and transportation of hazmat are processes 
of vital economic importance for any advanced and technologically complex society, which 
are always coupled with an increase of the number of industrial facilities and hazmat 
quantities handled [Mannan, 2005; Guedes et al., 2009]. Nonetheless, this modification requires 
a continuous learning process to deal with the constant threat of technological disasters 
generated by the development of new and more complex technologies. Moreover, this 
learning process is frequently based on the study of previous MIA, as well as, on the 
compilation and comprehensive analysis of data. 
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1.1.1 Concepts 
The potential for MIA has emphasized the need for a clearly defined and systematic approach 
to evaluate and control hazmat process, storage or transportation, in order to protect workers, 
the public and the environment. As a result, various definitions of relevant concepts have been 
proposed and extensively used in regulatory and scientific contexts. 
Commonly, an accident can be defined as ‘an unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly 
and unintentionally, typically resulting in damage or injury’, as cited in the Oxford Dictionary 
[Oxford Dictionaries, 2010]. When considered in the context of industrial activity and 
associated risks, a MIA is ‘an occurrence such as major emission, fire, or explosion resulting 
from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any industrial plant 
(storage, process or transportation, leading to serious danger to human health and/or the 
environment, immediate or delayed’. Such incidents/events can take place inside or outside 
the plant involving one or more dangerous substances. 
Everyday life human activity entails a variety and degrees of hazards and risks. These terms are 
familiar and intuitive to many of us. However, they are regularly treated as interchangeable 
synonymous in many fields and activities including economics, business, sports, industry, 
even not always referred to with exactly the same meaning. Consequently, this has lead to a 
sort of ambiguity in the use and definition of these concepts over the last years [Christensen et 
al., 2003]. The Oxford English Dictionary provides again some insights defining hazard as ‘a 
possible source of danger or risk’ and risk as ‘a situation involving exposure to danger’ or ‘the 
possibility that something unpleasant will happen’ [Oxford Dictionaries, 2010]. Nonetheless, 
in spite of being relatively new and still in development, modern engineering sciences and 
regulatory communities have also proposed guidance definitions for these concepts over the 
last years, as follows. 
In a technical interpretation, hazards can be defined as ‘the source of danger, that may be an 
intrinsic phenomenon, human activity, a chemical or physical condition that has the potential 
for causing damage to people, property, or the environment and may or may not lead to an 
emergency or disaster’ [Greenberg and Cramer, 1991]. Furthermore, the Center for Chemical 
Process Safety [CCPS, 1999] and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction [UNISDR, 2009] argue that hazards can be quantitatively described by the likely 
frequency of occurrence and different intensities of consequences determined from historical 
data or scientific analysis. Their origin may be purely natural (e.g. earthquakes, storms, floods, 
forest fires), technological (e.g. industrial accidents, terrorist attacks), or a mixture of both (e.g. 
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sinking of an oil tanker in a winter storm at sea, explosion of tank during earthquake) [Slovic, 
2000]. In any case these events can lead to threats and damages to people, the environment or 
material assets. While natural hazards are purely natural origin processes or phenomena; 
technological hazards refer to failures of man-made systems, occurring accidental or 
deliberately with minor or no warning preceding the event, that have the potential to cause 
fatalities and/or casualties and produce significant damage to structures and environment. In 
the context of industrial and transportation activities, technological hazard events often 
involve the release of hazmat, fires or explosions with severe impacts. Consequently, the 
assessment of technological risk has been recognised to be more complex than natural risk and 
then, a target of numerous research works [e.g. Covello, 1982; Sherif, 1990; Shaluf et al., 2003; 
Schmidt-Thomé, 2005; EEA, 2010], given the influence of human activity in its occurrence, 
prevention and impacts mitigation. 
On the other hand, the word risk has two distinctive connotations: in popular usage the 
emphasis is generally placed on the concept of possibility for a particular danger, harm or 
hazard to occur, such as in the ‘risk of an accident’; whilst in technical emphasis is on the 
consequences, in the form of ‘potential losses’ for some particular cause, place and period 
[Smith, 1996; Oxford Dictionaries, 2010]. In ‘professional and engineering sciences’ risk is 
regularly defined as the ‘combination of the consequences of an event (hazard) and the 
associated likelihood (probability) of its occurrence’ [World Health Organization (WHO), 
2004; Vose, 2008; International Electrotechnical Commission and International Organization 
for Standardization (IEC/ISO), 2009]. Notwithstanding, risk is a complex function of the 
degree of hazard to a certain system (technological or environmental), the likelihood that a 
hazard results in an undesired event and the vulnerability of the system into which the 
undesired event may develop its consequences [Kirchsteiger et al., 1998]. Therefore, it is 
possible to mention that risks are actually the consequences if hazards do materialize (occur). 
1.1.2 Historical overview of major industrial accidents 
The history of industrial activities (including transportation and storage) is replete with 
reported MIA. Since the industrial revolution numerous and severe MIA have been reported 
almost every year, causing major fatalities and asset damage, but most of all, highlighting the 
resulting potential, and sometimes, devastating social, financial and environmental 
repercussions [Carol et al., 2002; Tavares et al., 2010]. Even with the increasing number of MIA 
reported since the beginning of the 20th century, a drastic raise is observed since the 1970s. 
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Figure 1.1 illustrates the total number of technological disasters (comprising accidents in 
industrial and transportation activities) reported worldwide since 1900 to present (2009). 
 
Figure 1.1 – Time evolution of technological disasters reported between 1900 and 2009 [URL1.2]. 
Time evolution behaviour of major technological disasters reported between 1900 and 2009 
can be directly linked with the intense industrial development worldwide. From Figure 1.1 it 
is perceptible a relatively reduced number of MIA reported between 1900 and 1950s, despite 
the noticeable higher values during the 1940s (seriously affected by the World War II). 
However, a drastic raise of reported MIA is observed from the second half of the 20th century 
onward, largely caused by the rapid industrial development commonly next to (gradually 
more densely) populated areas. Along history, a large number of reported MIA, including the 
ones summarized in Table 1.1, became known mostly due to their consequences on people 
and the environment, illustrating the myriad ways in which human or equipment failures, at 
industrial and transportation activities, may cause accidents leading to large impacts on 
human health and environment [EEA, 2003; Lindberg, et al., 2010]. 
Table 1.1 lists some noteworthy MIA reported worldwide over the last decades highlighting 
the correspondent type of accident and the estimated number of people death and injured 
based on available information in the literature and databases. 
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Table 1.1 – Some noteworthy reported major industrial accidents worldwide. (a) 
Year Location Products involved Type of accident Death Injured 
1947 Texas City, USA Chemicals Explosions 581 ≈5,000 
1957 Mayak, USSR Nuclear Explosion 200 ≈8,000
(b)
 
1957 Windscale, UK Nuclear Fire - ≈200 
1974 Flixborough, UK Cyclohexane Explosion 28 89 
1975 Beek, Netherlands Ethylene Vapour cloud explosion 14 109 
1976 Seveso, Italy TCDD Dioxin Explosion and dispersion 0 37,000 
1977 Columbia, USA Ammonia Toxic gas dispersion 30 22 
1978 Los Alfaques, Spain Propylene Fireball (road transport) 216 200 
1980 Danaciobasi, Turkey Chemicals Unknown 107 0 
1984 México city, México Liquefied Pressurized Gas Fire and explosion 550 23 
1984 Bhopal, India Methil Isocyanate Toxic gas dispersion 22,000
(c)
 0 
1986 Chernobyl, Ukraine Nuclear Explosion and fire 60 Unknown 
1986 Basel, Switzerland Chemicals Fire 0 
(d)
 0 
1988 North Sea, UK Oil, gas Fire 167 0 
1989 Acha Ufa, USSR Gas Explosion (pipeline) 575 0 
1989 Pasadena, USA Polyethylene Explosion 23 120–300 
1991 Livorno, Italy Naphtha Transport accident 141 0 
1996 Alberton, USA Chemicals Spill (train transport) 1 300 
2000 Baia Mare, Romania Cyanides Spill 0 
(d)
 0 
2000 Enschede, Netherlands Fireworks Explosion 23 947 
2001 Toulouse, France Ammonium nitrate Explosion 30 2,242 
2004 Ghilenghien, Belgium Liquefied Natural Gas Explosion 24 131 
2005 Texas City, USA Chemicals Explosion 15 170 
2005 Buncefield, UK Fuel Explosion and fire 0 43 
2009 Viareggio, Italy LPG Fire (train transport) 31 +30 
2010 Louisiana, USA Oil Explosion and spill 11 0 
2010 Bonaire, USA Oil Explosion and fire 0 0 
2010 Ajka, Hungary Alumina sludge Spill 10 120–150 
2011 Sendai, Japan Nuclear Explosion
(e)
 0 7 
(a) Information compiled from MARS, EM-DAT and FACTS databases. 
(b) More than 8,000 deaths from health problems caused by exposure have been reported until 1992. 
(c) Around 22,000 deaths (with direct or indirect exposure consequences) have been reported until 2004. 
(d) No fatalities but large environmental damage. 
(e) Effects on humans and the environment have not yet been estimated 
One of the worst MIA disasters reported in North America occurred in Texas City, in the 
United States of America (USA) in the morning of 16th April 1947. A chain of catastrophic fires 
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and explosions that destroyed the entire chemical complex facilities and the surrounding 
populated area started with a small fire on bags of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in the hold of a 
cargo ship anchored at the sea Port complex. The fire and explosions detonated approximately 
3,250 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and 1,800 tons of sulphur [Stephens, 1993]. The official 
death toll was 581 people (including the entire Texas City Firefighters Department crew), 5,000 
people were injured and 113 classified as missing [URL1.3]. 
Since the 1970s an increasing number of severe MIA events have been reported with major 
casualties, financial, social and environmental repercussions. The explosion and subsequent 
fire at a petrochemical site close to Flixborough, in United Kingdom (U.K.) on 1st June 1974, 
lead to a widespread public outcry over industrial activities safety, and significant tightening 
of regulations covering hazardous industrial processes [Mannan, 2005]. According to Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) [1975], in the explosion, 28 people were killed and 89 
injured (36 workers and 53 off-site). Around the ‘ground zero’ area, 1800 buildings within a 
1.6 km radius of the site were damaged. Notwithstanding the level of destruction, shown in 
Figure 1.2, the number of fatalities was relatively reduced because the accident took place on a 
Saturday [Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 1975]. 
(a)                                                                                                            (b) 
  
Figure 1.2 – Aerial (a) and local (b) views over Flixborough explosion Ground Zero area [HMSO, 
1975]. 
Post-accident investigations concluded that human failure was the cause of the rupture that 
originated the release and ignition of about 40 tonnes of cyclohexane [Lees, 1996]. This 
accident endorsed a significant improvement on maintenance operations procedures and 
checklists in petrochemical industries. This event is often considered the genesis for the 
development of new regulatory and safety procedures and regulatory documents at European 
Union (EU) level [Marshall, 1987; Høiset et al., 2000]. 
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Two years later, the release of about 30 kg of TCDD dioxin (2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
dioxin) on 10th June 1976, at the Industrie Chimiche Meda Società Azionaria (ICMESA) 
chemical plant located in Seveso (Italy), caused extensive impacts in both humans and the 
environment. Approximately 37,000 individuals were affected by direct and/or indirect 
exposure to TCDD [Rice, 1982]. Although there were no immediate human casualties, as in 
previously described accidents, delayed and indirect effects resulted in thousands of animals 
died, or killed to prevent further impacts along the food chain, buildings were demolished, 
and residents were forced to leave the area [Wettig et al., 1999]. Delayed exposure effects on 
humans, like chemical burns and chloracne were observed in many of the affected people. The 
Italian public authorities lift temporarily the law banning abortion, allowing several pregnant 
women to terminate pregnancies voluntary [Bertazzi, 1991]. Studies on long-term effects of 
mortality and cancer incidence on resident populations have been conducted in the following 
years to evaluate the carcinogenic risks posed by TCDD, such as Bertazzi et al. [1998] or 
Pesatori et al. [2009]. In the light of this MIA event, the development and implementation of a 
new European legislation aiming at the prevention and control of accidents involving hazmat 
was emphasized and put into practice. As a result, the European Directive 82/501/EEC, also 
called ‘Seveso Directive’ (to maintain the memory of the consequences of this event) on the 
major accident hazards of certain industrial activities was prepared and adopted EU-wide in 
1982. 
For the worldwide chemical industry, the Bhopal (India) toxic gas release in 1984 can be 
considered the worst MIA ever recorded [Willey et al., 2005]. On the night of 2nd to 3rd 
December 1984, a runaway chain of chemical reactions caused the release of about 45 tonnes 
of MIC (methyl isocyanate) at the Union Carbide Corporation industrial plant close to Bhopal. 
MIC gas cloud drifted over the densely populated Bhopal neighbourhoods around the 
industrial installations. The impact on people living close to the chemical plant was immediate 
and devastating, many died in their beds, others staggered from their homes, blinded and 
choking, to die in the street (see Figure 1.3) [Shrivastava, 1992]. 
The final death toll was estimated to be between 15,000 and 22,000 people, comprising 
immediate and delayed fatalities [Willey, 1998]. Some half a million survivors suffered several 
health problems caused by the exposure to MIC. The attention of international media, e.g. the 
Time magazine cover shown in Figure 1.4, as well as information and investigation reports, 
were a key factor for the increase of public awareness about the potential impacts of industrial 
accidents. 
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Figure 1.3 – Time magazine front cover reporting 
Bhopal accident [URL1.4]. 
 
Figure 1.4 – Time magazine front cover 
reporting Bhopal accident [URL1.5]. 
Severe MIAs have also been reported in the energy production industry. Among the most 
studied and known events in this sector, over the last decades, the 1986 explosion at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine (former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR)), can be considered one of the two1 worst accidents in history with a level 7 event on 
the International Nuclear Event Scale [Gunn, 2008]. Although precise causes of the accident 
still remain uncertain, it is generally believed that a series of incidents leading to an explosion 
followed by a fire and nuclear meltdown was caused by a combination of reactor design flaws 
and operator error. The explosion resulted in the collapse of part of the building (see Figure 
1.5) and the release of a radiation cloud into the atmosphere, ejecting about 8 tonnes of 
radioactive material during the following two weeks after the incident. Released material was 
widely carried away in the form of gases and dust particles (mostly Cesium-137 - 137Cs) by air 
circulation and mainly deposited over the territory of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus (see Figure 
1.6) [Bennet et al., 2006]. 
However, the extension of the dispersion and deposition of radioactive matter (137Cs) reached 
outlying countries like Austria, Greece or Italy [EEA, 2003], as illustrated in Figure 1.6, and 
even the USA as reported by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation (UNSCEAR) [2008]. After the accident, the damaged reactor was sealed in a 
‘sarcophagus’, keeping the other operating until November 2000 [URL1.6].  
The main reported casualties were among the fire-fighters including those who attended the 
initial small fires. By mid-2005s, fewer than 60 deaths could be linked directly to Chernobyl 
                                                          
1 The second level 7 nuclear accident event occurred in Fukushima (Japan) nuclear power plant involving a 
series of explosions after being striken on 11th March 2011 by the tsunami wave formed by an earthquake of 
magnitude between 8 and 9 in Richter sismic scale. 
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(mostly workers who were exposed to massive radiation during the accident or children who 
developed thyroid cancer) [UNSCEAR, 2009]. 
 
Figure 1.5 – Aerial view over 
the nuclear reactor after the 
explosion at Chernobyl plant 
[URL1.7]. 
 
Figure 1.6 – Ground deposition of 137Cs radionuclide in Europe after 
the Chernobyl accident [EEA, 2003]. 
Estimates of the eventual death toll from Chernobyl vary widely Aiming to provide valuable 
information and evaluate the real consequences of this event, an initiative of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in collaboration with the WHO, United Nations (UN), Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), UNSCEAR and the 
World Bank, created the UN Chernobyl Forum as a contribution to the United Nations’ ten-
year strategy for Chernobyl program, launched in 2002 [URL1.8]. The main purpose of this 
Forum is the provision of scientific information concerning the ‘real’ consequences from the 
accident on population and the environment in the most affected countries.  
After the accident, an increase in thyroid cancer was found in children exposed to fallout from 
the accident [IAEA, 2006]. In 2000, about 2,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been reported in 
those exposed as children in the former Soviet Socialist Union, and in 2005, the number was 
estimated at 4,000 [WHO, 2005]; the latest estimate for the year 2056 ranges from 3,400 to 
72,000 [Cardis et al. 2005]. The effects are not limited by national boundaries and more than 20 
years after the accident, people in the affected countries had not yet precise and clear scientific 
consensus and knowledge on the health, environmental and socio-economic consequences of 
the accident [Baverstock and William, 2006; IAEA, 2006].  
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Entering the 21st Century, a major explosion at the Azote de France (AZF) fertilizer plant, 
located 3 km from Toulouse (France), on 21st September 2001, caused the destruction of the 
entire industrial complex (see Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8), killed 30 people (21 on-site and 9 off-
site), and injured nearly 2,242, many of them seriously [Cahen, 2006]. As illustrated in Figure 
1.7, the accident generated a crater in the industrial facility and also affected two other 
chemical plants in the vicinity.  
Figure 1.7 – View over crater formed during the 
explosion of AZF plant in Toulouse [URL1.9]. 
 
Figure 1.8 – View of the AZF fertilizer plant 
structure after the explosion [URL1.10]. 
Various investigations have been performed in the following years trying to establish the 
chain of events that caused the explosion [e.g. Barthelemy et al., 2001; Dechi et al., 2004], 
however the precise technical explanation for this disaster remains unanswered. According to 
the judicial enquiry, the explosion was caused by a human handling error [Barthelemy et al., 
2001]. However, AZF suggests another hypothesis through its own commission of enquiry, 
claiming that the explosion was caused by an electric arc between two transformers located 
outside the plant [Dechy et al., 2004]. This accident involved considerable damage to the 
structure in the industrial complex as shown in Figure 1.8, but also, over surrounding 
residential areas and affected the electricity distribution system in the region. 
The explosion was one of the worst industrial disasters in France, and the third major 
chemical disaster after the accident in Seveso (Italy, 1976).   
The recent events on the 11th December 2005 at Buncefield fuel depository in Hertfordshire 
(U.K.) were possibly the largest explosion in Europe since the World War II, as reported by the 
Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (BMIIB) [BMIIB, 2006]. The incident caused 
injuries on 43 people and left a scene of devastation (see Figure 1.9). Both industrial complex 
and surrounding area were evacuated leaving some 2,000 people displaced [BMIIB, 2008a]. 
Initial findings of the BMII investigation [BMIIB, 2006] pointed to an instrumentation failure 
with a leak of aviation fuel spilled into a bund for several hours generating vast quantities of 
vapour, as high-level gauges failed to detect that the tank was full. A total of 20 tanks and 
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building structures were involved in the incident. Environmental issues related to the disaster 
do not appear to have long-term implications with regard to water pollution as the heavily 
contaminated firewater was contained on site. Even with the intense and dense cloud of 
smoke observed (see Figure 1.9) that lasted for days, it was classified as irritant, rather than 
being toxic, based measurements at both air and ground levels [BMIIB, 2008a,b].  
             
Figure 1.9 – Aerial photographs of Buncefield explosion and resulting fire [URL1.11]. 
Following the extensive investigation, major changes on land-use planning and control of 
societal risks around hazards sites measures, as well as, safety and environmental standards 
for fuel storage sites have been recommended by both BMIIB and the British HSE [BMIIB, 
2008c; HSE, 2009]. 
Notwithstanding the extensively investigated MIA that occurred in industrial sites, the 
transportation sector has also been target of numerous studies given the severe accidents 
involving the release of hazmat also reported over the last decades [e.g. Vílchez et al., 1995; 
Oggero et al., 2006; Ellis, 2011; Ronza, 2007]. A recent well-known accident involving 
transportation of hazmat was the train accident followed by explosions and pool fires that 
occurred on 29th June 2009 at Viareggio (Italy) railway station. Figure 1.10 shows two aerial 
photographs taken at Viareggio train station area after the explosion and subsequent fire.  
One of the 14 transported tank wagons went off the rails and got damaged causing the release 
and spread of liquefied pressurized gas (LPG) with subsequent explosion and fire. The LPG 
gas cloud dispersed radially from the derailed tank mainly across the railway line, due to 
rather calm weather conditions. A narrow long street parallel to the railway line comprising 
more than 42 buildings was also affected (see Figure 1.10).  
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Figure 1.10 – Aerial photographs of Viareggio trains station explosion and resulting fire [URL1.12]. 
A large number of buildings surrounding the train station were destroyed by explosions or 
fires. A total of 31 people died and more than 30 people were seriously injured and about 
1,100 inhabitants had to evacuate their houses for safety reasons either due to unsafe buildings 
or to areas exposed to further risks [Manca et al., 2010]. Consequences and fatalities of the 
accident would have been even worse if the station master had not stopped two passenger 
trains that were arriving in Viareggio a few minutes later [Dellacasa, 2009]. As far as the 
transportation of dangerous goods, the Viareggio accident can be considered the worst 
railway accident that ever happened in Italy [Landucci et al., 2011]. 
Over the last decades, various theories tried to explain the reason for the continuous 
occurrence of accidents, regardless the numerous safety measures and large efforts on 
prevention and control of MIA. Normal accidental theorists, like Perrow [1999], defend that 
accidents still happen since companies with major accident hazards have increasingly complex 
technology and tightly coupled processes, which result in situations where accidents just 
happen because the learning process is handicapped [Lagadec, 1997]. Others, such as Hopkins 
[2005], claim that this complexity is what makes accidents so predictable. Nevertheless, it is 
generally recognized that past accidents represent important ‘experimental data’ and are 
essential sources for updating state-of-the-art requirements in process safety [Uth, 2004]. 
Valuable lessons and knowledge are continuously gained analyzing past MIA events in 
finding better ways to manage most frequent causes of failure, safety and emergency 
response. Thus, accident investigation is an indispensable source for further developments on 
accident prevention and control measures [Uth, 1999]. 
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1.1.3 Available information of major industrial accidents 
Over the last decades, there has been a strong enforcement for industries to report abnormal 
and MIA events, making more and ‘transparent’ the information available to public, analysts, 
regulatory and scientific prone communities. At the same time, industrial activities face more 
stringent execution by regulatory authorities with respect to Risk Assessment (RA) for 
prevention and reduction of risks and implementation of emergency planning and response 
strategies.  
The increased awareness and impetus prevention and control of MIA resulted in greater 
transparency and on the development of databases aimed to compile reported MIA events 
[e.g. Kletz, 1988; Drogaris, 1993; Khan and Abbasi, 1995; Kirchsteiger, 2001; Hadad et al., 2007]. 
Mainly supported by the interest to investigate past events, but also estimating present and 
future trends, different databases have been developed by national or international, public or 
private institutions, focusing on reporting relevant information of current and past industrial 
accidents and subsequent consequences. In most available databases, information concerning 
accident type and hazmat involved, main causes and effects, as well as efficiency on 
emergency response and lessons learned are compiled [Nivoulianitou et al., 2006]. Table 1.2 
summarizes basic and relevant information of some of the best-known and most used MIA 
reporting databases. 
Table 1.2 – Examples of available databases of MIA reports. 
Name Agency Time covered # reported accidents Area covered by data 
EM-DAT CRED 1900 to present > 19,000 Worldwide 
MARS MAHB 1980 to present 743 EU and OECD countries 
FACTS TNO Late 1970s to present 24,100 Worldwide 
MHIDAS HSE 1964 to present 11,000 Worldwide 
ARIA MEESDS 1992 to present 37,000 France/Worldwide 
ERNS USEPA 1987 to present 275,000 USA 
APELL UNEP 1970 to present not available Worldwide 
RISCAD AIST & JST 1949 – 2006 4796 Japan 
RMP USEPA 1990 to present > 15,5000 USA 
IRIS NRC 1990 to present > 605,000 USA 
AIS SAWS 2000 to present 20,000 China 
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) with the collaboration of 
WHO created in 1980 the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), intended to compile, 
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validate and analyze information on major natural and technological disasters reported 
worldwide [URL1.2]. More than 19,000 reported events are compiled since 1900 to present 
(June, 2011) (see Figure 1.1). The most used and recommended (in European legislation) 
database EU-wide is the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) database [URL1.13], 
created in 1984 to be used within the framework of the SEVESO Directives of the European 
Commission (EC) and managed by the EU’s Major Accident Hazard Bureau (MAHB). Major 
accidents, near-events (near misses) and other events (incidents), occurred in EU and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, are the main 
types of events reported in MARS database [Rasmussen, 1996]. A total of 743 reported events 
are currently listed in MARS (until June 2011), referring to 660 major accidents, 8 near misses 
and 75 other events. Other extensively used European databases are the Dutch Failure and 
ACcidents Technical information System (FACTS) database [URL1.14] from the Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the British HSE Major Hazard Incident 
Data Service (MHIDAS) database [HSE, 2006] or the French Analyse, Recherche et Information 
sur les Accidents (ARIA) database [URL1.15] from the French Ministry of Ecology, Energy, 
Sustainable Development and the Sea (MEESDS).  
One of the most used databases in the United States of America (USA) is the Risk 
Management Plans (RMP) database [URL1.16], developed by the United States of America 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), comprising more than 15,500 accident events 
(until June, 2011) in American industrial activities. Other American databases are the United 
States Incident Reporting Information System (IRIS), [URL1.17] developed by the National 
Response Centre (NRC) and the Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS) [USEPA, 
1989], which results from a cooperative effort among USEPA Headquarters, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), National Transportation Systems Center (NTSC), the ten EPA Regions, 
the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the National Response Center (NRC). Both IRIS 
and ERNS databases compile information concerning both major and minor abnormal events 
at industrial activity involving the release of hazmat. 
 In the Asian context, both Japan and China also developed industrial accidents reporting 
databases systems. The Japanese Relational Information System for Chemical Accidents 
Database (RISCAD) [URL1.18] is maintained by the Japanese National Institute of Advanced 
Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) 
and includes data on accidents caused by explosives, high pressure gas, chemical substances 
and chemical plants [He et al., 2011]. Additionally, the Accident Inquiry System (AIS) database 
was developed and managed by the Chinese State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) and 
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the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). It is one of the official Chinese abnormal 
events reporting systems for all types of work safety accidents in China [Hou and Zhang, 
2009], compiling information regarding around 20,000 reported accidents since July 2000 [He 
et al., 2011]. Other Chinese industrial accident reporting systems include the Chemical 
Accident Case database (CAC) of the China Chemical Safety Association (CCSA) affiliated to 
SAWS and the Daily Accident Information (DAI) of the National Registration Centre for 
Chemicals (NRCC) affiliated to SAWS [He et al., 2011]. 
Apart the differences of objectives or coverage (types of events, area and period of time), 
available databases make possible historical statistical and trend analyses, providing valuable 
information for the understanding of  the various steps that can and/or need to be accounted 
in environmental and risk/safety assessment studies [Nivolianitou et al., 2006]. As a result, 
they have also supported, over the last decades, the development of new policy and decision 
making instruments adopted at national and international levels [Vílchez et al., 1995; Zhang et 
al., 2008]. Worldwide regulatory, analysts and research prone communities have been 
investigating the events compiled data in order to identify common trends of accidents 
precursors (i.e. causes of the event), typical casualties, as well as estimated risks and 
consequences. For instance, CRED continues to update EM-DAT database and examine 
worldwide major technological disasters trends based on reported data concerning the 
number of events and people killed and affected, generating information such as presented in 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.11. 
Examining Figure 1.11 it is possible to observe a slender increase of the number of reported 
accidents since the 1930s; with a marked raise between 1970s and 2000s, followed by a strong 
inversion until 2010. Such variation clearly reflects the intense industrial development 
occurred during the second half of the 20th century. A noticeable resemblance between the 
number of reported event and number of people reported killed is visible along the analyzed 
period. Nevertheless, the estimated total number of reported people affected shows some 
deviations from overall behaviour, in particular in 1957, or even between 1970 and 1995. The 
‘isolated peak’ of the number of affected people in 1957 results mainly from the accidents 
occurred at the Mayak Nuclear Power Plant (Russia) and at the Windscale Nuclear Power 
Plant (U.K.) (listed in Table 1.1) [URL1.2]. Moreover, a marked increase of the total number of 
people reported affected is observed in 1970s-1980s, mainly due to various MIA, such as the 
ones happened in Seveso (1976) and Bhopal (1984); and a significant decline observed during 
the period 1980-1990. This variation reflects the enhancement of safety and control measures 
in industrial activity. Still, between 1995 and 2009 all three trend lines show a similar tendency 
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(shape) of augment until the year of 2000, followed by a significant decrease trend. Detailed 
graphical representations of reported fatalities and affected people by MIA are presented in 
Figure A.1 (Appendix A). 
 
Figure 1.11 – EM-DAT reported technological accidents summary for the period 1900-2010 [URL1.2]. 
Sonnemans et al. [2003] investigated 17 accidents that occurred in the Dutch petrochemical 
industry sector and demonstrated qualitatively that if accident precursor (failure) information 
had been recorded, with proper measures to control future occurrences such accidents could 
have been foreseen and possibly prevented. In another study, Sonnemans and Korvers [2006] 
observed that even after recognizing accident precursors and disruptions, the operating 
systems inside companies often fail to prevent accidents. Uth [1996] and Uth and Wiese [2004] 
evaluated general main features and lessons learnt from the major accident and near miss 
events in Germany between 1993 and 1996. The results underlined the importance of 
maintenance, detailed knowledge of chemical properties, human factor issues and the role of 
safety organization. Elliott et al. [2004] analyzed the frequency and severity of accidents 
reported in the RMP database with respect to socio-economic factors and concluded that 
larger hazardous chemical companies are located in countries with larger African-American 
populations and with both higher median incomes and higher levels of income inequality. 
Accident trends evaluation studies made by the EEA [2003] showed that between 1971 and 
1992 there was, on average, one technological accident every year in Europe with a total 
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number of 25 or more reported fatalities. Even so, these accidents claimed only a fraction of 
the lives lost compared to natural hazardous events (approximately 5% of the total in the 
period 1985–96 in Europe) [EEA, 2003]. More recently, EEA [2010] analyzed and mapped 
MARS database reported MIA and related impacts (in particular fatalities) during the period 
1996-2009. Figure 1.12 shows the reported and analyzed MIAs (light blue) and related 
fatalities (dark blue) between 1996 and 2009 EU-wide. Given the lack of reported information 
in 1996 and 1997, MIA fatalities were only analyzed between 1998 and 1997. 
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Figure 1.12 – MIA (light blue) between 1996 and 2009 and related fatalities (dark blue) between 1998 
and 2009 reported in MARS database [EEA, 2010; URL1.11]. 
Between 1996 and 2009, a total of 389 events were reported (12 oil spills, 370 major accidents 
and 7 toxic liquid spills) in the MARS database [URL1.13]. After having increased steadily 
until 1996 [EEA, 2003] the annual number of industrial accidents has been more or less stable 
since then (around 28 major accidents per year). Although the number of serious accidents has 
remained more or less constant, in general they tend to be less severe following the decreasing 
behaviour of overall technological accidents worldwide previously presented in Figure 1.11. A 
detailed analysis of reported data based on Figure 1.12 shows that the highest number of 
events were reported in 2002 (39 events), in contrast with 2009 (7 events). The nature of these 
incidents varies from major spills, to partial or total destruction of an industrial plant with 
serious environmental implications and human cost [EEA, 2010]. A continuous decline is 
observed after 2006 reaching the minimum number reported in 2009. Such behaviour may be 
the result of the implementation of more recent safety and regulatory requirements in 
European countries. Nevertheless, the analysis of the total number of MIAs is not 
straightforward, due to the continuous increasing population of covered establishments, the 2 
EU enlargements during this period (2004 and 2007), but also the permanent enforcement and 
implementation of safety and regulatory requirements EU-wide. 
Concerning the total number of reported fatalities caused by MIA (in MARS database) no 
obvious trend is observed between1998 and 2009, as well as, there is not a direct correlation 
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with the total number of MIA. For instance, 2001, 2004 and 2009 show the highest number of 
reported fatalities, despite the reduced number of reported MIA. Nonetheless, the high 
number of fatalities in 2001 and 2009 is mostly related to Toulouse (2001) and Viareggio (2009) 
incidents. In 2002, even with the peak number of reported MIAs (39), the number of fatalities 
is small. EEA [2010] also verified that, between 2003 and 2009, a total of 27 industrial accidents 
in Europe with human casualties were reported in MARS database, in addition to 34 accidents 
that resulted in injuries to people [EEA, 2010]. Most of the victims were workers of chemical 
plants. In contrast, in the same period there were only 22 incidents with impacts on the 
environment. 
From another perspective, Nivolianitou et al. [2006] analyzed the various types of industrial 
activities involved in MIA reported in MARS during the period between 1985 and 2002. In 
general the authors concluded that release of hazmat was the most observed type of accident, 
followed by fires and explosions. Moreover, petrochemical industry was one of the most 
affected industrial fields, with a percentage of 17% of the total reported events (see Figure 
1.13), with the exception of general chemical industrial activities covering around 32%.  
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Figure 1.13 – Percentage of MIA reported in MARS database per type of industry in the period 1985-
2003 [Nivolianitou et al., 2006]. 
Nivolianitou et al. [2006] also determined that in most cases, Liquefied Pressurized Gas (LPG) 
and petroleum related substances were the most involved hazmat in reported MIA, followed 
by Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), heavy hydrocarbons, hydrogen and ethylene. Moreover, the 
same authors concluded that the human factor (in 40% of the cases) and the equipment (in 
44% of the cases) are the main causes of MIA in the petrochemical industry, similarly to the 
previous (global) analysis of Rasmussen [1996] (see Figure 1.14). Earlier, Rasmussen [1996] 
verified that mechanical failures (44%) and operator errors (22%) were the most common 
immediate causes of the accidents reported in MARS database between 1984 and 1993, as 
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shown in Figure 1.14. However, in the same study the author stated that the dominant 
underlying causes identified were poor safety and environmental management.  
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Figure 1.14 – Causes of major accidents in the process industries [Rasmussen, 1996]. 
The age of process plants is also a relevant factor of risk for the occurrence of major accidents 
as the probability of ‘wear-out’ failure increases with age [M&M Protection Consultants 1997]. 
Other relevant research findings on safety revealed that human factor plays a fundamental 
role in an organisation’s safety performance [Hughes and Kornowa-Weichel, 2004]. 
Nivolianitou et al. [2004] concluded that human factor is considered to contribute by over 80% 
to accidents occurring due to the high reliability of electronic and mechanical components and 
the new role of human operators in complex systems. Employees can be considered the last 
barrier against risks, and their behaviour is critical for avoiding both material and personal 
losses [Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996]. However, unsafe worker behaviour is frequently the 
result of latent failures in the organisation and its management system that predispose 
workers to act unsafely [Sonnemans and Körvers, 2006]. Such ‘defects’ or unsafe actions 
include, particularly, the lack of instructions or appropriate training [Attwood et al., 2006], 
demotivation [Kletz, 1993], lack of work procedures, poor design of tasks, lack of control, low 
management commitment to safety [Rundmo, 1996], and, in short, inadequate safety measures 
and management systems [Hofmann, et al., 1995; Kwon, 2006]. More recently, Jacobsson et al. 
[2010] analyzed the main causes of updated MARS reported MIA and concluded that for 67 % 
of the reported events, the dominant underlying causes were poor safety and environmental 
management. This means that both mechanical failures and operator errors can likely be due 
to some kind of management failure, which is thus the underlying cause. 
The intense industrial development observed during the last decades also generated a 
significant increase of transportation flows of hazmat through roads, railways, rivers, seas and 
pipelines. Unlike fixed plants, hazmat transport is less controllable because it is not set in a 
‘rigid’ location, but in a dynamic scenario influenced by numerous factors. Considering that 
transportation of hazmat creates numerous opportunities for the occurrence of accidental 
releases due to traffic accidents, train derailments, shipwreck at sea, equipment failures and 
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human errors, among other causes, is important also to investigate past accidents in the 
hazmat transportation sector. A large number of serious transport-related accidents have been 
reported over the last years, with particular incidence in road (e.g. cistern trucks), railways 
(train wagons), but also in pipeline systems. Bernatik et al. [2008] analyzed historical data 
concerning hazmat transportation incidents reported in USA by transportation mode during 
the period of time between 1997 and 2006. Pipelines are generally considered as the safest way 
to transport hazardous substances [Mitchison, 1999]; yet this mode of transportation has the 
potential for creating major-accident hazards and reported accidents over the last decades 
[Kishawy and Gabbar, 2010]. One of the worst accidents occurred in Apawor (Nigeria) in 1998 
where a blast from a leaking petrol pipeline killed 701 persons [URL1.10]. Concerning railway 
transportation modes, in addition to the previously described Viareggio, Italy (2009), another 
recent reported event with a high number of fatalities is the train accident occurred in 
Ghislenghien, Belgium, in 2004 [EEA, 2010]. 
Accidents involving hazmat are also reported in sea ports every year [Ronza, 2007]. According 
to Darbra and Casal [2004], hazmat gas releases are the most common type of accident in sea 
ports, followed by fires, explosions and gas clouds, similarly to petrochemical industry trends. 
In the same study Darbra and Casal [2004] showed that, from a total of 471 accidents inside 
ports areas, 83% during the last 20 years and 59% in the past decade. An increasing trend 
regarding the frequency of occurrence in port activity and sea transport of hazmat has been 
observed over the last decades, as analyzed by Ronza [2007].  
With similar importance is the investigation of MIA involving ‘domino’ effects, i.e. accidents 
where a release of hazmat in a process unit becomes the trigger and will damage one or more 
other process units, causing a chain of additional accident events [Darbra et al., 2010]. Domino 
accidents may start from an initial incident, with fires being the most frequent cause in 
industrial installations, followed by explosions and gas clouds [Darbra et al., 2010]. Several 
authors have analyzed relevant aspects involved in domino accidents, in particular their 
frequency, likelihood and consequences [e.g. Bagster and Pitblado, 1991; Khan and Abbasi, 
1999a, 2001; Kourniotis et al., 2000; Cozzani and Salzano, 2006; Darbra et al., 2010; 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011]. For instance, Kourniotis et al. [2000] statistically analyzed a set 
of chemical accidents showing different characteristic patterns in terms of fatalities caused and 
domino effects likelihood depending on the type of substances involved. More recently, 
Darbra et al. [2010] and Abdolhamidzadeh et al. [2011] analyzed the main features and causes 
of domino accidents sequences in terms of types of industries and substances of past recent 
events. The analysis showed that the most frequent causes of domino accidents in 
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process/storage plants and in the transportation of hazmat are external events and mechanical 
failure. Storage areas and process establishments are by far the most commons settings for 
domino accidents. Moreover, flammable materials were involved in the majority of accidents 
involving explosions and fires. 
In addition to the statistical investigation of ‘typical’ historical events, it is vital to examine 
spatial distribution of such events at regional, national or international level. Among other 
studies, the EEA [2010] analyzed the spatial distribution of reported technological events, by 
type occurred during the period between 1998 and 2009. Figure 1.15 shows the spatial 
distribution and type of accidents reported EU-wide between 1998 and 2009.  
 
Figure 1.15 –MIA in Europe reported between 1998 and 2009 in MARS database [EEA, 2010]. 
The distribution of disasters caused by technological accidents is not uniform in the various 
EU member states. As expected, most of MIAs are concentrated in the countries with the 
highest number of hazardous industrial activities and it is possible to verify that France and 
Germany reported by far the highest number of accidents, followed by the U.K. and the 
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Netherlands [EEA, 2010]. Two major technological accidents were reported in Portugal 
between 1998 and 2009. On 24th October 1998, a crude oil spill followed by ignition in the 
beach of Aterro, close to the ocean terminal of the petrochemical refinery at the Port of Leixões 
(Porto), caused one fatality and several injuries, but also water contamination [URL1.13]. Also, 
on 13th August 2001, an explosion followed by fire in a firework storage facility located in 
Guimarães killed 6 persons and injured 1, seriously damaging the industrial infrastructures 
[EEA, 2010].  
MIA events raised public awareness about the potential effects of technology [Willey et al., 
2005] and their impacts and consequences on- and off-site human health and environment, 
highlighting the need to develop regulatory and safety strategies to prevent and control 
accidents, but also, to reduce their consequences [Cozzani et al., 2006]. This increasing 
emphasis on industrial activity safety over the last decades also led to the development and 
implementation of powerful RA procedures [e.g. Fang et al., 2004; Reniers et al., 2005] and 
regulatory instruments, each time more supported by computational tools [Dechy et al., 2009], 
particularly at European level. 
1.2 European regulatory instruments on industrial accidents 
Apart from their serious impacts, MIA can also contribute to beneficial transformations on 
safety and regulatory instruments [Dechy et al., 2009]. Recognising that accidents do happen, 
regulatory authorities and industrial operators long have assumed that regulations play an 
important role in controlling risks. Thus, aiming to control and prevent MIA hazards and 
related consequences, regulatory and guidance documents/instruments have been prepared 
and adopted over the last decades worldwide. The history of safety and prevention regulation 
of MIA involving hazmat can be traced back to the beginnings of industrial revolution. One of 
the first regulatory documents was a French decree published in 1810, focusing activities with 
major risks, after the occurrence of a major dust explosion in 1795 at Grenelle (France), where 
around 1,000 people were killed [Vierendeels et al., 2011]. Since then, other European countries 
prepared and adopted their own MIA regulations and control instruments at national and 
international levels, most of them regretfully stirred by severe MIA. Nonetheless, main issues 
on prevention of consequences to human health and environment were integrated in 
disaggregated and widespread coverage documents, until the beginnings of the 1980s, when a 
series of Directives (the so-called Seveso Directives) were adopted EU-wide. Since then, this 
series of Directives became the main European regulatory instruments on prevention of major 
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accidents involving hazmat and limitation of their consequences for people and the 
environment. 
1.2.1 The ‘Seveso Directives Regime’ 
The severe MIA occurred in Flixborough and Seveso, among others, led to long discussions 
EU-wide (particularly at EC and European Parliament) and awareness for the need of 
(inter)national action because of the ‘dread, nature and uncontrollability of the hazards’ at 
stake [Arcuri, 2005]. The revision was also motivated because most of the ‘best policies’, 
accounting to protection of people and the environment, were in general disaggregated in 
various Directives and Regulations in different areas of action at both national and EU level. 
Consequently, since 1982 a set of new regulatory instruments regarding prevention and 
control of accidents involving hazmat have been adopted and continuously upgraded, in 
particular the often named ‘Seveso Directives Regime’, by virtue of the publication of a series of 
Directives and related Amendments following the Seveso MIA. Additional international 
regulatory instruments (Conventions and Regulations) have been adopted to assure a broad 
protection to human health and the environment from MIA and hazmat handle. Figure 1.16 
schematizes the chronological evolution of most important EU regulatory instruments 
adopted over the last decades in this field and relevant MIA that emphasized the need to 
revise and adopt or upgrade the contemporary legislation. 
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Figure 1.16 – Scheme of chronological evolution of EU regulation and relevant MIA EU-wide. 
The first European Directive directly treating MIA involving hazmat was the Directive 
82/501/EEC, often called ‘Seveso I Directive’, published in 1982. The preparation of this 
document was a response of the increased awareness of consequences from severe MIA EU-
wide (see Figure 1.16 and Table 1.1). The mere fact that the Directive was named after one of 
them reflects the magnitude of MIA as an influential parameter for changing legislation and 
regulatory instruments. 
The Seveso I Directive was mainly focused on the prevention and control of MIA which might 
result from certain industrial activities and the limitation of their consequences for man and 
the environment. The aim was the reduction of the source and incidence of technological risks 
by analyzing the causes, inspecting the establishments and creating an accident prevention 
system, assuring internal and external safety to industrial installations. The document also 
integrated a list of covered particular operators and storage facilities EU-wide supplemented 
by a list of 180 dangerous substances (Annexes I and II of Directive 82/501/EEC). 
A key aspect of this Directive was the mandatory provision, by industrial operators, of 
information on safety measures and on the correct behaviour to adopt, in case of the 
occurrence of a MIA. Additionally, transfer of safety and reporting responsibilities to 
operators, instead of the traditional ‘role of authorities’ was a relevant initiative. For instance, 
operators must take all the measures necessary to prevent MIA, to limit their consequences for 
persons and the environment and report, in a transparent way, relevant information on 
industrial activity and eventual ‘abnormal events’. Even with the large coverage range, Wettig 
and Porter [1999] argued that this Directive’s main scope was more focused on the protection 
of persons that on the protection of the environment. 
In the light of the MIA occurred in Bhopal (1984) and Basel (1986), the original Directive was 
amended twice by the Directive 87/216/EEC in 1987, and by the Directive 88/610/EEC in 
1988. Both amendments extended the range of covered installations (including storage of 
hazmat) and substances, to broadening the scope of the Directive. Also the improvement of 
public information requirements and reporting systems and safety instruments aiming to 
increase transparency of safety measures were focused in the amendments. 
Driven by major revisions performed following the resolutions of the fourth (1987) and fifth 
(1993) European Action Programmes on the Environment, further refinement of the original 
Directive was deemed necessary to expand the area of application and to enhance setting up 
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improved safety management systems within industrial activities [Wettig et al., 1999]. The 
revision of the original Directive showed that major modifications should be made and an 
entirely new Directive adopted instead of preparing a third hypothetical amendment [Wettig 
and Porter, 1999]. The explanatory memorandum of the EC COM(94)4 also mentioned that an 
analysis of the 130 major accidents reported between 1982 and 1994 showed that about 95 % 
could have been prevented by the application of existing knowledge and proper management 
and operational procedures [Walker, 1995]. Furthermore, changes in the EU system of 
classification of dangerous substances to which the Directive refers, among other issues and 
limitation/gaps, emphasized the need for the adoption of an entirely new Directive in 1996 – 
Directive 96/82/EC also called ‘Seveso II Directive’. This Directive was adopted by the Council 
of the European Union on 9 December 1996 and the Member States had until February 1999 to 
turn the obligations of the Directive mandatory for industry and public authorities responsible 
for its implementation and enforcement.  
The main scope of Seveso II Directive has been broadened and simplified at the same time, 
covering both, industrial ‘activities’ and storage of hazmat. Instead of the previous ‘static list 
of operators, depending on the level of potential hazards (quantities of hazardous substances) 
a ‘two-tier establishments regime’ (i.e. a two levels of risk coverage regime of industrial 
establishments – upper- and lower-tier establishments) is defined. It also covers 
establishments, defined as ‘the whole area under the control of an operator where hazmat are 
present in one or more installations, including common or related infrastructures or activities’, 
without the need to define the term industrial activity. At the same time, the list of hazardous 
substances was also reduced to around 50 substances, referring additional related Regulations. 
New duties for both industry and administrative bodies/authorities comprise the preparation 
of internal and external emergency plans and the evaluation of possible accident effects 
including potential domino effects among other requirements. In addition, the 
implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) is also mandatory, to assure the use of 
suitable measures to control the foreseeable hazards, and these are properly managed and 
continuously upgraded so as to be effective at all times. The most practical outcome of SMS 
outputs is the explanation of accidental scenarios (covering both most plausible and worst-
case) and prevention/control measures taken by industry and authorities. 
A new series of MIA (Baia Mare, Enschede and Toulouse) allied with studies on carcinogens 
and substances dangerous for the environment and with changes in the EU system of 
classification of hazmat to which the Directive refers highlighted the need to review the 
Seveso II Directive. Hence, this Directive was amended in 2003 by the Directive 2003/105/EC. 
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Risks arising from storage and processing activities in mining, from pyrotechnic and explosive 
substances and from the storage of fertilizers are now included. Other minor changes taking 
into account the changes of the hazmat classification and the introduction of new technologies 
and industrial activities were also performed. 
Due to modifications of the EU system of classification of dangerous substances to which the 
Directive refers (see subsection 1.2.3), a ‘two phases’ review study of currently implemented 
Seveso II Directive started in 2008 by EC [URL1.19]. The main objective of this study is to 
assess its effectiveness and identify possible improvements [COM(2010)781-SEC(2010)1590]. 
The study was also extended to a wider revision of the Directive because its basic structure 
and main requirements have remained essentially unchanged since its adoption. The first 
phase of the review ('Study of the Effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive'), conducted in 2008 
and known as the 'F-Seveso' study showed that no real need for significant legislative change 
is required, despite some identified inconsistent implementations of the Directive at national 
and regional EU-level [COM(2010)781-SEC(2010)1590]. The second phase of the study started 
in 2009 and was launched to examine the effectiveness of the main requirements imposed on 
public authorities. Among others, the main conclusions emerging from the second study are: 
no fundamental changes to the Directive are necessary; the existing approach should be 
maintained; but, there is a need to clarify/update some provisions. Additionally, 
improvements can be made to the implementation and enforceability of the Directive, but any 
changes should avoid adding administrative burdens. Overall, the revision study of the 
Directive showed the need of minor changes and on 21 December 2010 the EC adopted a 
proposal for a new (Amendment) Directive that would repeal and replace the current 
Directive, by the 1st June 2015 [URL1.19]. 
1.2.2 Seveso establishments EU-wide 
Within the context of Seveso II Directive around 10,000 establishments (upper- and lower tier 
establishments) are currently covered EU-wide, heterogeneously distributed by member states 
(see Figure 1.17 and Table A.1 in Appendix A). These establishments include a diverse 
number of industrial sectors EU-wide that store, process or handle hazmat, mainly in the 
chemicals, petrochemicals, storage, and metal refining sectors [COM(2010)781-SEC(2010)1591] 
as listed in Table A.2 (Appendix A). Overall, the number of lower tier is in general higher than 
upper-tier establishments, excepting for Austria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Germany, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden as graphically presented in Figure 1.17. As expected, the 
most heavily industrialized countries in Europe (Germany, UK, Italy, France and Spain) have 
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more than 500 sites, corresponding to about 63 % of the total number. Despite the number of 
lower-tier establishments, special attention is usually taken to upper-tier establishments given 
their enhanced hazards and risk to neighbouring and progressively denser urban/populated 
areas. 
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Figure 1.17 – Seveso establishments by EU member state and tier class in 2009 [COM(2010)781-
SEC(2010)1591]. 
For instance, EEA [2010] analysed the distribution of upper-tier establishments per country in 
the last years, which is presented in Figure 1.18. 
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Figure 1.18 – Upper-tier establishments per EU member state: 2002, 2005 and 2009 [2009 
[COM(2010)781-SEC(2010)1591]. 
Figure 1.18 reveals the ‘irregular’ trends of the number of Seveso establishments. While in 
some countries the total number of upper-tier sites increases mainly between 2002 and 2008 
(Belgium or Germany), others decrease regularly (Cyprus, France and Greece). As regards to 
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Portuguese Seveso establishments (mostly chemical facilities), despite the clear increase 
between 2002 and 2008, a slight decrease between 2008 and 2009 is observed. 
Given the number of upper-tier and ‘constant threat/risk’ of occurrence of MIA allied with the 
visible expansion of urban/populated areas gradually closer to industrial establishments, it is 
important to develop and implement regulatory and safety instruments, as well as, risks and 
consequences evaluation methodologies supported by computational modelling instruments. 
1.2.3 Other relevant European regulatory instruments 
In addition to Seveso Directives, broader European Regulations for the protection of human 
health and the environment have also been implemented EU-wide, such as the Commission’s 
Directive 96/61/EC on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive or the 
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 also called REACH (Registration, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals) Directive (2006) and the Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 (2008). In 
spite of their specific objectives, these documents ‘help’ achieving the objectives of Seveso 
Directives by promoting integrated approaches that contribute to a greening of industrial 
establishments so that the impact of any accident would be minimized. 
The IPPC Directive was adopted in 1996 and can be considered one of the most important 
initiatives aiming the ‘protection of the environment as a whole’, based on a common rules 
permitting system to control the environmental impacts (regular emissions into air, water, and 
land, use of raw materials, energy efficiency, and generation of waste) of certain industrial and 
agricultural activities [Emmott and Haigh, 1996]. Permits must contain emission limit values 
based on ‘Best Available Techniques’ (BATs), referring to technologies and ways in which an 
installation is designed, built, maintained and operated that are most advanced and effective 
in preventing or reducing emissions, taking into account economical and technical viability 
and their costs and advantages. It covers mostly large industrial installations, since for the 
majority of sectors there are already established production capacity thresholds, excluding the 
smallest installations [Emmott, 1999]. This Directive has a number of interactions with 
institutions and other Directives covering different fields, including the Seveso II Directive. 
Recently (2007) the EC adopted the Proposal COM(2007)844-2007/0286(COD) for a new 
Directive on industrial emissions. The proposal recasts existing Directives related to industrial 
emissions into a single clear and coherent legislative instrument, in particular the IPPC 
Directive. As a result, the IPPC Directive has been codified in the Directive 2008/1/EC 
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control. The codified act included all the 
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previous amendments to the IPPC Directive and introduced some linguistic changes and 
adaptations. Currently, around 52,000 industrial installations are covered by IPPC Directive 
EU-wide (significantly higher than the currently covered 10,000 ‘Seveso establishments’). 
In regards to harmonized systems of classification, control, labelling and cataloguing guides of 
hazmat to which Seveso II Directive refers, the most important documents are the Regulation 
(EC) No 1907/2006 often called REACH and the Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 also called 
Regulation for ‘Classification, Labelling and Packaging’ (CLP). 
REACH is the EC Regulation on chemicals and their safe use and was adopted in 2006 
entering into force one year later. It deals with the registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemical substances. The main goal of this Regulation is to improve the 
protection of human health and the environment through a better and earlier identification of 
the intrinsic properties of chemical substances. At the same time, it intends improving 
innovation and competitiveness of EU chemicals industry. REACH also calls for the 
progressive substitution of the most dangerous chemicals when suitable alternatives have 
been identified. The Regulation places greater responsibility on industry to manage the risks 
from chemicals and to provide safety information on the substances. Operators are required to 
gather information on the properties of their chemical substances, which will allow their safe 
handling, and to register the information in a central database run by the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA). This Agency acts as the central point in the REACH system: it manages the 
databases necessary to operate the system, co-ordinates the in-depth evaluation of suspicious 
chemicals and is building up a public database in which consumers and professionals can find 
hazard information. 
The CLP Regulation incorporates the chemical substances and mixtures classification criteria 
and labelling and packaging rules agreed at UN level by the so-called Globally Harmonised 
System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS). This Regulation intends protecting 
workers, consumers and the environment by means of labelling what reflects possible 
hazardous effects of a particular chemical. It is expected to facilitate global trade and the 
harmonised communication of hazard information of chemicals, but also, to promote 
regulatory efficiency. It complements REACH, replacing previous Directive 67/548/EEC and 
Directive 1999/45/EC. New classification criteria, hazard symbols (pictograms) and labelling 
phrases are introduced considering the current EU legislation. 
Recognized the importance and urgency of preventing serious adverse effects of MIA on 
human health and the environment also at a broader transboundary (international level), and 
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of promoting all measures to stimulate the rational, economic and efficient use of preventive, 
preparedness and response measures, the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents was prepared in 1992. It was elaborated under the auspices of the United 
Nations/Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) and signed in Helsinki in 1992, 
entering into force in 2000 in most countries. The main objective of the Convention is to 
enhance individual and collective national responsibility and capacity in the prevention and 
control of industrial accidents capable of causing transboundary effects, with a view to 
protecting human life and environmental safety [UN/ECE, 1992]. It also provides measures to 
prevent industrial accidents, preparedness for and response to accidents that can lead to 
transboundary effects, including the impact of accidents caused by natural disasters; 
promoting an international cooperation on mutual assistance, research and development, 
exchange of information and technology to prevent industrial accidents. 
Considering the continuous occurrence of MIA, adopted control and prevention regulatory 
instruments and the number of ‘hazardous’ establishments (gradually closer to 
urban/populated areas), it is essential the development and implementation of risk and 
consequences evaluation methodologies supported by computational modelling tools. 
1.3 Research objectives and structure of the thesis 
This introductory chapter has shown that, even not an everyday phenomenon, technological 
accidents involving the release of hazmat gases are continuously reported worldwide with 
significant impacts on human health and environment. This has lead to an increased public, 
regulatory/safety and scientific awareness of the consequences from exposure to hazmat 
released into the atmosphere and a renewed interest in assessing risks from technological 
accidents occurring in industrial and built-up urban environments. As a result, with the aim of 
supporting regulatory instruments and risk analysis, particularly consequence analysis 
methodologies, several numerical models have been developed and implemented over the last 
decades for the prediction of hazard areas affected by accidental releases of toxic gases. 
Moreover, modelling accidental release is nowadays required in the frame of quantitative risk 
analysis and European regulatory instruments (e.g. EU Seveso Directives), for a variety of 
reasons: analyzing different accident scenarios, preparing emergency response plans and 
optimal countermeasures, but also real-time consequence analysis and emergency response. 
Depending on the demand and main purposes of application, the choice of appropriate 
modelling tools is up to the authorities, industrialists and analysts. Even with the number of 
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available consequence analysis modelling tools/software packages, most comprise either 
simple modelling approaches that can not properly represent the actually occurring real 
conditions in industrial and built-up areas, or complex modelling system that turn the tool 
powerless to provide fast response information, especially in case of emergency response to 
industrial accidents. Thus, a major challenge in applied environmental sciences is the 
development of fast run local-scale modelling tools able to be used in consequence analysis for 
tracking and predicting short-term pollution episodes and effects from exposure to hazmat 
gas released in industrial and neighbouring build-up environments. Endorsed by the 
continuous improvements on computational hardware capacity, the development of new 
numerical tools incorporating state-of-the art modelling techniques is of great importance for 
assessing technological risks and for consequence analysis in industrial and urban areas. 
In this sense, the present thesis intends to contribute to consequence analysis modelling of 
hazmat risks on humans in industrial and build-up areas. The main goals are: 
(i) The development of the EFfects of Released Hazardous gAses (EFRHA) model, an 
integrated consequence analysis computational modelling tool designed to simulate short-
term pollution episodes in case of hazmat gas accidental release into the atmosphere; 
(ii) The evaluation of the EFRHA model suitability to predict concentration fields of hazmat 
gases (heavy and passive) based on the its application to specific and typifying test case 
scenarios and modelling conditions; and 
(iii) The application of the developed model to a demonstrative case study in the scope of 
consequence analysis. 
The EFRHA model is designed to be used in consequence analysis studies, enabling the 
estimation of potential consequences to human health in case of accidental release of hazmat 
gases in industrial and built-up environments, determined in the form of concentration fields 
as a function of time. 
The thesis is organized in six main chapters addressing the theoretical and scientific 
background, development and validation, and finally, application of the developed model and 
main findings.  
Chapter 2 contains the scientific background of quantitative risk analysis, focusing on 
consequence analysis of industrial hazmat gas releases and applied modelling techniques. 
Main features of hazmat gas accidental release and dispersion modelling are presented and 
interpreted in the light of current understanding of hazmat dense and passive gas release and 
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dispersion phenomena. An overview of consequence analysis physical and numerical 
modelling is provided, highlighting the well-known work carried out over the last years to 
numerically describe hazmat gases accidental release and atmospheric dispersion. 
Chapter 3 describes the core structure and mathematical formulation of the developed model. 
The different modules that compose this numerical tool and implemented modelling 
approaches are explained. Hazmat outflow rate (source term) and dispersion simulation are 
key modules for the output concentration field required for the estimation of consequences 
from the exposure to hazmat gas. The model main input and output data are also discussed. 
In chapter 4, the EFRHA model is validated and results interpreted. This evaluation process is 
composed by a set of four independent stages. The first two stages consisted on the 
preliminary individual assessment of EFRHA Meteorology and Source Term Modules 
consistency. The third stage comprised the validation of EFRHA reliability to predict hazmat 
gas dispersion in obstructed areas. Finally, in the last stage EFRHA aptness to simulate heavy 
hazmat gas accidental release and dispersion scenarios is assessed in its entire scope. 
Chapter 5 presents a demonstrative application of the EFRHA model to a case study 
illustrating its reasonability to estimate potential consequences to humans from hazmat gas 
accident scenarios in industrial and built-up areas. The definition of hypothetical accident 
scenarios, as realistic as possible, based on industrial activity and neighbouring built-up 
structure allows discussing the applicability and model’s main outputs quality, as well as, the 
influence of input data for real case accident scenarios. 
Finally, main conclusions and outcomes of the present work are addressed in Chapter 6. 
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2. QUANTITATIVE RISK AND CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS: SCIENTIFIC 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
This chapter presents the scientific background of the thesis main subject: Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA) and Consequence Analysis (CA) modelling of MIA involving hazmat gas release 
into the atmosphere. Up-to-date QRA and CA theoretical and modelling approaches are 
described. Physical and numerical modelling techniques for the description of hazmat gas 
accidental release and atmospheric dispersion main features are addressed, without forgetting 
examples of relevant work conducted over the last years. Finally, main advantages and 
limitations of available CA numerical modelling techniques and tools are discussed 
emphasizing the selections and approaches considered in the present work. 
2.1 Quantitative risk analysis of industrial accidents 
Fear of technological hazards has been present worldwide since the industrial revolution and 
‘responses’ seem to oscillate along the spectrum of prohibition, prevention, precaution, 
foresight and ‘blind euphoria’ followed by a belief in scientific and technological progress 
from the second half of the 20th century onward. This change, deeply influenced by the 
sequence of serious MIAs, introduced major changes on the perception of risks; and therefore, 
new methods and tools (technical and regulatory instruments) have been developed to assess 
risks of MIA [Tixier et al., 2002]. 
As a result, QRA methodologies ‘emerged’ worldwide since the mid-1970s with ever-
increasing importance becoming the ‘scientific pillar’ of regulatory, control and prevention 
instruments, as an important and practical tool of Risk Assessment (RA) studies to map and 
quantify specific risks identified in hazardous industrial and transportation activities [Kolluru, 
et al., 1996; Vose, 2008]. However, given the ambiguity associated to hazard and risk concepts, 
both RA and QRA definitions and methodologies/techniques are also commonly influenced 
by some misunderstanding and controversy [Kirchsteiger, 2002]. 
In ‘professional and engineering sciences’ context, QRA can be defined as the methodology or 
process intended for identifying and assessing the impact, frequency of occurrence and 
magnitude of consequences and effects of the human activities on systems with hazardous 
characteristics, i.e. the various types of risks associated to a given industrial installation [Lees, 
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1996; ICE/ISO, 2009]. Its methodologies are based on engineering evaluation and 
mathematical techniques, combining estimates of incident consequences and frequencies 
(probability of likelihood) to make decisions, either through a relative ranking of risk 
reduction strategies or through comparison with risk targets [CCPS, 2000; Ale, 2009]. When 
applied to ‘hazardous industries’ (e.g. Seveso establishments), QRA is intended to evaluate 
and estimate the risks of a system or its elements and provide authorities with relevant 
information [Pietersen and van het Veld, 1992]. 
Nowadays, the diversity in QRA methodologies and techniques is such that there are many 
appropriate techniques for any circumstance and the choice has become more a matter of taste 
[Reniers et al., 2005; Marhavilas et al., 2011] Notwithstanding the wide variety of 
methodologies developed over the last decades, ‘full QRA methods’ comprise five main steps 
[Vose, 2008], namely: 1 – scope and objectives definition; 2 – hazards identification and 
accident scenarios definition; 3 – frequency and probability estimation; 4 – effects and 
consequences estimation; and finally, 5 – risks estimation. Figure 2.1 schematizes the five main 
steps of ‘full QRA methods’. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Scheme of quantitative risk analysis methodology [based on Mannan, 2005]. 
The first step consists of defining the main scope and objectives of the QRA study. Relevant 
information is collected for an accurate/appropriated characterization of the studied system 
(e.g. hazmat properties, geographical, meteorological and site-specific data). A balance is 
established between the intended scope and objectives with available data and expected 
results (quantified risks). Next (step 2) hazards and related accident scenarios are identified 
based on compiled information. Most frequent or plausible and worst-case scenarios can be 
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defined, according to the characteristics of the studied system and main purposes of the QRA. 
Both steps 1 and 2 are essential for establishing the basis of the QRA study [Tixier et al., 2002]. 
A pure probabilistic approach is considered for the estimation of the frequency and 
probability (likelihood) of occurrence of the identified hazards in step 3, through the 
application of vulnerability and probability models or simply statistical data [Ale, 2009]. 
Despite its relevance to assure a precise and complete QRA study, this step is applied if the 
minimum required information for the estimation of probability and frequency is available. In 
step 4, the magnitude of consequences and effects from the target hazards of accident 
scenarios are quantified through the application of deterministic approach mathematical 
techniques [Mannan, 2005], in accordance with previous steps information. Finally, risks 
(usually refereeing to individual, social or environmental risks) are estimated in step 5, as a 
function of frequency/probability (step 3) and the magnitude of consequences (step 4). 
 QRA main outcomes can be directly analyzed or used in the context of RA studies, to evaluate 
the current situation and introduce (if necessary) relevant modifications or corrective 
actions/measures on the most severe risks identified [see Vose, 2008; Ale, 2009]. 
Albeit the variety of suggested QRA methodologies and related approaches or techniques, 
Kirchsteiger [1999] argued that a valid estimation of risk does not necessarily entails all five 
main steps. Hence, depending on the degree of accuracy and available input data, QRA 
studies can consist on combinations of steps, namely: (i) steps 1 and 2; (ii) steps 1 to 4; (iii) 
steps 1, 2 and 4; or (iv) steps 1 to 5 (‘full QRA study’). Whatever approaches and techniques 
are used, three main elements are always present: (a) the expected output data; (b) the 
available input data; and (c) the selected method. Indeed, analysts usually predefine the 
expected outputs according to the identified hazards; next they collect information related to 
the target system and main purpose of the QRA study, and finally choose the most 
appropriated approaches and techniques. Furthermore, as highlighted in Figure 2.1, CA 
methodologies overlap QRA steps 2 (identification of hazards and accident scenarios) and 4 
(estimation of consequences). 
In general, it is possible to identify two ‘distinct’ approaches as the main basis of QRA 
methodologies: probabilistic and deterministic [Mannan, 2005; Ale, 2009]. These can be 
implemented individually or combined in QRA studies, depending on the main purpose, 
available information and the degree of complexity [Vose, 2008]. Table 2.1 summarizes some 
of the most known and extensively used QRA techniques, as a function of the considered 
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approach methodology, based on Tixier et al., [2002], Casal [2008] and Marhavilas et al. [2011 
reviews.  
Table 2.1 – Examples of QRA techniques as a function of the approach methodology [based on 
Tixier et al., 2002; Casal, 2008]. 
Approach Qualitative techniques Quantitative techniques 
P
R
A
 
- Accident Sequences Precursor (ASP) 
[Holmberg, 1996]; 
- Delphi Technique [Rogers, 2000]; 
- Earthquake safety of structures and 
installations in chemical industries [Jezler, 1998] 
- Defi method [Rogers, 2000]; 
- Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [Gadd et al., 1998; 
Nicolet-Monnier, 1996]; 
- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [Casal, 2008] 
D
T
A
 
- What if? Analysis [Rogers, 2000]; 
- Task Analysis (TA) [Rogers, 2000]; 
- Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) [Kennedy and 
Kirwan, 1998]. 
- Methodology of domino effects analysis 
[Dolladille, 1999]; 
- Methods of potential risk determination and 
evaluation [Jager and Kuhnreich, 1998]; 
- SAATY methodology [Troutt and Elsaid, 
1996] 
P
R
A
 &
 D
T
A
 
- Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) 
[Khan and Abbasi, 1998]; 
- Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [Rogers, 2000]; 
- Safety Culture Hazard and Operability 
(SCHAZOP) [Kennedy and Kirwan, 1998]. 
- Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA [Ale, 
2009]; 
- Facility Risk Review [Schlechter, 1996]; 
- Probabilistic Safety Analysis PSA 
[Papazoglou et al.,1992]; 
- Rapid Ranking RR [Larson and Kusiak, 1996]. 
The Probabilistic Risk Analysis approach (PRA) is a systematic and logical method aimed at 
identifying and assessing risks to people and the environment based on the analysis of 
probability or frequency of hazardous events or on the occurrence of potential accidents 
[Kirchsteiger, 1999], This approach is commonly applied for safety-related hazards in complex 
technological systems, often supported by the use of past accidents databases and probabilistic 
uncertainty methods [e.g. Stamatelatos et al., 2002; Muhlbauer, 2004; Baklanov and Mahura, 
2004]. 
On the other hand, the Deterministic Risk Analysis approach, also called Deterministic Test Case 
approach (DTA) was developed to estimate immediate and conditional short-term potential 
for consequences and damages of the identified accident scenario hazards through the 
definition of plausible (maximum credible) and/or worst-case scenarios [Sorensen et al., 2010; 
Díaz-Ovalle et al., 2010]. DTA can be considered the most straightforward approach taking 
into account hazmat properties, equipment and quantification of the consequences on people, 
the environment or equipment structures. Moreover, worst- and most credible/plausible case 
scenarios can be analysed without the need to estimate the probability of occurrence [Ale, 
2009; Tavares, et al., 2010]. 
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Although PRA and DTA main principles and techniques are distinct, QRA methodologies can 
comprise combinations of techniques from both approaches [see Vose, 2008; Marhavillas et al., 
2011]). This integration enables conducting a more accurate and realistic estimation of 
resulting risks. On the risk estimation frontier, Kirchsteiger [1999] discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of various PRA and DTA approaches and techniques using past-events examples 
from nuclear and chemical activities. The author argues that PRA approaches are more 
complex and cost-effective encompassing data usually not readily available to satisfy the 
needs for its application, still, results that can be easier to communicate to decision and policy 
makers are obtained. Nonetheless, it is also stressed the relevance of DTA approaches for 
fewer complex and more rapid analysis (e.g. prediction of consequences and fast information 
transfer to emergency first responders). Legget [2004], supported by the Wald’s maximin 
paradigm2 [Wald, 1945], considers that a better assessment for chemical facilities safety should 
be based on a DTA approach. This approach enables the use of the wisdom of hindsight 
(experiences of past accidents) and up-to-date knowledge (to evaluate its impact) in 
forecasting accident situations. DTA approach can also be considered a relevant reference 
point and link between the past, present, and future accident scenarios investigated with QRA 
methodologies [Khan and Abbasi, 1995]. Moreover, based on the analysis of 62 suggested 
QRA techniques, Tixier et al. [2002] concluded that the majority is deterministic because 
historically, operators and public organisations have initially tried to quantify damages and 
consequences of potential accidents before to understand why and how they could occur, i.e. 
the frequency and probability of occurrence. Regardless of related advantages and 
shortcomings, neither one of them (separately) is sufficient for a ‘full QRA study’. 
Independently of the applied approach, qualitative and quantitative techniques (see Table 
2.1), with varying complexity, have also been developed and integrated in QRA 
methodologies, to estimate the magnitude of risks of examined accident scenarios [Marhavilas 
et al., 2011]. 
Qualitative techniques are mainly based on the definition and use of subjective criteria to 
establish a scale of evaluation parameter categories; focusing on compilation and analysis of 
relevant data, identification of hazards and risks, selection of accident scenarios and 
classification of potential consequences [Andrews and Moss 1993]. Typically, they include the 
simplest and subjective procedures based on past field and technical experience [Mannan, 
                                                          
2
Wald’s maximum model of uncertainty was proposed by Wald [1945]. It is a non-probabilistic decision-making 
approach ranked on the basis of worst-case outcomes. It is frequently used for the definition of worst-case 
scenarios in Risk Assessment studies. 
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2005]. These techniques are widely appreciated by stakeholders and regulation prone 
communities, because they are generally easy to perform, following previous applications or 
examples, especially where possible deficiencies are highlighted. However, the lack of 
reproducibility, less accuracy, dependency on previous experience and used terminology can 
be a barrier to communication (e.g. probable, unlikely or extremely unlikely) and turns this 
techniques more vulnerable to criticism than quantitative methods. 
On the other hand, quantitative techniques are used to quantify risks as a function of 
frequencies and consequences. These techniques comprise different models including 
vulnerability models, consequence models, and effects models [Casal, 2008]. Regularly a full 
QRA study requires the use of the various quantitative technique models along the various 
steps. Despite the notable accuracy and reliability to quantify risks and related frequencies of 
occurrence and consequences, the characteristics of the various types and natures of models 
makes these techniques substantially more complex than ‘simple’ qualitative techniques, due 
to the level of expertise/experience and amount of information required. It is possible to 
mention that both QRA and CA methodologies can comprise qualitative and quantitative 
techniques, independently of the applied approach (DTA, PRA or a combination of both) 
[Marhavilas et al., 2011]. Despite the accuracy and precision of a full QRA, the usual lack of 
information, enforces the use of less complex, but still, suitable methodologies to assess 
consequences and impacts of identified accident scenarios, like the well-established CA 
methodologies. 
2.2 Consequence analysis of industrial accidents 
In general, CA methodologies include sets of techniques enabling the estimation of likely 
physical consequences and their quantification, in the form of damage to human health, 
property, natural resources or toxic effects, from the defined accident scenario [Casal, 2008]. 
Since the mid-1980s, a wide variety of both quantitative and qualitative techniques have been 
developed and applied in CA methodologies, following either individual ‘pure’ or combined 
DTA and PRA approaches [Mannan, 2005]. In any case, CA methodologies need at least a 
DTA approach technique for the estimation of effects and consequences from examined 
accident scenarios. Thus, to estimate consequences, CA generally comprises the set of four 
stages schematized in Figure 2.2, namely: (i) Accident scenario definition, (ii) Source term 
characterization, (iii) Atmospheric dispersion modelling, and finally, (iv) Physical effects and 
consequences estimation. 
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Figure 2.2 – Scheme of consequence analysis methodology [based on CCPS, 1999]. 
As in QRA, CA studies start with the identification of hazards from initially defined accident 
scenarios. In view of analyzing accidents involving the release of hazmat gases, potential 
scenarios include various types of failures, like catastrophic crash of pressurized vessels, small 
punctures in vessel wall or full bore ruptured pipelines, among other type of malfunctions. To 
address the characterization of accident scenarios, analysts often consider two main types of 
potential scenarios [Casal, 2008], namely: 
- Type 1 – hazardous situations that may lead to frequent releases of limited hazmat 
amounts (e.g. controlled depressurization releases) often-called maximum credible 
scenarios;  
- Type 2 – sudden catastrophic releases, also known as worst-case accident scenarios.  
Whereas Type 1 accident scenarios often comprise regular or long duration slam safety relief 
losses frequently considered in PRA approaches; Type 2 enables assessing the maximum 
potential hazards of accidents in industrial facilities or equipments, i.e. the worst possible 
accident scenarios (e.g. total crash of a vessel), examined in both PRA and DTA approaches. 
Next, accidental release (hereinafter called source term) is quantitatively described in stage 2 
by estimating the hazmat gas outflow parameters (e.g. outflow rate, pressure or temperature). 
Long has been recognised that source term characterization is not a straightforward process, 
deeply depending on several conditions, such as, type of accident, chemical properties and 
containment (storage or transportation). As a result, various techniques/models have been 
developed over the last decades, enabling the description of hazmat gas behaviour during the 
release process. The most common accident scenarios involve the release and spread of gases 
or liquids handled in industrial facilities. 
Stage 3 comprises CA models specifically developed to describe how the hazmat gas is 
transported downwind and dispersed in the atmosphere. Generally, this stage is considered 
the central component of CA studies [CCPS, 1999; Mannan, 2005]. Different models can be 
applied to accurately predict hazmat gas dispersion depending on the source term accident-
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specific behaviour, the hazmat chemical properties and resulting behaviour during the 
dispersion. 
Finally, consequences are estimated in stage 4, in the form of quantified effects and damages, 
as a function of the affected area and distance, as well as, estimated concentration levels. The 
dispersion-specific average concentration results are converted into effects on people (injury 
or death) and environment through their direct comparison with reference exposure limit 
thresholds depending on the object and purpose of the study. Fires and explosion can also be 
taken into account in case of flammable hazmat gases [Mannan, 2005]. Moreover, damages 
may occur as an immediate and direct consequence of the accident, or during the dispersion of 
the resulting hazmat gas cloud (e.g. ignition and explosion of flammable hazmat gas cloud). 
Notwithstanding the relevance of fire and explosion phenomena, the present thesis will only 
focus on the consequences from the exposure to the dispersed hazmat gas cloud (i.e. any kind 
of ignition source and related consequences will not be treated in the present work). 
Overall, the provision of recognizable measures of consequences, used for the estimation of 
risks in QRA step 5, depends mainly in the accuracy of the description of: (i) hazmat gas 
release (i.e. source term component), and (ii) hazmat gas cloud atmospheric dispersion. CA 
modelling results are often presented in the form of risk contour maps and/or number of 
people potentially affected. In an attempt to simplify analysis’s efforts, major developments on 
CA modelling have been taken and a wide variety and number of computational modelling 
tools are being implemented in both QRA and CA methodologies. 
2.3 Consequence analysis modelling 
The need to understand and numerically describe the various stages of accident scenarios 
involving the release and dispersion of hazmat gases, gave numerical tools a unique value in 
QRA methodologies and large efforts have been taken in the development and 
implementation of new and more accurate modelling techniques, assuring a proper 
quantification of consequences [Casal, 2008]. In fact, it has long be recognized that numerical 
models can provide valuable information to control and emergency responders to plan, guide 
and respond adequately in case of accident, also at the very local scale where the risks and 
threats are potentially high. Nonetheless, the continuous increase in computing power also 
endorses the development and use of more advanced models, especially, in the context of 
local- and neighbourhood-scale hazmat gas releases. Moreover, despite of extensive and well 
studied passive gas dispersion phenomena, the typical denser-than-air gas, i.e. with a higher 
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density than ambient air (hereinafter called ‘dense gas’) behaviour, observed in the majority of 
hazmat gases handled in industrial facilities disables the use of ‘traditional’ air quality models 
[Casal, 2008] enforcing the development of adequate computational tools. 
In view of the various stages of CA methodologies, it is possible to consider three main types 
of numerical modelling elements [CCPS, 1999]: (ii) source term, (ii) atmospheric dispersion, 
and (iii) consequences and effects models. The set of elements is, in general, complemented by 
external models, such as meteorological models, often not considered as ‘truly’ CA modelling 
elements, but crucial to assure the accuracy of CA studies. In the literature there are general 
guidelines for the application of the various CA numerical modelling elements [e.g. CCPS, 
1999; Fingas, 2002; Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005a,b,c; Casal, 2008]. 
2.3.1 Source term modelling 
Under normal operating conditions, release behaviour of most hazmat gas occurs in a 
‘controlled fashion’ [Mills and Paine, 1990]. With the exception of fugitive emissions (e.g. wind 
blown dust from a pile), the source term rates are usually described as ‘regular steady-state 
emissions’ correlated with process parameters and then somewhat easy to estimate. 
Conversely, accidental release of hazmat clouds tend to exhibit rapid time variations of the 
emission rate or phase change and interaction with the immediate surroundings, requiring 
more complex and not as straightforward approaches as for ‘regular emissions’ [Hanna and 
Drivas, 1996]. Hazmat gas release into the atmosphere can be linked with a large diversity of 
circumstances ranging from slow discharge through a small pinhole failure to rapid 
discharges resulting from a major rupture of the containment [Jones, 1992]. 
The release phenomenon depends mainly on the hazmat physical properties; the containment 
(process or storage) conditions; the way the accident takes place; and possible subsequent 
mechanical and physical interaction with the immediate surrounding environment, among 
other factors [Hanna and Strimaitis, 1989; Hanna and Drivas 1996; Dutch National Institute of 
Public Health and the Environment (VROM), 2005a; Hanna et al., 2008; Brambilla and Manca, 
2011]. Notwithstanding the difficulty and uncertainties linked with an accurate 
characterization of the release [see Hanna and Britter, 2008], typifying and illustrative accident 
scenarios have been defined and extensively used in CA [Mannan, 2005]. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
some of the most well-established and characterized typifying accident scenarios considered 
in CA studies, divided into standard classes also listed in Table 2.2. 
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Figure 2.3 – Illustration of some conceivable release mechanisms according to (a) initial condition, (b) 
container, (c) aperture, (d) enclosure, (e) height, and (f) fluid momentum [Mannan, 2005]. 
In general, hazmat gas source term scenarios include sudden release, transient spillage, fires 
or explosions [Hanna and Drivas, 1996]. Among others, the initial conditions, container, 
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location and height of the aperture, duration and type of outflow or fluid momentum, are 
used as the most often selection criteria for the characterization of accident outflow conditions 
in CA studies [CCPS, 1999]. Some of the common used classification criteria and respective 
classes (illustrated in Figure 2.3) are summarized in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 – Classification of accidental release situations [based on Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005a]. 
Initial 
conditions 
Container Aperture Enclosure Height 
Duration/type of 
outflow 
Fluid 
momentum 
Compressed 
gas 
Vessel Total rupture Indoor Below 
ground 
level 
Instantaneous Low  
Liquid Other 
equipment 
Limited 
aperture 
Outdoor At ground 
level 
Finite-duration 
(constant rate or 
transient) 
High 
PLG Pipework 
(pipes or 
pipelines) 
  Above 
ground 
level 
Continuous 
(constant rate) 
 
The released hazmat gas can be initially contained as a compressed gas, a liquid (cryogenic, 
sub-cooled, superheated or at normal temperature) or a Pressurized Liquefied Gas (PLG), and 
therefore released in the same form, excepting PLG, that may be released in the form of gas, 
liquid or two-phase vapour-gas mixture, depending on the location and type of the aperture 
(Figure 2.3a). If the release occurs from a container holding PLG, the hazmat will normally be 
liquid if the aperture is below the liquid level and vapour or two-phase mixture if it is above 
the liquid level. The container on which the release is defined can be a vessel or other 
equipments, such as pumps or pipeworks (pipes or pipeline systems) (Figure 2.3b). 
The aperture where the release takes place may range from a limited aperture, such as a small 
hole in a vessel wall, to a large fraction of the envelope of the container in case of a complete 
rupture of a vessel (Figure 2.3c). The orifice can be a sharp-edge orifice, a conventional pipe 
branch, a rounded nozzle branch or a crack. The flow through a rounded nozzle is greater 
than through a conventional pipe branch; however it is the last one that is often considered 
[Mannan, 2005]. Other kinds of holes include drain and sample points; pressure relief devices 
(pressure relief valves, bursting discs, and liquid relief valves); seals; flanges or pipe ends. 
It is also necessary to consider where the release takes place, distinguishing indoor or outdoor 
releases (Figure 2.3d). Additionally, the height at which the release occurs (below, at or above 
the ground) may also affect the release and dispersion behaviour (Figure 2.3e). 
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In case of liquid spills, possible subsequent evaporation phenomenon must be also examined 
if liquid pools are formed, because a hazmat gas cloud source could be generated. In general it 
can be assumed that if a liquid is discharged from a container below the ground level, it may 
remain completely contained without significant evaporation. However, when occurs at or 
above the ground level, significant evaporation may happen, generating hazmat gas that may 
be dispersed over a substantial distance, similarly to ‘direct’ hazmat gas releases. Moreover, 
the shape of the liquid pool depends on the presence of retention bunds or other kinds of 
barriers [Hanna and Drivas, 1996]. 
The dimensions of the aperture and initial conditions can also affect the momentum of the 
released hazmat (Figure 2.3f). If hazmat is released in the form of gas, low and high 
momentum jets can be observed if the gas forms a plume and a turbulent momentum jet, 
respectively. For liquids, the momentum will only affect the distance of which the liquid will 
be discharged and form a liquid pool [Lees, 1996]. A more complex approach is required for 
PLG releases, since both gas and liquid discharges may occur separately or simultaneous. In 
case of liquid spill, subsequent evaporation or flashing phenomena from the formed liquid 
pool must be also taken into account [Hanna and Strimaitis, 1989; Witlox et al., 2002]. 
When analyzed the discharge conditions, the duration and type of outflow rate depend 
greatly on the type of failure and initial conditions of the hazmat. Three main types of classes 
can be considered for the duration of the release, namely instantaneous (e.g. total collapse of a 
vessel), finite-duration (e.g. relief valve opened for a few minutes) and continuous (e.g. long 
period undetected and uncontrolled release in a piping system) [VROM, 2005a]. As concerns 
to finite-duration it is possible to consider both transient and continuous release types. 
Regardless the influence of the aperture shape, hazmat initial conditions and chemical 
properties will also affect the behaviour of the gas during the release and atmospheric 
dispersion regimes. Moreover, it is commonly the case that accidentally released hazmat 
gases, be they flammable or toxic or both, are often dense gases, as a result of either the 
properties of the hazmat, the methods of storage or release, or a combination of both [Britter, 
1982]. Despite the typical passive or positively buoyant gases (gases with density lower or 
similar to the air) frequently considered in traditional atmospheric pollution problems [see 
Zannetti, 1990; Stull, 1997; Seinfeld and Pandis, 2006], a large fraction of existing hazmat has 
the dense gas behaviour by virtue of having [Britter and Griffiths, 1982; Britter and McQuaid, 
1988; Lees, 2006; Green and Perry, 2008]: 
- High molecular weight when compared with that of ambient air (e.g. chlorine); 
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- Significantly lower temperature even with low molecular weight (e.g. liquefied natural 
gas (LNG)); 
- High storage pressure even with low molecular weight, whose vapour at the boiling 
temperature is less heavy than the environment, but which, due to the release type, 
produce a cloud including material droplets (e.g. failure of ammonia stored at high 
pressure with formation of aerosol); 
- Chemical transformation/reaction of the released material with water vapour in the 
ambient atmosphere (e.g. nitrogen tetroxide, hydrogen fluoride - HF). 
Albeit the ‘huge’ number of hazmat handled in hazardous industry that may form dense gas 
clouds, interest usually focuses on those that are combustible or toxic, with boiling points 
below ambient temperature [Britter, 1989]. These are commonly stored or transported as 
liquids, maintained in that phase at or near to their saturation temperature at atmospheric 
pressure by refrigeration and insulation, or at ambient temperature by pressurization (e.g. 
PLG or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)). Among the more prominent and known hazmat that 
may form dense gas clouds are chlorine, HF, ammonia, propane or LNG. 
For instance, chlorine behaves like a dense gas both in liquefied and gas releases. Its normal 
boiling temperature is -34 ºC and its molecular weight is 71 g.mol-1, which is higher than 
ambient air (≈28.96 g.mol-1) [Yaws, 1999]. In case of liquefied chlorine releases its density is 
even higher [Green and Perry, 2008]. HF has a molecular weight of 20 g.mol-1 and a normal 
boiling point of 20 ºC, but often behaves like a dense gas [Puttock et al., 1991]. This is because 
under certain circumstances it undergoes an oligomerization reaction, which has a formula 
(HF)n; and formed saturated vapour of HF has a molecular weight of 78.2 g.mol-1 at its normal 
boiling point [Poling et al., 2001]. Ammonia has a molecular weight of 17 g.mol-1 and a normal 
boiling temperature of -33 ºC, but liquid ammonia releases generate dense gas clouds [Yaws, 
1999]. If there is no liquid spray, the cloud density will decrease when it mixes with air and it 
is likely to become a neutral gas; nonetheless, if there is a fraction of liquid spray, the cloud 
will be dense [Lees, 1996]. Propane has a molecular weight of 44 g.mol-1 and a normal boiling 
temperature of -42 ºC [Yaws, 1999], so releases of either propane gas or liquefied propane, are 
always heavy. LNG also originates dense gas releases, not because its molecular weight (≈16 
g.mol-1) but due to temperature effects (normal boiling temperature is -161ºC) [Green and 
Perry, 2008]. Other examples of hazmat used in industry are identified in the literature [e.g. 
Yaws, 1999; Poling et al., 2001; Casal, 2008; Green and Perry, 2008]. 
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To determine the emission rate or volume of hazmat gas, different input data must be defined, 
depending on the accident release and ambient conditions. Typically, physical and chemical 
properties of the released material, geometry of the source, characteristics of the ground 
surface and mitigation measures should be supplied. Main outputs from source term models 
greatly depend on the type of accident scenario; however, for CA studies of industrial 
facilities, general and typifying guidelines are often applied to minimize uncertainties of input 
data gaps [CCPS, 1999; Hanna and Drivas, 1996; Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005a; Casal, 2008].  
Overall, the second stage of CA studies, must be capable to assure a proper numerical 
description of the outflow conditions (emission rate, temperature, pressure, etc.), but also to 
determine hazmat gas ‘type’ (heavy or passive gas) providing accurate and realistic 
information to reliably perform subsequent atmospheric dispersion modelling. 
2.3.2 Atmospheric dispersion modelling 
The third stage of CA modelling consists on predicting the transport and atmospheric 
dispersion and dilution of the formed hazmat gas cloud (passive or dense). It can be 
considered the ‘core’ element of any CA methodology [Fingas, 2002], given the need to 
simulate the concentration fields for further estimation of consequences and damages. During 
the early instants after the release, hazmat gas behaviour may be dominated by factors arising 
from the initial containment conditions, influencing the buoyancy (positive, neutral or 
negative) behaviour. Thus, in addition to the well know dispersion of passive (and neutral) 
gases regime, hazmat dense (or negatively buoyant) gas behaviour must be also taken into 
account in CA dispersion modelling techniques [Hanna and Drivas, 1996; Mannan, 2005; 
Borrego et al., 2009], to properly describe the cloud movement after the release. This 
requirement is strongly supported by reported MIA involving hazmat gas releases with dense 
gas mixture clouds observed during the initial instants of the dispersion (e.g. Flixborough or 
Mexico City), in addition to the main findings of a large number of experimental tests [see 
Britter, 1989; Nielsen, 1998; Mannan, 2005, Casal, 2008].  
2.3.2.1 Dense gas atmospheric dispersion 
Since the 1970s large efforts have been made to understand dense gas dispersion, in particular 
from sudden (accidental) releases of large quantities of hazmat into the atmosphere [see 
Feldbauer et al., 1972; Te Riele, 1977; Britter and Griffith, 1982]. The interest in studying dense 
gas dispersion was intensified in the early 1980s onwards [see Ermak et al., 1981; Goldwire et 
al., 1983; Puttock et al., 1984; Britter, 1988, 1998; Nielsen, 1998] leading to the implementation 
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of relevant large scale experimental trials and the development of a wide variety of numerical 
models, some of them commonly used in CA, for the chemical and process industries [Nielsen 
and Ott, 1996; Fingas, 2002; Luketa-Hanlin, 2006; Pontiggia, et al., 2010]. Over the last years a 
renewed interest on modelling hazmat gas accidental release and dispersion strongly 
influenced by the need to provide more realistic and accurate tools to support CA studies, but 
also, due to the developments of computational and hardware capabilities. 
The influence of density difference on gas mixing arises primarily from the associated 
buoyancy force i.e. the Archimedean force on a body submerged in a fluid of different density. 
Although density difference also affects the inertia forces acting on a fluid in motion, the 
variations to the fluid accelerations are generally assumed to be small when compared with 
the acceleration arising from buoyancy forces. This assumption is the so-called ‘Boussinesq 
approximation’ [Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. The buoyancy forces follow a sign of convention, 
where negative buoyancy implies a buoyancy force in the opposite direction to the positive 
direction of the z-coordinate. Hence a dense gas dispersion layer at ground level in the 
atmosphere may be defined as a negatively buoyant flow (buoyancy force directed to the 
ground surface). The converse situation is a neutrally or positively buoyant flow. Moreover, it 
is normal to refer to neutrally buoyant case as a passive gas, although strictly the term implies 
that the conditions of emission play no dynamic part in the way in which the emission 
subsequently diffuses into the ambient flow, a condition that will not be satisfied if the 
emission has significant momentum [Green and Perry, 2008]. 
Unlike ‘traditional’ passive gas dispersion, which is entirely governed by the atmospheric 
turbulence characteristics, the spreading of dense gas is relatively insensitive to variations in 
meteorological conditions compared to gravity forces and density factors [Jensen, 1981]. Dense 
gas cloud moving along the ground represents a stably stratified configuration, and it will 
survive for a considerable time even in the presence of wind. Britter and McQuaid [1988] 
argued that major physical processes specific for negatively buoyant clouds, include: 
- Gravitational velocity field (also called gravitational slumping) is produced by the 
horizontal density gradients, which is an additional transport mechanism to that provided 
by the atmospheric flows. This self-generated phenomenon results in clouds with 
increased spreading in horizontal, and reduced in vertical dimensions. Furthermore, 
profiles of concentration in the lateral direction are frequently quite uniform with little 
meandering due to random environmental flow. 
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- Velocity shear at the cloud interface may lead to a gross intermingling of the cloud with 
the surrounding air and eventually in the turbulence generation. This mechanism of 
dilution is of major importance if self-generated velocities are large, compared with the 
mean wind velocity. 
- Vertical density stratification is a direct result of vertical variation of density. Dense gas 
clouds have negative vertical gradients that may result in turbulence and therefore, 
turbulence mixing can be strongly reduced or entirely inhibited. This effect can extend to 
the atmospheric turbulence in the wind flow over the cloud, as well as to the cloud itself. 
- Inertia of released gas directly depends upon the material density, i.e. depends on the 
density difference between released material and ambient air. When density difference 
vanishes, dense gas dispersion approaches to passive gas clouds behaviour. 
It is obvious that density difference between the released gas and the ambient air is not the 
only condition in delineating cloud behaviour; others like volume or volume flux (depending 
on the type of release), other source term characteristics (e.g. source diameter) or atmospheric 
conditions must be also taken into account for dense gas cloud dispersion analysis. 
Considering the various conditions, several criteria/parameters have been suggested to 
numerically determine whether a released hazmat gas will exhibit dense gas behaviour or can, 
for practical purposes, be treated as a passive gas. One of the most used parameter is the 
similarity dimensionless Richardson number (Ri) [Britter, 1989; Green and Perry, 2008]. The Ri 
is the ratio of the buoyancy to the inertia forces, i.e., it represents the ratio of the potential 
energy due to the density excess inside the cloud with the kinetic energy due to the ambient 
turbulence. It should be noted that the prevailing estimation of Ri does not conflict with the 
Boussinesq approximation stated earlier, since the approximation only implies that the 
influence of density difference on the fluid inertia is small, which doesn’t means that inertia is 
itself small [Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. Various expressions/conditions have been suggested 
based on similarity parameters, such as the Ri and experimental tests [e.g. Havens and Spicer, 
1985; Hanna and Drivas, 1987; Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. For instance, Britter and McQuaid 
[1988] suggested that a hazmat gas released instantaneously (Eq. 2-1) or continuously (Eq. 2-2) 
into the atmosphere has dense gas cloud behaviour if the following conditions are satisfied: 
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In which, Dc is the source or cloud diameter, g is the gravitational constant, uh is the wind 
velocity at the reference height h (10 m) Qi,o is the initial volume of instantaneous puff, qc,o is 
the source volume flow rate for the continuous plume, and finally, ρg and ρa are the cloud and 
atmospheric air densities, respectively. For grounded releases Dc is equal to the initial cloud 
width, while for elevated releases it is the initial diameter or the rupture close to the source or 
the height of the release further downwind when the cloud touches the ground are used. 
Nonetheless, the reference limits can not be absolute numbers, which separates the dense gas 
dispersion from the passive gas dispersion, being used only as guidance [Britter, 1989].  
In the early stages of dispersion, the behaviour may be dominated by factors arising from the 
type of storage and/or release. Continuous releases from pressurized containers may be 
expected to produce momentum – dominated jets. In case of pressure vessels catastrophic 
failure (instantaneous release) there will be a rapid ‘vapour-flash’ in which a 
thermodynamically determined fraction of the now superheated (with respect to ambient 
conditions) liquid converts to vapour. It has been observed that for some hazmat the violence 
of this process ejects a substantial fraction of the residual liquid as fine droplets, producing a 
cloud consisting of a mixture of air, vapour, droplets of the material and of condensed water. 
There is, in this case, a substantial initial dilution with air [Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. 
Observations following accidents or experiments showed that, depending on the release and 
dispersion mechanisms, hazmat dense gas cloud evolution can be divided into five main 
phases [Van Ulden, 1986; Britter and McQuaid, 1998]: 1 – emission into the atmosphere, 2 – 
expansion, 3 – slumping phase, 4 – transition phase, and finally, 5 – passive dispersion phase. 
Figure 2.4 shows the set of evolution phases identified in dense gas clouds dispersion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)– Dense gas source emission; 
(2)– Expansion zone; 
(3)– Slumping phase; 
(4)– Transition phase; 
(5)– Passive dispersion phase 
Figure 2.4 – Phases in the dispersion of a dense gas cloud [based on Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. 
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Dense gas source emission phase (1) comprises the failure and accidental release of (liquefied) 
gas. In case of liquid spills, the evaporation phenomenon must be also considered. This phase 
is very important for the temporal behaviour of the dispersion [VROM, 2005a]. In an 
instantaneous release, the ‘entire’ volume of gas is discharged in a very short time. 
Alternatively, in finite duration releases, emission occurs during longer periods with time-
varying (transient) or steady-state (continuous) outflow rates. 
Next, the expansion zone (2) is strongly influenced by the dissipation of stored energy during 
the process. In some cases, for instance when cold LNG spilled comes in contact with water, 
an initial rapid vapour expansion, the so-called ‘Rapid Transition Phase’ (RTP), may occur in 
certain circumstances [Mannan, 2005]. This expansion is not combustion related, but rather is 
classified as a physical or mechanical expansion where there is a high-pressure energy release 
[Luketa-Hanlin, 2006] and a visible vapour volume expansion is observed. In this phase the 
cloud starts to descend to the ground reaching the slumping phase. Some authors [e.g. Van 
Ulden, 1987; Fingas, 2002; Casal, 2008] consider these first two phases as a single one, covering 
both emission and expansion mechanisms. In any case, stopped the expansion phase, the 
cloud starts to ‘slump’ under the action of gravity and formation of a ground-based cloud. 
The slumping phase (3), schematically illustrated in Figure 2.5 for an idealized instantaneous 
release, occurs when the effects of turbulence and momentum of the ambient air, and surface 
friction are neglected. Although being observed in all release regimes, the variation of gas 
cloud shape is more pronounced in case of instantaneous release [Lees, 1996]. 
 
Figure 2.5 – Slumping phase of dense gas cloud dispersion [based on Casal, 2008]. 
During this phase, entrainment dynamics and mixing of the cloud are exclusively driven by 
the negative buoyancy of the cloud. A slumping and radially spreading cloud is observed 
with a more or less pronounced raised edge, sharp radial boundaries and a diffuse top. 
Substantial mixing takes place at the cloud lateral edges (also called gravity-front), resulting 
from the self-generated vortices in the extreme lateral areas generated by gravity spreading.  
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Mixing by atmospheric turbulence at the top of the cloud is eventually suppressed by the 
density gradient, and turbulence within the cloud is reduced due to the stable stratification, 
i.e. a negative vertical density gradient, of the dense gas layer. Still, the influence of gravity, 
wind, heat transfer from the environment, may also affect the cloud shape and radial spread 
[Britter, 1989]. In addition to the ambient air, heating from the ground can also affect the 
spreading phenomenon in case of cold clouds. As the cloud continues to be diluted, the 
hazmat concentration continues to fall (thought it is important to note that dilution with air 
will lead also to a cooling effect that may ‘compete’ with parallel heating processes if droplets 
are present, since the heat for evaporation must come from the cloud). 
After gravity spreading has finished, vertical variation of density in the cloud shows a stable 
stratification which strongly reduces the dispersion and mixing in the vertical direction. At 
this level of dilution the density difference becomes negligible, and the transition phase starts 
(4). Even gravity spreading continues dominating over horizontal atmospheric diffusion; the 
cloud no longer slumps, because turbulence leads to vertical mixing at a similar or greater rate 
than the gravity induced slumping motion. Advection by the mean wind happens and surface 
friction may also affect the gravity spreading. Throughout this period the cloud is being 
diluted further by air entrainment resulting from the action of turbulence in the ambient flow, 
and turbulence generated by velocity gradients at the interface between the cloud and the 
surrounding air. As a result, the sharp-edge cloud transforms into a diffuse cloud. 
After the transition phase (4), subsequent cloud behaviour can be described, following neutral 
or positively buoyant gas dispersion behaviour – passive dispersion phase (5). In this phase 
the cloud density effects can be neglected. Dispersion by atmospheric turbulence and 
advection by the mean wind are similar to those for passive gas dispersion. Moreover, as a 
consequence of the increased lateral spread, dense gas clouds exhibit a lower advection 
velocity and less meander, or responsiveness to large scale atmospheric motions, than is 
observed with passive releases [Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. Some of dense gas dispersion 
phenomenon core features are well replicated in measured observations from large-scale and 
laboratory experiments on water or land [e.g. Koopman et al., 1982a; McQuaid and Roebuck, 
1985; Schatzmann et al., 1993; Duijm, 1994; Nielsen and Ott, 1996; Koopman and Ermak, 2007]. 
Over the last decades, large efforts have been taken for the development and implementation 
of new and more accurate physical and numerical modelling techniques to understand and 
describe hazmat dense gas release and dispersion behaviour. Albeit the common purposes, 
physical and numerical modelling approaches comprise clear differences, concerning the main 
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intention of application, CA stage(s) covered, complexity and efforts, or even assured quality, 
among other factors, as discussed by Nielsen [1998]. 
2.3.2.2 Physical modelling of dense gas atmospheric dispersion 
Physical modelling consists on experimental simulation of dispersing gas releases [Duijm et 
al., 1994] commonly set to provide relevant information to support the development and 
application of theoretical approaches and/or numerical models. Hazmat gas release and 
atmospheric dispersion experimental modelling can be conducted on large scale field trials or 
on reduced scale tests at laboratory facilities (atmospheric boundary layer (ABL) wind tunnels 
or water channel tunnels) [Lees, 1996]. Large scale experimental tests are mainly intended to 
observe and collect information on emission and dispersion, without the possibility to isolate 
specific variables or CA stages. On the other hand, laboratory experiments typically include 
two main types of tests [Meroney, 1982; Nielsen 1996]: the ones aiming to study in detail a 
specific process occurring (or variables) on a specific CA stage by isolating or controlling 
relevant variables; and those involving detailed simulation of the various stages of hazmat 
accidental release and dispersion. 
In general, laboratory wind-tunnel experiments permit a certain degree of control on 
examined variables (e.g. safety, meteorology, site or measurement variables) not often feasible 
or economic at large-scale trials [Snyder, 1981; Tavares, 2007]. In fact, the main limitations of 
direct field experiments comprise the simultaneously operation of all governing parameters, 
as well as, the difficulty in determine which parameters are governing and which are 
secondary or dispensable parameters [Meroney et al., 1996]. This is the main reason why the 
majority of the most recent experimental work is being conducted in laboratory wind-tunnel 
facilities. Nonetheless, in any case, the value of experimental information is a combination of 
the general usefulness of data and measurement quality [Tavares, 2007]. 
Most relevant experimental work focusing the release and atmospheric dispersion of hazmat 
gases (at both large and small scale) is widely reported and investigated since the 1960s [e.g. 
Lapin and Foster, 1957; Seargeant and Robinett, 1968; Van Ulden, 1974; McQuaid, 1979; 
Puttock et al., 1984; Goldwire et al., 1985; Havens, 1988; Schatzmann et al., 1993; Nielsen et al., 
1997; Robins et al., 2001; Hald et al., 2005; Ricciardi et al., 2008].  
Most of the 1960s-70s experiments were conducted, aiming to estimate evaporation rate and 
the maximum distances of danger for flammable (measured as the maximum distance until 
concentration levels could generate fire or explosion – lower and upper flammability limits, 
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LFL and UFL, respectively) hazmat gases (e.g. LNG) [Puttock et al., 1982]. Only further 
experiments (since 1980s) started to consider the dispersion of toxic gases (e.g. ammonia, 
chlorine) or safer simulants (e.g. carbon dioxide or liquid nitrogen), focused on describing and 
understanding hazmat gases behaviour during and after the release [Luketa-Hanlin, 2006]. 
Extensive descriptions and discussion of field experiments are available in the literature and 
continue to be publish, endorsed by the need of experimental data for numerical modelling 
validation [e.g. Puttock et al., 1982; Meroney, 1987; Nielsen et al., 1997; Mannan, 2005; Luketa-
Hanlin, 2006; Casal, 2008]. Table 2.3 summarizes some of the most known reported large and 
small scale experimental tests carried out since the 1970s focusing dense gas release and 
dispersion. 
Table 2.3 – Summary of well known experimental tests.  
 Experiment Location, date and Coordinator Phenomena involved References 
Esso/API 
Matagorda Bay, Texas (1971) 
Esso Company and the American 
Petroleum Institute 
Releases of liquid LNG, fast 
evaporation, maximum distance to 
LFL. 
Feldbauer et al., 
1972; May et al., 
1973 
Dutch Freon 
12 
The Netherlands (1973–74) 
Directorate General of Labour of the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Dispersion of Freon, simulation of 
chlorine vapours dispersion 
generated from a liquid release. 
Van Ulden, 1974; Te 
Riele, 1977 
Porton Down 
Porton Down, U.K. (1976-78) 
Health, Safety Executive, Chemical 
Defence Establishment of U.K. 
Release and dispersion of 
dichlorodifluoromethane, slumping 
phase  
McQuaid, 1979; 
Picknett, 1981 
Burro and 
Coyote field 
tests 
China Lake CA. (1980 and 1981) 
US Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 
Releases of liquid LNG, spill on water 
pond, fast evaporation and 
dispersion. 
Koopman et al., 
1981; Goldwire et 
al., 1983 
Maplin Sands 
field tests 
Maplin Sands, USA (1980) 
Shell 
Dispersion of continuously released 
propane and LNG, spill onto water. 
Puttock et al., 1984; 
Colenbrander and 
Puttock, 1984 
Thorney 
Island 
Thorney Islands, U.K. (1982-84) 
Health and Safety Executive 
Dispersion, release conditions of 
Propane and LNG, terrain effects, 
slumping phase behaviour 
HSE, 1984; 
McQuaid, and 
Roebuck1985 
Desert 
Tortoise  
Nevada, U.S.A. (1983) 
US Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 
Release, flashing of ammonia jets, 
dense to passive clouds, non-
obstructed flat terrain. 
Goldwire et al., 
1985 
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FLADIS 
Landskrona (1991-1993) 
Riso, HydroCare, FOA, CBDE 
Ammonia release, flashing jet, dense 
to passive cloud, non-obstructed 
Nielsen et al., 1994; 
Nielsen, 1996 
EC MTH 
project and 
FLADIS 
Hamburg, Germany 
Hamburg University Laboratory(1991) 
Continuous and instantaneous 
releases of Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), 
flat and obstructed with slopes 
Schatzmann et al., 
1991, 1993 
MT-TNO 
project BA 
Apeldoorn, The Netherlands (1988-
1990) TNO 
Continuous plume, Instantaneous 
releases (Thorney Isl. No 17), fence 
Van Oort and 
Builtjes, 1991 
EC MTH 
project BA 
Stevenage U.K. (1988-1991) 
Warren Springs Laboratory 
Instantaneous isothermal release of 
Thorney Island type in 1:100 model 
scale, Presence of fence 
Hall, 1991 
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STEP project 
FLADIS  
Apeldoorn, Netherlands (1992) 
TNO 
Continuous plume of SF6 gas Duijm, 1994 
One of the first large-scale field experiments focusing the release and dispersion of hazmat 
gases is the Esso Research and Engineering Company (Esso)/ American Petroleum Institute 
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(API) field test trials, conducted by the Esso and the API at Matagorda Bay in Texas (USA), in 
1971 [Feldbauer et al., 1972]. The series of tests involved instantaneous spills of LNG onto 
water and extensive measurement of the concentrations during the dispersion of the 
evaporated hazmat gases [May et al., 1973]. This study focused on LNG fast evaporation 
behaviour and the estimation of the maximum distances to threshold lower limit flammability 
level (LFL) concentration. Measurement results were analysed in terms of Gaussian plume 
profiles showing that the hazmat cloud width to height ratios were in general greater that 
those appropriated to passive gas releases in any atmospheric conditions. Overall, these tests 
more or less confirmed the influence of gravitational spreading and the need to account this 
effect in hazmat dense gas dispersion modelling [Luketa-Hanlin, 2006]. 
Later, the well-known Lawrence National Livermore Laboratory (LNLL) Burro and Coyote 
series of full-scale field tests were carried out, as a part of the US Department of Energy’s 
research on the issues of safety of liquefied energy gases [Koopman, 1981] at China Lake, 
California (USA), between 1980 and 1981. Both series of tests were well instrumented and 
obtained a fairly comprehensive set of measurements of meteorological parameters and 
concentration levels [Ermak et al., 1981; Koopman, 1981, 1982a,b]. 
The Burro tests involved a total of 8 LNG spills onto water in 1980 aiming to determine the 
dispersion characteristics of large LNG gas clouds [see Koopman et al., 1981]. In all tests, LFL 
distance first increased and then decreased with time, showing the direct influence of gas 
source strength on the observed distance to LFL. Moreover, gas cloud orientation and wind-
field flow direction were consistent in that the maximum gas concentrations generally lay 
along the wind-field centreline.  To illustrate the dimension of the experiment and observed 
dense gas dispersion behaviour, Figure 2.6 shows the plume in Burro 8 test after 30 s and the 
plume in Burro 6 after the quasi-steady state (passive phase) has been reached. 
 (a)                                                                  (b) 
          
Figure 2.6 – Photographs taken during Burro series: (a) LNG gas plume in Burro test 8 after 30 s; (b) 
LNG gas plume in Burro test 6 at quasi-steady state [Ermak, et al., 1982].   
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An exception was reported in one of the tests, in which gas flow was dominated by gravity, 
producing a highly bifurcated cloud that tended to follow low regions of the terrain [Ermak et 
al., 1981]. Although data and theory available prior to Burro series indicated that RTP 
explosions were not likely to occur, numerous explosions were observed, in two tests. Further 
analyses have been reported by Ermak et al. [1982] and Koopman et al. [1982a,b, 1989] which 
also included the comparisons between measured data and numerical models results.  
The Coyote tests were performed during the summer and fall of 1981 [Goldwire et al., 1983; 
LNLL, 1983] as a continuation of Burro tests, with some technical changes (number of tests - 18 
tests) and measurement sensors array set up). In addition to the main goals of previous tests, 
these also aimed investigating the damage of potential fires and RTP explosions resulting 
from the ignition of LNG spills evaporated hazmat gas clouds [see Goldwire et al., 1983].  
In the European context, the series of tests conducted by a consortium led by the British HSE, 
between 1982 and 1984, at Thorney Island (U.K.), involving the release of a mixture of Freon-
12 with nitrogen in a flat terrain over close-cropped grass [McQuaid, and Roebuck 1985] can 
be considered one of the first relevant studies. The core purpose of these tests was to obtain 
data which could be used to increase understanding of the mechanisms of hazmat gas 
dispersion (in the presence or not of simple obstacles) and to validate numerical models.  
The main focus was given to report the requirements for meteorological and similarity 
parameters used in numerical models (e.g. atmospheric stability, Monin-Obukhov length (L) 
or Ri) [Brambilla and Brown, 2010], without reference to the needs of any particular model 
description [McQuaid and Roebuck, 1985]. The tests were divided into three main phases, 
with different types of release and terrain set up [see Johnson, 1985; Puttock, 1987b]. Imagery 
was an important source of data for further evaluation of hazmat dense gas cloud behaviour 
to determine the cloud area in the first hundred seconds after the release, when the cloud had 
not reached any sensors [Nussey et al., 1985]. Instantaneous releases were performed using a 
cylindrical collapsible tent. Figure 2.7 illustrates some snapshots (photographs) taken of the 
collapsing cloud observed in Thorney Island test 8. 
A radially spread of the cloud fronts was observed and the highest peak concentrations were 
measured at the spreading ring. The presence of obstructions changed greatly the shape and 
peak concentrations along the cloud radial spread after entering in contact, depending on the 
geometrical shape and permeability of the barrier [McQuaid, 1987].  
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Figure 2.7 – Photographs of collapsing cloud observed in Thorney Island Test 8 [Prince et al., 
1987]. 
Continuous release conditions were also tested (phase III) [McQuaid, 1987], maintaining the 
same goals of previous phases. Main results showed that for high wind velocity, hazmat cloud 
lateral spread was less and the downwind extent greater. Additionally, the plume was 
characteristically very shallow, i.e. lower height and more extended laterally up to a certain 
distance from the source. 
More recently, a series of full-scale field experiments with liquefied ammonia continuous 
releases were carried out during the FLADIS Field Experiments conducted in the frame of an 
European Council of European Commission CEC ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM project 
[Nielsen et al., 1997]. The objective was to study the dispersion in all its stages, from the source 
into the regime of passive dispersion. 
Despite the ‘value’ and number of full-scale field experiments, a wide variety of laboratory 
wind-tunnel experimental studies have also been carried out over the last decades, often in an 
attempt to reproduce and control relevant parameters or conditions of release and dispersion 
previously tested at full-scale field experiments. Whatsoever, only in the last years some of 
these became more known by virtue of the main purposes or results obtained. Among others, 
wind-tunnel experimental tests have been performed in the scope of European research 
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projects, such as the EC Major Technological Hazards (MTH) project and FLADIS experiments 
[Schatzmann et al., 1991,1993] and the STEP project [Duijm, 1994] that replicated the several 
tests of previous full scale FLADIS experiments, the TNO Division of Technology for Society 
(MT-TNO) project [Van Oort and Builtjes, 1991], in which the Thorney Island test 7 
experiment was simulated, or even the EC MTH project BA [Hall, 1991] that replicated the 
Thorney Island instantaneous release tests. These projects analyzed different types of release 
and dispersion in obstructed and unobstructed areas, but in most cases, experimental set up 
reproduces prior full-scale field trials. Additionally, aiming to reproduce full-scale 
experimental data in wind-tunnel, Schatzmann et al. [1991, 1993] performed the wind-tunnel 
experiments of the FLADIS project. Different release conditions and hazmat gases were tested 
in surfaces comprising a wide variety of obstructions set ups. In general, wind-tunnel 
experiments showed the typical behaviour of dense gas dispersion, highlighting the need for 
proper description of this behaviour in real and full-scale conditions. 
The dispersion of pollutants is relatively well understood in open, unobstructed, nearly flat 
and homogeneous terrain, but this same unified level of understanding of dispersion in an 
intrinsically more complex urban environment appears to be lacking. In build-up regimes, 
new effects come into play as the turbulent flow interacts with isolated or groups of obstacles, 
taking a large range of shapes, sizes and possible configurations. A number of experimental 
studies of dispersion in sets of regular obstacles arrays have appeared in the past decade in 
the literature [e.g. Baechlin et al., 1991; Davidson et al., 1995; Macdonald et al., 1997; Allwine, 
2004; Ye and Biltoft, 2004; Bezpalcova and Harms, 2005]. 
The study of dispersion through idealized arrays of obstacles has shown to be an important 
method of obtaining a better understanding of the dispersion through a real urban 
environment [Leitl et al., 2003; Schatzmann and Leitl, 2011]. Although experimental studies 
considering idealized obstacles arrays can be considered valid simplifications of the real and 
complex urban environment [Britter and Schatzmann, 2007a], such type of geometries 
presumably displays some of the characteristics of the more complex, real-world 
configurations providing some simple physical models. Hence, it is through a comprehensive 
and controlled study of a wide range of idealized configurations that the underlying physical 
mechanisms of flow and dispersion in urban terrain can be effectively developed [Gailis and 
Hill, 2006]. 
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2.3.2.3 Numerical modelling of dense gas atmospheric dispersion 
Long has been recognized that numerical modelling is a valuable tool for a reliable application 
of CA methodologies; the inadequacy of ‘conventional’ passive gas dispersion models allied 
with the increased use of hazmat dense gases in industrial activity, enforced the development 
of models suitable to numerically describe both passive and dense gas dispersion behaviours. 
Hence, taking into account the number of industrial hazmat that can present dense gas 
behaviour when accidentally released and the main achievements from experimental studies, 
it was recognized the need to implement dense gas atmospheric dispersion models in CA 
modelling coupled with or even replacing traditional passive gas dispersion models.  
Illustrating the extensive work carried out over the last decades on this topic, a wide number 
of reviews and/or guidelines of hazmat gas dispersion modelling are given in the literature 
[e.g. Havens, 1982; Wheatley and Webber, 1985; Britter, 1989; Hanna et al., 1991; MEG, 1994b; 
Hanna and Drivas, 1996; Fingas, 2002; Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005a; Hanna et al., 2008], in 
which different types of models are classified, compared and modelling approaches discussed.  
Classification of dispersion models is far away of being consensual depending on author’s 
criteria and selection parameters [Hanna and Drivas, 1996; Markiewicz, 2006]. Yet, authors 
tend to classify dispersion models using different criteria, including mathematical principles, 
emission source type and model complexity [Britter, 1989; MEG, 1994a; Hanna and Drivas, 
1996]. Therefore, based on the complexity of the mathematical approach, CA dispersion 
models can be divided into three main classes of models [Britter, 1989; MEG, 1994b; Hanna 
and Drivas, 1996; Mannan, 2005; Markiewicz, 2006], as summarized in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 – Classes of CA atmospheric dispersion models. 
Class                           Model Class                                               Model Type 
I - Empirical or phenomenological models 
                     Nomograms or simple correlations 
II 
- Intermediate or integral models 
                     a) Box models 
                     b) Uniform or Gaussian plume models 
                     c) Generalized plume models 
                     d) Integral jet models 
                     e) Shallow layer models 
III - Computational fluid dynamic (CFD) models 
                     a) Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes models (RANS) 
                     b) Direct Numerical Simulation models (DNS) 
                     c) Large Eddy Simulation models (LES) 
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The models increase in complexity and vary according to the focus of application. With the 
exception of Class I models, generally, most dense gas models include an automatic internal 
transition to neutral Gaussian dispersion behaviour when the density effects become 
negligible [CCPS, 1999]. This transition is clear in Class II models, enabling modelling both 
heavy and passive gas dispersion behaviours along the dispersion process. Following, a brief 
description of the main characteristics and features of each class is provided, with a particular 
attention to class II models, which are the basis for the development of the model presented in 
this thesis. 
Class I models can be considered the most simple, allowing determining the relation between 
the centreline concentration decay and the downwind distance of instantaneous and 
continuous dense gas releases in flat and grassy terrain. Mathematically, these models are 
based on the analysis of empirical relations of dimensionless quantities in the form of 
nomograms or simple correlations obtained from both field tests and wind tunnel tests 
[Blackmore, et al. 1982]. A well-known example of this class is the Britter and McQuaid model. 
Class II models comprise a wide variety of intermediate and integral models, divided into five 
main types of models [MEG, 1994a]: (I) the so-called ‘box models’, (II) the uniform or Gaussian 
plume models, (III) the generalized plume models, (IV) the integral plume models, and (V) the 
shallow layer models. These models typically consider dense gas clouds by analyzing them in 
terms of a number of regimes. After the initial momentum- and buoyancy-dominated phases, 
the cloud is usually assumed to be passive. 
‘Box models’ (Type I) have been developed to describe grounded dense gas puffs [McQuaid, 
1984]. In general it is assumed that the instantaneously released cloud has a shape somewhat 
similar to an upright cylindrical box cloud with radius (R) and height (H) [Cox and Carpenter, 
1980] as represented in Figure 2.8.  
 
Figure 2.8 – Idealised cloud shape assumed in box models for instantaneous releases [based on Cox 
and Carpenter, 1980]. 
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Traditional box models assume that all parameters (concentration, density, temperature, 
enthalpy difference, etc.) are uniformly distributed within the volume [Nielsen, 1994]. Basic 
ordinary differential equations representing the cloud horizontal spreading, mass and energy 
conservation, depending only on time, are applied to describe lateral and top entrainment of 
air (mass exchange) and plume heating. Horizontal spreading of cloud radius is assessed by 
estimating the self-generated gravitational front velocity [Britter and McQuaid, 1988]. Some 
variations have been implemented to account the dispersion in slopes [e.g. Webber, 1993, 
Kunsch and Webber, 2000] or the possibility to the cloud to become elliptical [Britter et al. 
1991; Nikmo and Kukkonen, 1991], among others. Box model approach has also been 
extended in to simulate continuous or time-varying releases, in which the total release is 
divided into a number of cloud puffs, each of which is considered as a separate release and 
regular shape [e.g. Nikmo and Kukkonen, 1991]. 
Examples of box models include the DENZ-EDF model [Kaiser and Walker, 1978], the 
HEGABOX model [Witlox, 1994a], and other models described in the literature [e.g. Eidsvik, 
1980; Fay and Zemba, 1985; Cleaver et al., 1994; Kunsch and Fannelop, 1995]. 
Uniform or Gaussian plume models (Type II) are mainly used to predict the dispersion of 
continuous steady state grounded hazmat dense gas sources. All basic phenomena associated 
to dense gas release, such as horizontal spreading, mass exchange between the plume and 
surrounding environment or plume heating are described by ordinary differential equations 
similar to the ones used in box models. In uniform plume models, the cloud is assumed to 
have uniform height and width, concentration and temperature being described by a sort of 
rectangular box model sort of box model with the downwind development as sketched in 
Figure 2.9 [Morgan et al., 1983] 
 
Figure 2.9 – Idealised cloud shapes assumed in uniform models for continuous steady state 
grounded releases [based on Cox and Carpenter, 1980]. 
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On the other hand, the ‘traditional’ Gaussian profile is adapted in Gaussian plume models to 
consider some degree of variation of concentration in the cross section [Markiewicz, 2006]. In 
both uniform and Gaussian models, the increasing plume width is estimated by the front 
velocity at the two lateral edges and entrainment of air is described by the entrainment top 
velocity (top) and the front entrainment velocity (front). Transition between dispersion 
regimes is already implemented, assuming the traditional Gaussian approach and after 
reaching the passive plume dispersion behaviour in the far field. 
The models described in works of Delvosalle et al. [1993], Fay and Zemba [1986] are examples 
of uniform plume models and the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) dense gas model 
[Mohan et al., 1995] is a well-known example of a Gaussian plume model. 
Generalized plume models (Type III) can be considered an extension of Type II models in the 
sense that they consider a greater structure to the spatial variations of dense gas concentration 
than merely assuming a Gaussian or rectangular profile. Figure shows a schematized 
representation of Type III model dense gas cloud shape along the dispersion.  
 
Figure 2.10 – Schematic representation of a Generalized plume model [based on Havens, 1988]. 
Basic equations describing the gas mass conservation, air entrainment, horizontal crosswind 
gravity spreading and crosswind diffusion are used to estimate the plume dispersion, in 
which, concentration is expressed in terms of the centreline ground level concentration, the 
vertical and horizontal dispersion parameters and plume width. The plume is represented as 
being composed by horizontally homogeneous cross sections with Gaussian profile edges in 
the horizontal direction and the exponential profile in the vertical direction as schematized in 
Figure 2.10. The average transport velocity in the plume is determined adopting a power law 
profile for the wind velocity and quasi-three-dimensional solutions are obtained by using 
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similarity profiles. The transition from heavy to passive gas dispersion is taken into account 
through a smooth or continuous evolution to passive regime based on density difference, 
eliminating the need of coupling different algorithms [Colenbrander et al., 1980]. Once reached 
passive gas dispersion regime, the plume dispersion behaviour is performed according to a 
‘traditional’ passive gas dispersion Gaussian model approach. 
Examples of Type III models include the HEGADAS model [Witlox, 1994a,b], the DEGADIS 
model [Havens and Spicer, 1985], the GASTAR model [Britter, 1990] and the SLAB [Ermak, 
1990] or even the ALOHA models [Reynolds, 1992]. 
Integral jet models (Type IV) are typically applied to describe dense gases continuous, 
elevated or upward momentum (vertical jets) sources, in which the released plume follows a 
‘ballistic’ path before reaching the ground [Nielsen, 1998]. They are based on the integration of 
conservation equations of mass, species, downwind and crosswind momentum and energy 
averaged over a jet cross section. The equations directly predict jet variables, such as the 
concentration, jet velocity, radius or enthalpy, as a function of both downwind distance and 
time. In these models, the shape of the jet is not needed as a main variable. The jet path is 
mostly influenced by gravity, drag force of the ambient flow and momentum of the entrained 
air. Entrainment rate is different from that in the grounded release models, because it mainly 
depends on a velocity shear, the elevated jet, and the surrounding air. Examples of Type IV 
models include the HMP model [Hoot et al., 1973], the Ooms model [Ooms, 1972], the 
AEROPLUME and HFPLUME models [Witlox and McFarlane, 1994], the model described by 
Muralidhar et al. [1995] and more recently the Khan and Abbasi model [1999b]. 
Shallow layer models (Type V) can be considered the most complex of Class II models, due to 
their ability to consider topography and build-up effects, as well as, the theoretical principles 
and modelling approaches [Venetsanos et al., 2003: Markiewicz, 2006]. This type of models use 
depth-averaged equations obtained by the integration of conservation equations over the fluid 
depth to describe the flow behaviour based on shallow water equations [Hankin and Britter 
1994; Venetsanos et al., 2003]. Formally, shallow layer models describe the cloud by four main 
variables (cloud depth, two components of velocity (u,v), and cloud concentration) as a 
function of time and (two-dimensional) ground position [Hankin, 1997]. The cloud depth is 
defined in terms of vertical concentration distribution and variables are often referred to as 
depth averaged [Hankin and Britter, 1994]. It is assumed that pressure distribution is 
hydrostatic within the main body of the cloud; and dispersion mainly occurs due to special 
processes at the leading edge. Among others, examples of Type V models include the 
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SHALLOW model [Webber, 1993], the SLAM model [Ott and Nielsen, 1996], the TWODEE 
model [Hankin, 1997], the DISPLAY-2 model [Venetsanos et al., 2003] or more recently the 
TWODEE-2 model [Folch, et al., 2009] and the QUIC modelling system [Brambilla et al., 2009]. 
With the continuous increase of hardware capabilities and the optimisation of numerical 
methods, Class III computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models have become an attractive tool 
to predict flow and concentration fields in complex topography and build-up areas [Costa, 
2008]. These models allow determining the dispersion phenomena associated to 
instantaneous, continuous and transient hazmat gas releases. Furthermore, in contrast to 
previous classes, CFD models have the capability to description of the flow around obstacles 
in a ‘more realistic way’ [Duijm et al., 1996; Cormier et al., 2009; Schatzmann et al., 2010] Fully 
3-dimensional (3D) conservation equations provide precise information of spatial and 
temporal distribution of hazmat gas in complex topography and/or build-up environments, 
even close to the source. Class III models can be divided into three distinct types: (I) Reynolds 
Averaged Navier-Stokes equation (RANS), (II) Direct Numerical Simulation (DNS), and (III) 
Large Eddy Simulation (LES) modelling [Borrego et al., 2004; Pontiggia et al., 2009].  
RANS model (Type I) is a CFD modelling technique that uses turbulence models to simulate 
the turbulent flow. This approach may be used with a finite element method to estimate the 
cloud in a 3D configuration. The most popular closure model for RANS models is the k–ε two-
equation model, since it has been proven to assure reasonable results and good stability [e.g. 
Luketa-Hanlin et al., 2007; Costa, 2008]. Nowadays, RANS models are often used in industrial 
and engineering applications. Despite its known limitations, for instance the tendency to over-
predict pollutants concentration in the far field under some atmospheric conditions, k-ε model 
typically results into reasonable agreement with experimental information concerning mean 
flow and pollutant concentration [see Würtz et al., 1996; Gilham et al., 2000; Baik and Kim, 
2002; Schatzmann and Leitl, 2002]. Currently, the DNS is very computationally demanding 
limiting its application to very simple cases [Pontiggia et al., 2009]. An intermediate solution is 
represented by LES models. In this type of class III models, the time-dependent flow equations 
are solved for the mean flow and the largest eddies through the use of models for simulating 
the effects of isotropic dissipating eddies [Qin et al., 2009].  
Some of well-known CFD models commonly applied to dense gas dispersion include: the 
FEM3 model [Gresho et al., 1983], FLUENT [URL2.2; Gavelli et al., 2006], CFX [URL2.2; 
Sklavounos and Rigas, 2004], FLACS [URL2.3; Hanna et al., 2004] or the VADIS model 
[Martins, 1998; Borrego et al., 2004]. Whereas CFX and FLUENT models are general-purpose 
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CFD codes not specifically designed to model hazmat gas dispersion; both FEM3 and FLACS 
models have been specifically developed to model hazmat gas dispersion.  
As shown in this section, there is a plethora of dispersion models of varying complexity that 
can be applied and implemented in CA studies. Currently, Class II models, particularly Types 
II – IV, are almost exclusively integrated in CA methodologies and Class III just starting to be 
applied [Hanna et al., 2008]. For instance, ALOHA, DEGADIS, GASTAR or even SLAB models 
(Class II models) are being widely used in CA studies over the last two decades, given their 
convenience of fast computational run time and easiness use. Yet, their selection/application 
is not consensual and always allied with limitations or assumptions. Over the last years, 
numerous studies compared the performance of some Classes II and III models in CA studies 
[e.g. Nussey et al., 1992; Würtz et al., 1996; Hankin, 1997; Hankin, 2003; Hanna et al., 2009; 
Schatzmann et al., 2010] demonstrating the reasonability of Class II models to provide 
satisfactory results for dispersion in flat terrain cases where the main concern is ground level 
concentration fields along the downwind directions; whilst Type V of Classes II and Class III 
models are capable to produce reliable results, including complex and/or built-up areas.  
Apart from the extensive use of Class II models (Types II – IV) in CA studies, their application 
neglecting the effects of complex terrain or presence of obstacles is becoming increasingly 
unacceptable due to the need to replicate as realist as possible hazmat gas cloud behaviours in 
industrial and built-up areas [Nussey et al., 1992; Mannan, 2005]. Additionally, Class III RANS 
models are starting to be applied in CA studies given their multi-task capacity [Würtz et al., 
1996; Gilham et al., 2000; Schatzmann and Leitl, 2002; Kim and Baik, 2003; Schatzmann et al., 
2010]. Nonetheless, the required computational efforts and level of expertise motivates the 
remaining use of Class II models, mainly by virtues of the associated low cost and expertise 
skills required, especially supporting limited time decision and emergency response. For that 
reason, is important to develop alternative models that maintain the simplicity of Class II 
models but enabling considering atmospheric dispersion in industrial and built-up areas, as 
realistic as possible. 
A possible alternative is the ‘commonly forgotten’ Shallow layer (Class II Type V) models 
[Venetsanos et al., 2003]. As explained before, these models are suitable to realistic assess the 
effect of complex topography on dense gas dispersion [Folch et al., 2009]. This type of models 
also presents some disadvantages, especially more computational run time than Class II Types 
I – IV, but still significantly lower than Class III models. Moreover, based on the literature [e.g. 
Meroney, 1987; Britter, 1989; Ott and Nielsen, 1996; Hankin, 1997; Venetsanos et al., 2003; 
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Brambilla et al., 2009] Shallow layer models have some advantages over other Class II models. 
Recent developments emphasized the potential application in CA studies, given their 
capability to describe the release and account (in a relatively simple way) the influence of 
major obstructions on hazmat gas atmospheric dispersion in complex terrain and/or built-up 
areas [see Hankin, 2003; Brambilla et al., 2009; Folch et al., 2009]. Therefore, the development 
and implementation of new shallow layer models can represent an alternative to currently 
applied Classes II and III models, in an attempt to replicate hazmat gas dispersion in 
industrial and built-up areas with relatively low computational efforts. 
2.3.3 Meteorological modelling 
In addition to hazmat gas source term characterization, atmospheric dispersion modelling 
critically depends on the accuracy of atmospheric physical processes numerical description 
and especially the meteorology characterization. Aiming to understand the role of 
meteorology on pollutants dispersion, a wide number of studies have been conducted and 
models developed over the last decades [e.g. Monin and Obukhov, 1954; Turner, 1964; Hanna 
and Chang, 1992; Karppinen, 2001; Allwine et al., 2002; Cimorelli et al., 2004; Palau et al., 2005; 
Monache et al., 2009]. Overall, it is consensual that dispersion is particularly 
affected/controlled by meteorological conditions, particularly the wind (velocity and 
direction), atmospheric turbulence and the occurrence of inversion layers, ambient 
temperature and mixing height [Karppinen, 2001]. Consequently, a proper description of these 
meteorological and atmospheric boundary layer (ABL) stability conditions is of substantial 
importance for the performance quality of the atmospheric dispersion modelling element 
[Hewitt and Jackson, 2003; VROM, 2005a].  
Bearing in mind that turbulence and mixing height parameters are not measured in routine 
monitoring stations (as wind velocity and direction or temperature profiles), they have to be 
inferred from the available measurements through the application of theoretical and 
mathematical methodologies (parameterisation schemes). These methodologies can be 
implemented in integrated or separated meteorological pre-processing models. Thus, even not 
considered a ‘truly’ CA modelling element, meteorological modelling must be also integrated 
and applied to assure a proper characterization of meteorological and ABL conditions for 
further atmospheric dispersion modelling. Taking into account the main purposes of 
application of CA modelling tools, meteorological models commonly used consist of 
diagnostic tools, which use mainly past, present or hypothetical meteorological data. 
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In spite of the wide variety of meteorological models currently available, the majority 
integrates the ‘Monin-Obukhov Similarity Theory’ (MOST) principles for the treatment of 
meteorological information and estimation of ABL scaling parameters. It is also common the 
use of the surface momentum and energy fluxes method originally suggested by van Ulden 
and Holtslag [1985], with a separated treatment for convective and stable conditions [see 
Monin and Yaglom, 1971; Karppinen, 2001; Cimorelli et al., 2004]. In general, ABL scaling 
parameters (e.g. Monin-Obukhov length, surface friction velocity or surface heat flux) are 
estimated from routine or representative surface and upper air meteorological measurements. 
As regards to mixing heights, various mathematical schemes and approaches have been 
suggested and applied to determine ABL mixing heights during day and night periods [see 
Seibert et al., 1998; COST 715, 2002; Baklanov et al., 2006].  
Despite the limitations discussed by Högström [1996], Seibert et al. [1998], Venkatram [2004], 
Zilitinkevick et al. [2007] or Monache et al. [2009], or even the new modelling similarity 
approaches proposed recently [see Laubach and McNaugthon, 2009], McNaughton [2009] 
stated that MOST approach can work reasonably well, if not perfectly, with experimental field 
meteorological data. More realistic meteorological models, such as the 3D full-physical models 
(e.g. the Mesoscale Meteorological (MM5) [URL2.4] or Weather Research Forecast (WRF) 
[URL2.5] models) can be applied, however, the degree of complexity, expertise and run time 
still limits their application by analysts or emergency response. 
2.3.4 Effects modelling 
The assessment of consequences and damages from examined accident scenarios depends on 
the object of the CA study, providing reliable information of effects in human health, 
structures or the environment. For the purpose of assessing effects on human health, 
consequences can be expressed in the form of deaths or injuries [CCPS, 2000]. In case of 
physical structures, effects are expressed as damages or monetary losses. Environmental 
effects may be more complex, and can include impacts on animal life or plants, soil or water 
contamination, and other impacts. However, within the scope of CA studies in industrial 
activities, environmental effects are usually not taken into account [CCPS, 1999; VROM, 
2005c], being examined in the frame of other studies, such as environment impact evaluation. 
Over the last decades, several ways to quantify the effects from specific incidents have been 
developed and applied in CA studies [Mannan, 2005]. The most frequently used method of 
assessing the consequence of accidents is the ‘Direct effects model’ [CCPS, 1999], which 
estimates the effects on people and structures based on predetermined criteria (e.g. death or 
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crashes in a building). Contrarily to previous modelling approaches (source term or dispersion 
modelling), consequences cannot take the form of discrete functions [CCPS, 2000], given the 
variety and number of variables that must be considered (e.g. age, health conditions, period of 
exposure, resistance, etc.). Yet, depending on the type of accident, different modelling 
approaches have been developed and implemented in CA studies, for instance, the statistical 
methods of dose-response and probit functions, the toxic gas effects models, the thermal 
effects models or the explosion effects models [Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005b,c]. Overall, the 
name of each reflects the type of incident and related consequences examined, with the 
exception of the statistical methods that can be applied for various incidents. Whereas thermal 
and explosion effects models predict the consequences on humans and structures from fires 
and explosions respectively; toxic gas effects models are applied when examined accidental 
release and atmospheric dispersion of hazmat gases. Despite the broad range of application, 
the statistical methods are mostly applied when PRA approaches are used in the CA study 
[VROM, 2005c]. Regardless the relevance of the various consequences models, in view of the 
main purpose of the present thesis, only toxic gas effects modelling approach is presented. 
In general, toxic gas effects models are employed to assess the consequences to human health 
as a result of exposure to a known hazmat gas concentration for a known period of time 
[CCPS, 1999]. Direct comparison of estimated hazmat concentrations at specific locations 
against reference safety toxicological criteria (safety threshold limits) intends estimating the 
magnitude of potential effects on human health from the exposure. Within the frame of CA 
studies, effects models directly use concentration fields produced by the dispersion models. 
Taking into account the nature of potential consequences from accidents involve the release of 
hazmat gases, only effects on human health and related safety threshold limits are considered 
[CCPS, 1999]. These safety threshold criteria are based on the combination of results from 
animal experiments, observations of long- and short-term human exposures, and expert 
judgement [CCPS, 2000]. Some of the widely used safety threshold limits, extensively 
described in the literature, include Emergency Response Planning Guidelines for Air Contaminants 
(ERPGs), Threshold Limit Values (TLVs), Short-Term Exposure Limits (STELs), Permissible 
Exposure Limits (PELs) or even the Acute Exposure Guideline Limits (AEGLs) [Hanna and Drivas, 
1987; Fingas, 2002; VROM, 2005b,c; Casal, 2008] among others considered in emergency 
response planning, occupational health and safety in industrial environments [AIHA, 2004; 
Casal, 2008]. Often, these criteria comprise different degrees/levels of consequences as a 
function of the exposure period (e.g. STEL 15 minutes or AEGL–1 for 1 hour of exposure). In 
addition to toxicological consequences, flammability limits (LFL and upper flammability limit 
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(UFL)) can also be considered when potential occurrence of ignition is considered [Fingas, 
2002; Casal, 2008]. Nonetheless, in the present thesis will only be focused the toxicological 
thresholds considered for the estimation of short-term pollution episodes. 
Potential consequences can be estimated in various forms, depending on the degree of 
available information or purpose of application. The simplest comprise the estimation of areas 
potentially affected by concentrations above threshold limits. Direct comparison of predicted 
concentration-time fields’ against reference limits is performed and outcomes are produced in 
the form of risk contours maps. More complex approaches enable the estimation of potential 
effects on humans by crossing information from detailed characterization of the accident 
concentration field and the population spatial distribution [Tavares et al., 2010]. In this case, 
the quantification of effects is presented in the form of risk contour maps, hazardous cloud 
footprints as a function of time and effective number of people affected by concentrations 
above the examined threshold limits [CCPS, 2000; Ale, 2009; Pontiggia et al., 2009]. 
Nonetheless, if detailed information on local population of vulnerable spots is available, the 
number of people potentially in risk to suffer health problems can be also estimated. 
2.4 Synthesis 
Since the mid-1970s, QRA methodologies ‘emerged’ worldwide with ever increasing 
importance as the ‘scientific pillar’ of regulatory, control and prevention instruments to 
quantify the impact, frequency/probability of occurrence, consequences and risks of 
technological hazards identified in hazardous industrial and transportation activities. ‘Full 
QRA’ studies comprise five main steps for the estimation of risks from identified and 
examined accident scenarios based on probabilistic and/or deterministic approaches and 
qualitative and/or quantitative techniques. Considering the estimation and assessment of 
consequences the central focus of QRA studies, new and more complex CA methodologies 
(overlapping QRA steps 2 and 4) have been developed and applied over the last years, 
strongly supported by numerical modelling tools. 
The need to understand and numerically describe the various stages of accident scenarios 
involving the release and dispersion of hazmat gases, gave to numerical tools a unique value, 
and it possible to identify three main types of CA numerical modelling elements: source term, 
atmospheric dispersion and effects models. 
Considering the wide variety of release conditions, a large number of source term models 
have been developed to account for the various types of failure and initial containment 
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conditions of the hazmat gas accidentally released, commonly defined by typifying accident 
scenarios. A plethora of different dispersion models of varying complexity (divided in three 
main classes) has been developed and integrated in CA methodologies over the last decades, 
to estimate concentration fields as a function of time. Currently, Class II models (integral and 
intermediate), particularly Types II – IV, are almost exclusively integrated in CA, and Class III 
(CFD models) are just starting to be applied. Contrarily to ‘traditional’ air quality modelling 
tools, CA dispersion models essentially comprise models able to predict the dispersion of 
dense gas in industrial and built-up areas. Additionally, meteorological modelling tools, in 
general based on the MOST principles, provide information to numerically describe the 
meteorological and ABL conditions during the release and dispersion phenomena. Finally, the 
magnitude and extension of predicted consequences/effects from the accident scenario 
hazards are estimated in the effects models, based on direct comparisons of estimated 
concentrations fields and reference toxicological criteria (exposure threshold limits).  
Despite the extensive use of both simple (Class II Types II – IV) and more complex (Class III) 
models in CA studies, a remaining and major challenge to overcome their constrains and 
limitations, entails the development of intermediate (Class II) local-scale dispersion models, 
able to predict short-term pollution episodes from accidents involving the release of hazmat 
gases in industrial and/or built-up urban areas, in a more realistic but still simple way.  
A possible alternative are the ‘commonly forgotten’ shallow layer (Class II Type V) models. 
These models are suitable to describe in a realistic, but still relatively simple way, the 
influence of complex topography and obstacles on hazmat gas dispersion. Even requiring 
more computational run times than other Class II models, this is significantly lower than Class 
III models, enabling their use in CA studies for industrial and built-up areas, as well as, to 
support decision and emergency planning and response in reasonable run time. 
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF RELEASED HAZARDOUS GASES 
MODEL 
 
 
This chapter presents the development of the EFects of Released Hazardous gAses model 
(EFRHA), specifically designed to predict short-term pollution episodes from accidental 
releases of hazmat gases into the atmosphere in industrial and built-up areas. Its general 
structure, modules and main input/output data are described. Main features of implemented 
modelling algorithm techniques and approaches to numerically describe the various stages of 
the release and atmospheric dispersion of hazmat gases, as well as, the influence of 
environmental conditions are also addressed. 
3.1 General structure of the EFRHA model 
With the purpose of overcoming some of recognized constrains of Class II models/software 
packages currently applied in CA studies, the PC-based EFRHA model (written in the 
FORTRAN® 95 programming language) was developed for the estimation of short-term 
pollution episodes and consequences from accident scenarios involving the release and 
dispersion of hazmat gases in industrial and urban areas. Intended to be used by expert 
modellers, analysts and industrialists, but also, by less specialized regulatory and emergency 
or safety operators, the design of EFRHA model kept a compromise between the simplicity of 
Class II dispersion models and an increased modelling capability to account the influence of 
obstructions (complex terrain and/or obstacles) on hazmat gas atmospheric dispersion. Also, 
aiming to facilitate its use, up-to-date numerical methods usually applied separated in the 
various CA modelling elements and relevant databases were implemented, reducing the 
requirements of input and ‘interim’ data. As a result, a minimum number of strict mandatory 
user defined information was established, simplifying the complexity and effort on 
preparing/collecting input data, but also, enabling the application of the developed model, 
especially when limited input information is available, particularly if not easily accessible by 
the potential user. 
Considering the overall structure (see Figure 2.2) and requirements of CA studies and the 
process stages and modelling elements, the EFRHA model is designed to run as a five 
sequential steps modules: (1) Meteorological Module (EMM); (2) Terrain Module (ETM); (3) 
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Source Term Module (ESTM); (4) Dispersion Module (EDM); and finally (5) Effects Module 
(EEM), as schematized in Figure 3.1a. The organization of the modules follows the needs of 
information processing flow, to properly describe the source term and hazmat gas dispersion 
phenomena based on the defined accident scenario conditions, without forgetting the 
influence of surrounding environment, according to the structure presented in Figure 3.1b. 
Figure B.1 (Appendix B) shows a more detailed scheme of organization of the implemented 
modules and data used/produced in each. 
(a)
 
(b) 
 
Figure 3.1 – EFRHA model: (a) organization of the steps modules, and (b) basic structure with data 
flow along the simulation process. 
Even considering EDM the main core of the EFRHA model, additional related models have 
been implemented in the developed model in the form of pre- (EMM, ETM and ESTM) and 
post- (EEM) processors. The calculation starts with the treatment of meteorological input data 
and the estimation of ABL scaling parameters in the EMM. Topographical and obstacles input 
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information is processed and wind fields generated in ETM. Next, ESTM estimates the hazmat 
gas mass flow rate applying well-established source models according to the defined accident 
scenario characteristics. Atmospheric dispersion of the released hazmat gas in industrial and 
built-up areas is numerically described in EDM using an up-to-date Class II Type V modelling 
approach. Finally, potential consequences and effects on human health are determined in EEM 
based on direct comparisons of predicted concentrations temporal and spatial distribution 
against standard safety threshold limit values.  
Modelling schemes used in the simulation directly depend on various criteria, such as, the 
main purpose of the CA application, selected input modelling options, available information 
or type of the accident scenario evaluated. Detailed datasets of meteorological, terrain 
(surface, land-use and obstacles) and source information/parameters must be generated 
and/or provided along the modelling process to properly estimate the consequences of 
exposure to short-term pollution episodes from hazmat gas accidental release into the 
atmosphere in industrial and/or built-up areas. Nonetheless, the developed model is 
structured to simplify the definition of input information and data flow along the various 
modules, maintaining continuous verification of generated and transferred data, as well as, 
access to internal databases. 
Unlike most CA models or software packages currently applied in CA studies, the developed 
model is prepared to bypass ‘pre-processing’ modules, if correspondent outputs (EFRHA’s 
interim information) have already been estimated. For instance, if the same meteorological 
data is considered for various accident scenarios, EMM only needs to be run in the first 
simulation and therefore bypassed in the following, if it is assured the completeness of 
generated interim information and is accessible by the user. This option is of particular 
interest, especially in case of multiple runs under the same environment conditions, reducing 
the process time. 
In order to avoid errors or erroneous results (especially in interim modelled information), a 
continuous evaluation and consistency check procedure/test is implemented in the algorithm 
to assure that processed information (either input and output) is valid, i.e., within ranges of 
recommended valid data limits. Two main consistency check procedures are implemented in 
all the modules and model main algorithm to verify if processed data is valid to continue the 
simulation without producing erroneous outputs. The process is based on direct comparisons 
of input/output data against acceptance limits, according to modelling requirements and 
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recommendations available in the literature [e.g. Britter, 1990; USEPA, 2004a,b; TNO, 2005; 
VROM, 2005a; Borrego et al., 2009]. 
Following, mathematical methods and modelling approaches implemented in the various 
modules of the EFRHA model are presented, justifying the selection and adopted approaches 
and assumption. 
3.2 EMM – EFRHA Meteorological Module 
The EMM is designed to process meteorological data and numerically describe the ABL 
conditions, in the form of ABL scaling and mixing height parameters, during the period of 
simulation, according to the structure presented in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Schematic representation of EMM structure and data flow. 
Unlike most CA models/software packages, the user does not have to provide all input 
meteorological parameters, especially the ones rarely measured in routine meteorological 
monitoring stations and which the estimation may require a certain degree of expertise (e.g. 
ABL scaling parameters).  
The minimum input data requirements of EMM include measurements from an onsite or 
representative surface monitoring station and terrain surface and land-use characteristics. If 
the period of simulation includes daytime and/or after daytime hours, it is necessary to 
provide, at least, the early morning upper air radiosonde data. The complete list of input 
meteorological data considered by EMM is listed in Table B.1 (Appendix B). Apart from the 
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recommended use of the strict mandatory list of input parameters, the module is also 
prepared to ‘read’ both input and output meteorological parameters previously estimated by 
EFRHA or other meteorological model (e.g. mesoscale weather forecast models). 
In any case, direct comparisons of input and output data with acceptance limits established in 
accordance with the literature and meteorological models currently available [e.g. Reynolds, 
1992; Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants (CERC), 2002; USEPA, 2004b; TNO, 
2007] are performed, following the philosophy of continuous consistency data check. 
Moreover, although ‘traditional’ CA studies apply representative average and ‘constant’ 
meteorological conditions for the entire period of simulation, EMM is designed to process 
meteorological information for short and long periods of recorded data of varied temporal 
resolution. This capability is of significant importance for ESTM and EDM calculation 
processes. 
The EMM modelling approach is based on the quantitative MOST approach through the 
integration of the commonly applied surface momentum and energy fluxes relationships 
method, with a separated treatment for convective and stable conditions [Ulden and Holtslag, 
1985; Cimorelli et al., 2005]. It is assumed that mean wind and temperature profiles and 
turbulent velocities in the ABL can be completely determined by scaling lengths (surface 
roughness length (z0), displacement length (d) and L), and scaling velocities – surface friction 
velocity (u*) and the convective velocity scale (w*) [see Deardorff, 1970 Seinfeld et al., 2006]. It 
is also considered that fluxes are constant with height and the mean wind follows a 
logarithmic profile, with an adjustment for diabatic flows [Hanna and Britter, 2002].  
During the period of simulation, meteorological and turbulence conditions are numerically 
described by estimated ABL scaling parameters, according to the two stages calculation 
process schematized in Figure 3.3. 
The first stage comprises the determination of the period of the day (day or night time period), 
prevailing stability conditions (convective or stable) and the estimation of the following ABL 
scaling parameters: L, u*, sensible heat flux (H) and potential temperature scale (θ*). 
At a first analysis, the period of the day is determined based on the estimation and 
comparative analysis of solar elevation angle (φs) and critical solar angle (φcrit) at the moment 
of meteorological data. The estimation of φs is based on the general method described in 
VROM [2005a], whereas φcrit, is estimated as presented by Cimorelli et al. [2004]. If φs > φcrit, it is 
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considered to be at daytime; otherwise it is assumed night time. This initial process is of 
significant importance for further estimation of ABL mixing heights in stage 2. 
 
Figure 3.3 – General calculation equations flowchart of EMM. 
Taking into account that different approaches are applied for stable and convective conditions, 
prevailing stability conditions are also determined by the estimation of H (Eq. 3-1), assuming 
that H<0 - stable; H>0 - convective and H=0 - neutral [Seinfeld et al., 2006]. The expression to 
estimate H was derivate by Holtslag and van Ulden [1983] from the energy balance at the 
earth’s surface for rural sites, using the Oke’s [1978] approach at the earth’s surface for rural 
sites, as follows: 
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In which Rn is the net radiation and Bo is the Bowen ratio. The Bo is an indicator of surface 
moisture, and expresses the ratio between the H to the latent heat flux. Standard default 
values of Bo are widely compiled in the literature [e.g. Paine, 1987; Seinfeld et al., 2006], ranging 
from less than 0.001 m over a calm water surface to 1 m or more over a forest or urban area, 
depending on land use type, season, moisture conditions and period of day, among other 
criteria. In EFRHA, the Bo is processed in ETM as further described (see Section 3.3). 
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If measurements of Rn are not available, it is estimated from the insolation and the thermal 
radiation balance at the ground following the method of Holtslag and van Ulden [1983] as: 
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In which c1=5.31x10-13 W.m-2.K-6, c2=60 W.m-2 and c3= 0.12 are constants, ra(φs) is the albedo as a 
function of φs, Rsol is the incoming solar radiation, σSB=5.67x10-8 W.m-2.K-4 is the Stefan-
Boltzmann constant, Ta is the reference ambient temperature and n the fractional cloud cover.  
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where ra’ is the ra (φs =90º) for the sun on the meridian, which is specific for the surface 
characteristics of the site. In the open literature standard default values for ra(φs) is available 
and recommended [USEPA, 2004b]. 
If Rsol is not available in input data, it is computed from φs, n and the incoming solar radiation 
for clear skies (R0) following the Kasten and Czeplak [1980] expressions, given by: 
( )4.30 75.01 nRRsol −=                Eq. 3-4 
( ) 30sin9900 −= sR φ                 Eq. 3-5 
If measurements of n and Rsol are not available, a default value of n=0.5 is assumed in Eq. 3-2 
and Eq. 3-4; however, if observations of Rsol are available, an equivalent fractional cloud cover 
(neq) is calculated from Eq. 3-6, such that  
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Finally, if H<0 it is assumed that the atmosphere is stable, otherwise convective stability 
conditions are considered. In case of different results obtained by the previously describe 
methods, prevails the result of the estimation of H. 
Known the relation between ABL stability and H, the implemented approaches and 
expressions used to estimate L and u* and θ* are ‘selected’ depending on the determined 
stability condition [Venkatram, 2004]. In case of atmospheric convective or unstable conditions 
(CBL), the L and u* are estimated using Eq. 3-7 and 3-8 to 3-10; otherwise, under stable 
conditions (SBL) the L, u* and θ* are estimated using the set of Eq. 3-11 to 3-14; as schematized 
in Figure 3.3. 
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According to the MOST approach, the effects of ABL stability on the wind profile can be 
completely determined by L [Hanna and Britter, 2002], which provides a measure of stability 
and can be interpreted as the height above the ground where turbulence generated by wind 
shear equals the turbulence dissipated by the heat flux [Wyngaard, 1988], estimated as: 
Hgk
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=                 Eq. 3-7 
In which g=9.8 m.s-2 is the gravitational acceleration, k=0.41 is the von Karman constant, Cpa is 
the specific heat capacity of air at constant pressure, and Ta is the reference ambient 
temperature representative of the surface ABL. Eq. 3-6 shows that L depends directly from the 
estimation of both H and u*. Therefore, the estimation of L and u* is performed simultaneously 
through an iterative process. The methods implemented for the estimation of these ABL 
scaling parameters differ according to ABL stability conditions, as further presented. 
During CBL conditions, u* and L are computed through a surface similarity iterative method 
(Eq. 3-7 to Eq. 3-10) until the convergence less than 1% is reached. In this case it is used the 
value of H initially estimated from Eq. 3-1. The iterative method is initialized assuming 
neutral conditions (i.e., L = ∞), Ψm = 0, and u = uref. In each step, u* is computed by the 
expression of Panosfsky and Dutton [1984] as follows: 
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In which uref is the wind velocity at reference measurements height zref, and z0 is the roughness 
length. The integrated forms of the similarity functions Ψm’s are evaluated by Panofsky and 
Dutton [1984] as: 
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with µ0 and µ1 calculated from: 
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Alternatively, under SBL conditions u* and L are estimated recurring to a simpler empirical 
approach suggested by Venkatram [1980], because Oke’s [1978] approach used for the 
estimation of H (Eq. 3.1) is unreliable in the SBL conditions.  
The L can be expressed as: 
2
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=                  Eq. 3-11 
Venkatram [1980] observed that an empirical relationship (Eq. 3-12) can be established 
between θ* and H given by: 
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In stable conditions, the θ* can then be calculated from the empirical form considering the 
cloud cover [van Ulden and Holtslag, 1985] as: 
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*
5.0109.0 n−=θ                 Eq. 3-13 
As regards to u*, it is considered the Panofsky and Dutton [1984] expression for the wind 
velocity profile: 
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where βm = 5. Substituting Eq. 3-11 into Eq. 3-14 and modifying the expression is obtained a 
quadratic solution that simplifies the estimation of u* [Venkatram, 2004]. The solution for L, u* 
and θ* is then found through an iterative process by the continuous application of the Eq. 3-11 
to Eq. 3-14 [Hanna and Chang, 1993]. Reached the acceptable degree of convergence lower 
than 1%, H is estimated from Eq. 3-11 and final value of L is estimated from Eq. 3-10. Detailed 
description of the implemented methodology for stable conditions is presented in Cimorelli et 
al. [2005].  
Next, surface energy flux balance and mixed-layer parameters are estimated in the second 
stage, in the form of ABL mixing height (zi), convective (zic) and mechanical mixing heights 
(zim), the w* and vertical profiles of meteorological parameters. The estimation of zi depends on 
both zic and zim, as a function of the prevailing ABL stability conditions. During CBL 
conditions, zi is considered to be the larger of zic and zim; whilst under SBL conditions, 
mechanical processes are dominant and zi is directly estimated by the estimated zim 
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[Venkatram, 2004]. In an attempt to facilitating the application of EFRHA model even in case 
of limited input meteorological information, two distinct modelling techniques are 
implemented in EMM for the estimation of ABL mixing height parameters (zi, zic, zim and w*) 
depending on the availability of early morning upper air data for the period of time 
considered.  
If early morning upper air data is available, CBL conditions are considered and no 
measurements of the mixing height are input, zic is calculated with the simple one-
dimensional energy balance model developed by Carson [1973] and modified by Weil and 
Brower [1983] given by: 
{ } { } ( ) { }∫∫ +=−
t
paa
z
icic dtC
tHAdzzzz
ic
00
'
'21
ρ
θθ             Eq. 3-15 
In which θ is the potential temperature, A = 0.2 and t is the record hour after sunrise, requiring 
the continuous contribution of H along the daytime period. In case of additional upper air 
vertical profiles are available during daytime EMM is prepared to continuously use this 
information to correct the estimated parameters time evolution. 
On the other hand, if early morning upper air data is not available, the default standard values 
listed in Table B.3 (Appendix B) suggested by the European ARIA-EIA project [URL3.1] are 
considered for the estimation of zic and therefore zi during daytime periods. The selection of 
the zic value is based on the well-established Pasquill-Gifford (PG) stability classes determined 
from the ranges of L values relations suggested in the literature [see Seinfeld et al., 2006], as 
presented in Table B.3 (Appendix B). Despite the clear uncertainties associated to this 
assumption, the implementation of this methodology intends overcoming the ‘common’ 
limitation and allowing the estimation of consequences from the accident scenario analyzed 
even in case of limited input information.  
As regards to zim, EMM integrates different approaches depending on ABL stability 
conditions. Under SBL conditions, zim is estimated by the lower of the expressions suggested 
by Zilitinkevich [1972] (Eq. 3-16) and Venkatram [1980] (Eq. 3-17) as mentioned in Seibert et 
al. [1998] and COST 715 [2002] given by: 
21
*4.0 





= f
Lu
zim                  Eq. 3-16 
23
*
2300 uzim ×=                  Eq. 3-17 
Development of the EFfects of Released Hazardous gAses model 
 
Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 87 
where f is the Coriolis parameter. 
During CBL conditions, zim is estimated using the expression suggested by Venkatram [1980] 
(Eq. 3-17) [Cimorelli et al., 2005]. To avoid estimating sudden and unrealistic drops in the 
shear-induced turbulent layer, the time evolution of zim is computed following Venkatram 
[1982] approach in which the current ‘corrected’ value of (zim(i)) is ‘smoothed’ based on 
previous record (zim(i-1)) given by: 
[ ])/()/( 1)()1()( ττ timtimim eizeiziz ∆−∆− −+×−=            Eq. 3-18 
In which the time scale τ is estimated by: 
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In the estimation of τ, while zim(i-1) corresponds to previous record, u*(i) is the estimated value 
for the current record [Cimorelli et al., 2004]. 
Finally, w*, used to characterize the convective portion of the turbulence during CBL 
conditions [Wyngaard, 1988], is calculated as follows: 
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Vertical profiles of temperature and wind velocity are determined using the similarity 
parameterizations and power law profile approaches described by Karppinen [2001] and 
Cimorelli et al. [2005]. 
Overall, implemented ABL scaling parameters modelling approaches enable an accurate, but 
at the same time simple and fast-run technique to provide reliable information for subsequent 
modules. In order to assure that reliable interim meteorological and ABL scaling parameters 
are provided to subsequent modules, a consistency check is performed covering all estimated 
meteorological and ABL scaling and mixing height parameter. 
In case of bypass, or direct provision of output parameters values (e.g. from previous runs), 
EMM checks the consistency of the complete set of ‘input parameters’. An alternative 
procedure to the EMM bypass option is to derive the necessary meteorological data from 
weather forecast models (e.g. MM5 [Dudhia et al., 2001] or WRF [Michalakes et al., 2004] 
forecast models) or previous EFRHA model meteorological simulations available for the same 
location and period of time and directly provide the complete list of input data considered in 
EFRHA meteorological input file. 
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3.3 ETM – EFRHA Terrain Module 
The ETM aims processing topographical, land-use and obstacles data, as well as, the spatial 
distribution of receptors and sources within the simulation domain area ‘boundaries’. Apart 
from input and output data consistency check procedures, the ETM is structured in two main 
stages of data process: (i) surface and land-use characteristics, and (ii) estimation of average 
wind fields. Figure 3.4 shows the basic structure of the ETM and data flow.  
 
Figure 3.4 – ETM basic structure with the different stages of process. 
ETM main inputs comprise information concerning the spatial distribution of receptors, 
sources and buildings, surface and land-use information and meteorological information. 
Attempting to integrate up-to-date Geographical Information System (GIS) tools formats or 
other types of information, this module relies on a regular Cartesian coordinate system where 
true north is always upward in the positive y and east is always to the right in the positive x 
directions, independently to wind direction as illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5 – Schematic representation of terrain, receptors and source gridded data used in EFRHA. 
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Regular and discrete gridded terrain data can be used to characterize both terrain (terrain 
topography and land-use) and receptors spatial distribution. Sources are defined by the 
spatial location of the source centre point initially defined by the user and dimensions are 
further defined according to the type of accident and outflow conditions (see Section 3.4). 
Additionally, if relevant obstructions (e.g. buildings) are considered, their spatial distribution 
and geometries are also input, directly by the user or through preliminary data process 
procedures using GIS software with the terrain topography information. Spatial distribution 
and dimensions of receptors grids, sources and obstacles (if present) are checked against 
terrain domain gridded data and ‘boundaries’, to guarantee the reliability and completeness of 
processed data for the correct data treatment and further transfer to EDM. 
The first stage of ETM comprises the treatment of input land-use and terrain surface base 
elevation data. Land-use is characterized by the z0, Bo and ra(φs) values. Estimated, measured 
or even default values available in the literature based on the type of land-use and period of 
the year [e.g. USEPA, 2004b; Seinfeld et al., 2006; Turner and Schulze, 2007] can be used to 
characterize the study area surface, defined by one of two alternative approaches. 
If detailed information for the gridded terrain domain area is available (i.e. spatial distribution 
of the analyzed parameters), values for terrain base elevation, z0, Bo and ra(φs) in each receptor 
point are determined by interpolation from the closest terrain grid point’s data. Alternatively, 
if limited information of spatial distribution is available, or is relatively uniform, predominant 
terrain features can be supplied for various wind direction sectors (up to 16 sectors) about the 
major variations in terrain and land-use characteristics. Values for z0, Bo and ra(φs) in each 
receptor point are determined based on the wind direction recorded during the period of 
simulation and correspondent sector. 
As regards to the effective surface elevation at receptors locations, the interpolation of terrain 
surface elevation height values in each receptor from the closest terrain grid point’s data is 
performed (from a reference base level elevation).  
Next, average wind fields are estimated for the simulation domain to account, in a more 
realistic way, the influence of terrain and obstructions on hazmat gas dispersion behaviour. 
Two distinct situations are considered in ETM: 
(i) Flat terrain without any obstruction,  
(ii) Complex or obstructed terrain.  
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While in the first a uniform wind flow is considered, using only the mean wind direction 
measured in each meteorological record; in case of obstructed, a spatially variable wind field 
for each meteorological record must be estimated. In order to account the presence of 
obstructions, but at the same time maintaining the somewhat straightforwardness of EDM 
modelling approach, quasi-steady-state average gridded wind fields are estimated based on 
the Diagnostic Wind Model [Douglas and Kessler, 1990] principles for each meteorological 
record. Mean wind fields are adjusted based on the obstructions spatial distribution and a 
divergence minimization is performed to ensure mass conservation [Folche et al., 2009]. This 
option is also prepared to process multiple wind fields records based on the meteorological 
records initially defined by the user. In addition to the capability to account, in a relatively 
simple way the presence of obstructions, it also enables considering variation of wind 
direction during the period of simulation, independently if obstructions are considered or not. 
3.4 ESTM – EFRHA Source Term Module 
Aiming to numerically describe the hazmat gas release phenomenon, the ESTM comprises a 
set of up-to-date source models recommended for the wide variety of accident situations 
commonly analyzed in CA studies. Taking into account the number and types of source 
models, ESTM is divided in four sub-modules based on the initial hazmat physical state and 
scenario conditions: (i) ESTM1 – compressed gas, (ii) ESTM2 – non-boiling liquid, (iii) 
pressurized liquefied gas, and (iv) evaporation of liquid pool, as schematized in Figure 3.6.  
 
Figure 3.6 – ESTM basic structure with data flow. 
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Three distinct initial physical states can be considered: pure gas (from compressed gas or 
vapour fraction of PLG), pure liquid (from non-boiling liquids or liquid fraction of PLG) and 
two-phase mixtures (mixtures of vapour and liquid from PLG) [Green and Perry, 2008]. 
Depending on the initial physical state, varying degrees of calculation ‘complexity’ are 
implemented, as further described. 
In any case, to assure a proper characterization of hazmat initial containment conditions for 
the selected scenario, an initial consistency check of user defined input information and 
internally estimated chemical properties is conducted prior the ‘selection of the sub-module’. 
Input information concerning initial containment conditions, failure type/mode (i.e. the way 
the release takes place) and chemical properties parameters is directly compared against 
ranges of recommended acceptance limits [see Britter 1990; TNO, 2007; Reynolds, 1992]. 
Additionally, in view of guaranteeing the selection of the most appropriated modelling 
approach, the ‘real physical state’ of the hazmat prior the release is verified by means of the 
criteria listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 – Thermodynamic states [VROM, 2005a].  
Physical state Thermodynamic conditions 
Compressed gas T0 > Tc or P0 < Pv
0
(T) 
PLG P0 = Pv
0
(T) 
(non-boiling) liquid Tmelt < T0 < TB 
Initial hazmat storage/transport temperature (T0) and pressure (P0) are directly compared 
with correspondent critical temperature (Tc), boiling point temperature (TB), melting point 
temperature (Tmelt) and the estimated saturated vapour pressure (Pv0(T)) to confirm/define the 
‘real’ hazmat physical state prior to the release and then select the most appropriated source 
model. In view of considering the most common release scenarios examined in CA studies, the 
set of outflow conditions listed in Table 3.2 distributed by the four main sub-modules can be 
processed by ESTM, as a function of the initial hazmat physical state. 
According to Table 3.2, ESTM is designed to estimate the mass flow rate of: pure gas (from 
compressed gas or vapour fraction of PLG); pure liquid (non boiling liquid or liquid fraction 
of PLG); and two-phase mixtures (vapour and liquid mixtures PLG) release scenarios. 
Whereas for ‘pure gas’ releases, the calculation process is more or less straightforward, 
considering directly the estimated mass flow rate; ‘pure liquid’ outflows require the 
estimation of the liquid spill outflow and further evaporation rate (if applicable). A more 
Development of the EFfects of Released Hazardous gAses model 
 
Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 92 
complex approach is required for two-phase outflows from PLG depend in the liquid and/or 
vapour fraction. 
Table 3.2 – ESTM sub-modules and integrated release scenarios. 
Sub-module Initial physical state Outflow condition 
ESTM1 
Compressed gas 
(qs) 
- Totally collapsed vessel 
- Vessel through small leak from 
a) hole in vessel wall 
b) hole in vessel piping 
- Full bore ruptured pipeline 
- Pipeline through small leak 
- Full bore ruptured piping system  
- Piping system through small leak 
ESTM2 
Non-boiling Liquids 
(non-boiling or refrigerated) 
(qsL) 
- Totally ruptured vessel 
- Vessel through small leak 
a) hole in vessel wall 
b) hole in vessel piping 
- Full bore ruptured pipeline 
ESTM3 
PLG 
(saturated and refrigerated) 
(qsF, qsV, qsL) 
- Totally ruptured vessel 
- Vessel through small leak 
a) hole in vessel wall 
b) hole in vessel piping 
- Full bore ruptured pipeline 
- Pipeline through small leak 
ESTM4 
Liquids 
(qsVp) 
- Evaporation from spill of non-boiling and boiling 
liquids 
In order to cover both, short and long term release situations, as well as, controlled and 
uncontrolled outflows, the ESTM algorithm is prepared to process instantaneous, continuous 
(steady-state) and transient (time-varying) releases. In case of continuous releases, the user 
provides the finite-duration steady state emission rate (qsc), corresponding duration (tsc) and 
the cross-sectional area of the source aperture (Ah), independently of the containment 
equipment. In this case, if a pure gas release is defined, the ESTM checks the consistency of 
user defined input data and processes the information to be properly used in EDM; however, 
if is assumed a liquid of two-phase outflow, the ESTM checks the consistency of input 
information and estimates the resulting evaporation rate (in ESTM4). As regards to 
instantaneous release scenarios, the calculation process is similar to previously described for 
continuous, however is assumed the instantaneous release of the all hazmat volume. 
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Alternatively, transient release scenarios can be considered the most complex release 
situations, requiring the integration of source models developed to numerically describe the 
variation of the outflow rate under specific conditions and initial conditions. Independently of 
the selected sub-module, the source term calculation process only continues while the set of 
control conditions listed in Eq. 3-21 is satisfied. 
simi Tt ≤     aPP ≥     meltTT >     tNi ≤     Eq. 3-21 
In which ti is the time for the step i after the start of the release, Tsim is the period of simulation 
defined by the user, P is the pressure of the hazmat gas, Pa is the atmospheric pressure, T is the 
temperature of the hazmat gas, Tmelt is the typical melting temperature of the hazmat and 
finally Nt is the total number of steps defined by the user. Such conditions assure the 
consistency and accurate numerical description of hazmat gas outflow and remaining 
stored/transported fraction along the simulation time steps. Additional criteria may be 
considered to control the calculation process, depending on the selected modelling approach 
and input data, extensively described in the literature [e.g. Hanna and Drivas, 1996; CCPS, 
1999; Fingas, 2002; Mannan, 2005; VROM, 2005a]. 
 In general, implemented models provide the variation of outflow conditions along the 
simulation period while internal conditions and remaining stored/transported hazmat 
amount are ‘sufficient enough’ to continue the process. Following, source term modelling 
approaches implemented in the various ESTM sub-modules to estimate outflow conditions are 
further described. 
3.4.1 ESTM1 – Compressed gas 
In spite of the wide variety of accident scenarios implemented in ESTM1, emission from 
initially compressed gas containers always results in the release of pure gases into the 
atmosphere. In addition to the effortless approaches implemented for instantaneous and 
continuous releases (previously described), transient outflow scenarios can be characterized 
for the various types of containment equipments commonly present in industrial 
environments, through the application of different and varying mathematical and theoretical 
methods.  
Based on Table 3.2 it is possible to mention that, ESTM1 comprises the most ‘broadening’ set 
of potential accident scenarios (if compared with non-boiling liquids and PLG). In addition to 
the commonly applied and used accident scenarios involving small punctures of full bore 
ruptures in vessels and pipes/pipelines, ESTM1 also comprises a simplified approach for 
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more complex piping systems, commonly forgotten in extensively used models/software 
packages.  
The well-established equation developed for choked and unchoked flows [Mannan, 2005] is 
used to estimate the hazmat gas mass flow rate, qs, in case of small holes/punctures in a vessel 
wall: 
1
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where CD is the discharge coefficient for the hole, Ah is the cross-sectional area of the hole, ψ is 
the outflow coefficient (Eq. 3-23), ρV is the gas density, P is the upstream pressure of the gas 
inside the vessel and γ= CpV/CvV is the specific heat capacity ratio. Gas specific heat capacity at 
constant pressure, CpV, and volume, CvV, are internally determined by EFRHA chemical 
properties database as a function of the gas temperature T [Yaws, 1999]. 
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The density, ρg, is estimated as a function of the gas pressure, P, and temperature, T [Green 
and Perry, 2008] as: 
TR
MP
zg
×
×
=ρ                  Eq. 3-24 
In which R=8.314 J.mol-1.K-1 is the gas constant and M is the molar mass of the hazmat is input 
directly from the chemical properties database. Considering that for compressible gases, the 
ideal gas approach can be used, the compressibility factor, z, is assumed to be equal to unit 
[Green and Perry, 2008]. 
In case of gas releases through a vessel piping, the mass flow rate at the pipe opening, qs,h, is 
estimated based on the principle that, total pressure drop between the vessel and the ambient 
(∆P), is equal to the pressure drop over the pipe (∆Pp), and the pressure drop over the 
downstream opening in the pipe (∆Ph) [VROM, 2005a] stated in Eq. 3-25. The mass flow rate 
through the pipe opening, qs,h, is determined by the overpressure in the vessel and the flow 
resistance, as a function of the pressure drop over the piping [Fingas, 2002], in order to fulfil 
the condition of Eq. 3-26: 
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( ) ( )hhspps PqPq ∆=∆ ,,                Eq. 3-26 
where Pa is ambient pressure, P0 is the stagnant (initial) pressure at the upstream of the pipe 
(in the vessel) and Pe is the pressure at the end of the pipe just before the opening to the 
atmosphere (initially unknown), qs,p is the mass flow rate through the pipe controlled by the 
∆Pp, and qs,h is controlled by the ∆Ph. 
An iterative process by trial and error is implemented to estimate Pe (between P0 and Pa) qsh 
and qsp. Whereas qs,h is estimated through the use of Eq. 3.22, qsp is estimated by Eq. 3-27 until 
the condition from Eq. 3-26 is satisfied [Mannan, 2005]. 
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In this expression Ap is the pipe cross-sectional area, lp is the pipe length, dp is the pipe cross-
sectional diameter and fF is the Fanning friction factor calculated by the Colebrook-While 
expression approach described in CCPS [1999], P0 is the vessel pressure and ρ0 is vessel gas 
density. The iteration continues until Eq. 3-26 reaches a convergence less than 0.1%. Finally, it 
is assumed an averaged outflow rate qs = qsh. Detailed description of the iterative is available in 
Mannan [2005] and VROM [2005a]. 
A near instantaneous release of all gas volume is assumed for the total rupture of a vessel (e.g. 
total collapse of a vessel), generating a gas cloud with a similar shape of the vessel and no 
model is implemented. In this case it is assumed that initial cloud shape is similar to the vessel 
dimensions (e.g. a spherical or a vertical cylindrical cloud). 
As regards to accidents involving pipes and pipelines, EFRHA integrates two widely used 
models, namely the Wilson [1979] and the Weiss [Weiss et al., 1988] models, for full bore 
ruptured and small holes in the pipe wall, respectively. According to the Wilson model 
[Wilson, 1979], qs in case of full bore ruptured pipelines or long pipes scenarios, is given by 
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In this expression qs,0 is the initial gas release rate (from Eq. 3-21 with P0, T0 and CD=1), m0 is 
the initial total gas mass contained in the pipe, t is the time after the start of the release and tB 
is a time constant (from Eq. 3-29). 
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where us is the sonic velocity in the gas and fD is the Darcy friction factor calculated by the 
Colebrook-While expression approach described in CCPS [1999]. Assuming adiabatic 
expansion and non-ideal gas behaviour, us is given by: 
( ) MTRus ××= γ                Eq. 3-30 
According to Hanna and Drivas [1987], the Wilson model compares quite well with the more 
detailed numerical calculations, however it is only valid while the pressure wave travelling 
upstream didn’t reach the opposite side of the pipeline. Thus, it is necessary to estimate the 
maximum time after the start of the release, until the model is valid (tE) as: 
sp ult =E                   Eq. 3-31 
In fact, when t ≥ tE, the iterative process stops. Additionally, if the rupture occurs near the 
pipe’s half length qs is multiplied by two to consider the release from both ruptured sections 
[VROM, 2005a]. 
On the other hand, in case of small holes in pipe wall, an adaptation of the Weiss model 
[Weiss et al., 1988] is implemented in ESTM1 to estimate qs by Eq. 3-32 as: 
bdpVs tVq ×= ρ                 Eq. 3-32 
In which Vp is the total volume of gas in the pipe/pipeline and tbd is the blow-down time (Eq. 
3.32), i.e. the duration of the outflow from a small hole in the pipe wall [Weiss et al., 1988]. 
( ) bvscrbd Ct ××+= τττ                Eq. 3-33 
where τcr is the dimensionless sonic blow time (Eq. 3-34), τs is the dimensionless subsonic blow 
time (from Eq. 3-35), τv is the time constant (from Eq. 3-36) and Cb is the blow-down correction 
factor (from Eq. 3-37). 
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A conservative approach is implemented to estimate an averaged hypothetical finite duration 
qs, assuming a constant emission based on initial conditions in the pipe/pipeline and 
estimated tbd, as previously considered in Eq. 3-32 (replacing τs by tbd). 
Unlike most CA models, scenarios involving gas release from piping systems are also 
considered in EFRHA model. According to Crane [1986], it is possible to estimate qs (for both 
choked and unchoked conditions) in piping systems, considering the influence of piping 
fittings like elbows, valves of pumps influence, as follows: 
( )( ) ∑−××××= faVhs KPPgAYq ρ2           Eq. 3-38 
where Y is the expansion factor and ΣKf is the sum of the individual excess head loss terms. 
The Y and ΣKf are estimated as detailed recommended in CCPS [1999]. 
3.4.2 ESTM2 – Non-boiling liquid 
With the exception of accident scenarios involving the total rupture of vessels, the spilled 
liquid mass outflow rate (qsL), is only estimated if (and while) the opening point is located 
below the liquid height inside the container. In any case, the Bernoulli principle is the 
theoretical basis for the estimation of qsL, independently of the type of failure and equipment 
[Hanna and Drivas, 1987].  
As regards to small holes in vessel wall, the qsL is estimated by modified expression of 
Bernoulli equation principle, to account friction loss and characteristics of the hole, as follows: 
( ) LaLhDsL PPACq ρ×−××= 2              Eq. 3-39 
where ρL is the liquid density and PL is the total pressure at opening (Eq. 3-40). 
aLLL PhgP +××= ρ                 Eq. 3-40 
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In which the hL corresponds to the relative liquid height above the failure opening in the 
vessel. 
Accident scenarios considering the total rupture of vessels can be seen as a special case, in 
which no model is used to estimate the amount of liquid spilled. Instead, a near instantaneous 
spill of the total liquid volume is assumed just after the release leading to the formation of a 
liquid pool at the ground level. 
In case of full bore ruptured pipelines and pipes connected to vessels, the assumption that qsL 
can be estimated from the flow inside the pipe [Fingas, 2002] is used. Thus, qsL is estimated by 
Eq. 3.41 as follows: 
pLF
p
pLLpLsL lf
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×∆
×=××=
ρ
ρρ
2
           Eq. 3-41 
where uL is the (average) liquid flow velocity inside the pipe (Eq. 3-42) and ∆PL is the pressure 
drop over the pipe (Eq. 3-43). 
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The fF and fD are functions of the Reynolds number (Re) which depends on the liquid flow in 
the pipe uL as described in [CCPS, 2000; Green and Perry, 2008]. Thus, to account the 
interdependency of the variables, qsL is estimated by an iteration procedure based on the trial-
and-error method described in Mannan [2005]. 
In general, liquid spill scenarios include the formation of liquid pools on the ground. Even not 
observed in all cases (e.g. non-boiling liquids at ambient temperature), evaporation 
phenomena may take place, and must be considered, especially for the formation of hazmat 
gas clouds. Thus, ESTM2 is linked to the ESTM4 enabling the estimation of the hazmat gas 
evaporation rate required for subsequent modules. If no evaporation phenomena are 
observed, the modelling process stops, since no hazmat gas source rate is estimated. 
3.4.3 ESTM3 – Pressurized liquefied gas 
PLG source term models are rather more complex than single phase models as a result of the 
need to consider the two-phase ‘champagne effect’ (i.e. expansion of the liquid volume due to 
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bubble formation in the liquid and the expansion of the boiling liquid) observed inside the 
container during the release [see DIERS, 1986; Fingas, 2002; Manna, 2005]. Therefore, in 
addition to the previously observed single phase regimes (pure vapour or liquid), ESTM3 
must comprise modelling approaches able to numerically describe two-phase outflow 
conditions (mixture gas-liquid) regimes, depending on the location of the orifice and liquid 
surface level locations [Mannan, 2005].  
In view of maintaining the relative straightforwardness of modelling algorithm, a set of 
‘simplified’ models specifically developed for the estimation of PLG hazmat outflow 
conditions is implemented in ESTM3 to account for the more relevant and common accident 
scenarios analyzed in CA studies.  
Unlike single-phase outflow regimes, instantaneous and continuous releases of PLG releases 
require a more careful analysis. After the instantaneous spill, it is assumed a sudden 
depressurization causing the flashing of all PLG into a two-phase hazmat cloud. As regards to 
steady-state outflow rates, the initial physical state is defined, based on the location of the 
aperture, in relation to the liquid fraction level. If the aperture is located bellow the liquid 
level, is assume a pure liquid release and subsequent flashing must be determined; otherwise, 
it is considered a pure gaseous outflow. In any case, if liquid fraction (pure liquid or two-
phase liquid droplets) is considered during the release phenomena, it is also calculated the 
degree of flashing of the spilled material. The description of the flashing and estimation of 
liquid and vapour fractions, as well as the hazmat gas cloud formation follows the 
methodologies and recommendations described in Fingas [2002] and VROM [2005a]. 
Accidents involving transient releases from small holes in the vessel wall, two distinct 
situations are considered: 
(i) Top venting orifices – (DIES method),  
(ii)  Side or bottom wall holes (Mayinger correlation approach).  
Whereas the analytical Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) method 
[DIERS, 1986] is implemented to numerically describe the outflow conditions in case of top 
venting openings; the Mayinger correlation approach [Belore and Buist, 1986] is used to 
characterize the outflow of hazmat PLG from small holes in vessel side and bottom wall. 
In the first case, only two possible outflow regimes are considered along the calculation 
process – pure vapour and two-phase outflow, depending of the level of the expanded liquid 
fraction, which is considered as a two-phase regime. As recommended in the literature [see 
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Melhem and Croce, 1993; Green and Perry, 2008], an initial pure vapour outflow above the 
liquid surface is assumed, driven out only by the rise of the liquid that acts like a piston.  
According to DIERS [1986], the pure vapour outflow regime is assumed during the initial 
vapour outflow blow-out period (tV) (Eq. 4.44) 
0,0, sVv qmt =                  Eq. 3-44 
In which mV,0 is the initial vapour mass in the vessel (from Eq. 3-45) and qs,0 is the initial mass 
flow rate of pure vapour (from Eq. 3-21), considering saturated conditions (i.e. P0=Pv0). Initial 
vapour and liquid mass fractions (mV,0, mL,0) are known from the hazmat filling degree (φ) as 
follows: 
( ) 0,0, 1 VVv Vm ρφ ××−=                Eq. 3-45 
0,0, LVL Vm ρφ ××=                 Eq. 3-46 
where Vv is the vessel volume, ρL,0 and ρV,0 are the initial liquid and vapour densities, 
respectively. Contrarily to ESTM1, the compressibility factor (z) must be estimated in ESTM4 
to use Eq. 3-23. The Reid et al. [1988] approach is used based on the pitzer factor (ω) for the 
analyzed hazmat, because the ideal gas assumption is not valid for PLG. The rise of the liquid 
fraction due to the rapid depressurization is a consequence of the formation of bubbles and 
expansion of the liquid during the vapour outflow tV period [VROM, 2005a]. 
Two ways of liquid expansion (rapid flashing) inside the vessel can be considered to occur, 
namely, the bubbly and the churn boiling regimes [DIERS, 1986]. The bubbly flow is 
characterized by smooth vaporization and reduced number of small dimension bubbles in the 
liquid fraction, while the churn flow regime is distinguished by extensive bubble coalescence 
and the formation of larger dimension bubbles. When liquid level reaches the vessel top wall, 
two-phase is apparent and a more complex algorithm is used to estimate the qsF, considering 
the two-phase rapid flashing regimes. DIERS [1986] suggested that qsF, can be estimated 
iteratively based on the following equations: 
( )( )FahDs PPACq ρ−××= 0, 2              Eq. 3-47 
( )LmVmF ρρρ /)1(//1 Φ−+Φ=              Eq. 3-48 
where ρF is the two-phase mixture density and ΦV is the vapour mass fraction in the two-
phase flow estimated according to the rapid flashing regime [Fingas 2002]. The estimation of 
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Φm follows the methodology described in Green and Perry [2008]. In some cases, after the two-
phase regime, a pure vapour outflow is restarted and qs is estimated as at initial instants of the 
release. Detailed description of the DIERS method procedure is presented in DIERS [1986] and 
VROM [2005a]. 
On the other hand, the Mayinger correlation approach [Belore, 1986; Mayinger, 1990] is 
implemented for accident scenarios considering small holes in the vessel side or bottom wall. 
In addition to pure gas and two-phase outflows, it must be also considered pure liquid spills if 
the aperture is located bellow the liquid levels, at least in the initial instants of the release. At 
the initial instant, the standard relations for pure vapour (see Section 3.4.1) or pure liquid (see 
Section 3.4.2) state can be applied, depending on the location of the orifice relative to the hL. 
The rise of the liquid volume and the two-phase regime are estimated according to the 
Mayinger correlation principles [see Belore and Buist, 1986]. 
Two-phase regime can be apparent after the initial instant due to the formation of bubbles, 
while the expanded liquid volume remains above the level of the hole. For this outflow 
regime, a slightly different procedure from the used in case of top venting is implemented as 
described by Dinis and Dinis [2002] and Mannan [2005]. The qsF is estimated from Eq. 3-47 
with ΦV calculated using on the Mayinger correlation approach [VROM, 2005a]. A detailed 
description of the Mayinger correlation approach methodology is described in Green and 
Perry [2008]. 
In order to cover accidents in pipes and pipelines, ESTM3 integrates different methods 
according to initial PLG conditions and dimensions of the equipment. 
The modified form of the Homogeneous Non-equilibrium Model [Leung and Grolmes 1987] 
suggested by Fauske and Epstein [1988] is implemented in ESTM3 for subcooled PLG releases 
from small pipes (lp ≤ 0.1 m), as follows: 
FERMSUBhsF NGGFAq
22 +××=              Eq. 3-49 
where F is the frictional flow reduction factor based on the length-to-diameter ratio, GSUB is the 
subcooled mass flux (Eq. 3-50), GERM is the equilibrium mass flux (Eq. 3-51) and NF is a non-
equilibrium dimensionless parameter (Eq. 3-52). 
( )satvFDsub PPCG −×= 02ρ               Eq. 3-50 
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          Eq. 3-52 
where υfg (Eq. 3-53) is the change in specific volume from liquid to vapour (Eq. 3-53) and Pvsat 
is the saturation vapour pressure at T0 and Hvap is the heat of vaporization at T0. 
LVfg ρρυ 11 −=                  Eq. 3-53 
For longer pipes (lp > 0.1 m), equilibrium conditions are assumed and a simplified form of the 
Homogeneous Equilibrium Model (HEM) [Fauske and Epstein, 1988] suggested by Leung 
[1986] and is used to estimate qsF as follows: 
( )satvFDsF PPCFq −××= 02ρ               Eq. 3-54 
For PLG in saturated conditions, a simplified form of the Homogeneous Non-Equilibrium 
Model [Fauske and Epstein, 1988] is implemented to calculate the qsF, by: 
pLFfg
h
sF CTN
A
Fq
××
×
×
×=
0
11.0
υ
             Eq. 3-55 
In this expression NF and υfg are estimated from Eq. 3-52 and Eq. 3-53, respectively.  
While for longer pipes, is possible to assume that flashing conditions are reached and the 
Homogeneous Non-Equilibrium Model approximately reduces to the Homogeneous 
Equilibrium Model [Leung, 1986]. According to Fauske and Epstein [1988], the flow is 
generally chocked due to the flashing and equilibrium conditions, then qsF decreases only 
slightly with increasing lp and can be considered independent of the vapour quality. Thus, qsF 
can be simplified to: 
Lpfg
vap
sF CT
H
Fq
,0
1
×
××=
υ
              Eq. 3-56 
Expelled two-phase mass is often characterized by the presence of aerosol, therefore flashing 
of released liquid or two-phase mass just outside the orifice is determined for all scenarios 
presented above to determine the ‘final’ correspondent liquid and vapour fractions. This last 
evaluation process aims verifying the physical state of released material and eventual 
formation of liquid pool on the ground, vapour jet clouds or both at the same time. From  the 
literature [e.g. CCPS, 1999; Mannan, 2005; Green and Perry, 2008], the flashing phenomenon 
can be characterized by the flash fraction, ΦV,F of the released mass, estimated through a 
standard expression suggested by Crowl and Louvar [1990]: 
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( ) vapBoilpLFV HTTC −=Φ ,                Eq. 3-57 
Pure vapour phase is assumed if ΦV,F > 0.5, meaning that no rain-out is considered [VROM, 
2005a]; otherwise, rain-out is predicted and both phases (vapour and liquid) are considered, 
with correspondent fractions estimated. Still, if ΦV,F approximates to zero, pure liquid spill is 
considered.  
In any case, if liquid (pure liquid or rain-out fraction) spill is predicted, the formation of a 
liquid pool is assumed and ESTM4 is applied to estimate the ‘additional’ evaporation 
phenomenon, by using the most appropriated modelling approach of ESTM4. 
3.4.4 ESTM4 – Liquid pool evaporation 
Considering that liquid spill of either pure liquid or PLG rain-out fraction, tend to form pools, 
it is of major importance to describe the subsequent evaporation phenomena and to evaluate 
its contribution to consequences to human health. For that reason, a set of well-known 
evaporation models are implemented in ESTM4 to numerically describe the spreading, 
evaporation rate and duration of hazmat gas emission from the previously formed liquid 
pools. Considering the applicability of ESTM4, this sub-module is designed to consider two 
distinct situations: (i) user manually defined input pool dimensions, and (ii) interim 
characterization of pool dimensions from ESTM2 or ESTM3 liquid spill outputs. 
In case of manual definition of evaporation scenario consists of the definitions of an already 
formed liquid pool within bunds is defined by the user for the estimation of subsequent 
evaporation rate. Alternatively, depending on previous estimations of liquid spills, 
instantaneous, continuous or transient liquid spills, with or without bunds scenarios can be 
analyzed without any control of the user. 
Unlike previous ESTM sub-models, pool evaporation models also require a detailed 
characterization of the surface environmental conditions, such as characteristics of subsoil and 
dimensions of bunds (if present). For convenience and main purpose of application of the 
developed modelling system, classic and simple methods based on boiling and non-boiling 
liquids are implemented in EFRHA source term module to determine the evaporation rate. 
Nevertheless, despite the gaps/limitations of this type of models [Kootstrat et al., 2004], the 
complexity of advanced models, like GASP model [Webber, 1993], still require substantial 
computational efforts [Kootstra, 2004]. Moreover, the selected simple models are currently 
implemented in similar CA software packages [Britter, 1990; Reynolds, 1992; TNO, 2007] and 
recommended in the literature [e.g. VROM, 2005a; Casal, 2008]. 
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The overall mass balance (dMpl(t)/dt) for an evaporating pool and further characterization of 
dimensions is given by Eq. 3.58 as : 
'
, relVp
pl qq
dt
dM
+−=                Eq. 3-58 
In which qsVp is the evaporation rate and q’ree is the liquid spill rate flowing into the pool 
(neglected in case of instantaneous liquid releases). 
The selection of the most appropriated model depends on the ‘type of liquid’ – boiling or non-
boiling liquid, commonly determined by heat and mass balances for boiling and non boiling 
liquids [see Hanna et al., 1996; Kootstra et al., 2004]. For instance, a non-boiling liquid is 
assumed if its TB is higher than the ambient subsoil temperature (Ta,s); otherwise it is assumed 
as a boiling liquid [Fingas, 2002].  
For non-boiling liquids, the MacKay and Matsugu model [Kawamura and MacKay, 1987] is 
implemented for the estimation of qsVp, as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
( ) plpl
plvm
sVp AtTR
MtTPtk
q ×
×
××
=              Eq. 3-59 
In this expression km(t) is the mass transfer coefficient (Eq. 3-60), Pv is the vapour pressure at 
pool temperature, Tpl and Apl is the pool surface area. The km(t)  is influenced by the uref, the 
pool surface average radius (rp(t)) and the Schmidt number (Sc). 
( ) ( )( ) 67.011.078.0 2004785.0 −− ××××= Sctrutk prefm           Eq. 3-60 
The evaporation of a (initially) non-boiling liquid pool causes a decrease of the liquid 
temperature (Tpl) during the evaporation (assuming that the surface temperature of the pool is 
equal to the temperature of the bulk of the liquid in the pool), which will influence the 
estimated qsVp. Variation of the pool temperature (dTpl/dt) is estimated from the heat balance 
suggested in VROM [2005a]: 
( ) ( )
,pLpl
plvapplsVppl
Ch
THAqH
dt
dT
××
×−
=
∑
ρ
            Eq. 3-61 
where ΣH is the sum of the surrounding environment heat fluxes, from soil, air, solar 
radiation, long wave radiation and mass flowing into the pool estimated as detailed described 
in VROM and the references therein [2005a], hpl is the depth of the pool and Hvap(Tpl) is the heat 
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of evaporation at pool temperature estimated by EFRHA chemical properties database. Pool 
depth depends on pool surface dimensions and subsoil conditions. 
Alternatively, in case of boiling liquid pools, it is possible to assume that Tpl is constant and 
equal to TB during the evaporation process [VROM, 2005a]. According to Kootstra et al. [2004] 
the evaporation rate can be determined by the amount of heat supplied to the boiling pool 
from environment: 
( )
pl
plvap
sVp ATH
tH
q ×= ∑ )(                Eq. 3-62 
The estimation of ΣH(t) for a boiling liquid pool, is slightly different from non-boiling liquids 
as suggested in CCPS [1999]. 
When sufficient heat is available and supplied to a non-boiling liquid pool it may reach its 
boiling point and start boiling. The other way around is also possible when heat transfer to the 
liquid pool is insufficient, temperature drops and evaporation decreases [Trijssenaar-Buhre et 
al., 2008]. As recommended by Kootstra et al. [2004], the transition between evaporation 
mechanisms is based on the Tpl relative to TB.  
As regards to the liquid pool dimensions, ESTM4 is designed to consider the presence of 
bunds or other similar passive retention barriers, in which is assumed that pool dimensions 
are lower or equal to the bund; otherwise it is considered an evaporation pool without bunds 
which may significantly spread at the ground surface. This option affects the estimated 
dimensions, namely Ap, hp and rp. The estimation of the variation of the pool dimensions 
during the release follows the expressions and methods detailed described by Trijssenaar-
Buhre et al. [2008]. 
Determined the variation of the hazmat gas outflow conditions it is possible to predict the 
atmospheric dispersion during and after the release process.  
3.5 EDM – EFRHA Dispersion module 
Considered the ‘main core’ of EFRHRA model, the EDM comprises an up-to-date Class II 
shallow layer (Type V) modelling approach to quantitatively describe the hazmat gas 
transport and dispersion phenomena. Following the philosophy of continuous data transfer 
along the calculation process, this module takes the main output data from the ‘pre-
processors’ EMM, ETM and ESTM (see Figure 3.1) and predicts the hazmat gas concentration 
fields as a function of time, according to the structure presented in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 – EDM basic structure with the different stages of process. 
Taking into account the variety and amount of input information required to properly 
estimate the hazmat concentration fields, a preliminary consistency check test of source term, 
meteorological, terrain, obstacles and receptors data completeness and validity is processed. 
Aiming to maintain a compromise between the complexity of Class III and the simplicity of 
Class II models, EDM integrates an atmospheric dispersion shallow layer modelling approach 
to produce the concentration fields as a function of time. The EDM modelling approach and 
structure is mainly based on the TWODEE model [Hankin, 1997; Hankin and Britter, 
1999a,b,c], recently upgraded by the TWODEE-2 model [Folch et al., 2009]. This model was 
developed to simulate large scale instantaneous and continuous release and dispersion of 
dense gas on complex topography. In addition to the main features of the original code, the 
development of EDM considered a set of relevant modifications in order to consider the more 
appropriated ‘conditions’ and scenarios for CA studies of hazmat gas accidental releases in 
industrial and built-up areas.  
Considering the large effort in implementing the set of source term models (to describe the 
variation of the outflow conditions), a multi-puff approach was implemented in EDM 
modelling algorithm to enable simulating transient releases, in addition to the ‘traditional’ 
instantaneous and continuous release conditions. The model is also prepared to use fine grid 
resolutions, to be able to account for the influence of obstacles in the dispersion in a more 
realistic way. The capability of defining both regular and discrete receptors grids enables 
counterbalancing the increased efforts associated to the higher grid resolution, particularly for 
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parameters are continuously corrected as a function of temperature and available information, 
instead of defining a constant value for the entire period of simulation. 
The implemented modelling approach is based on depth-averaged equations of density ( ρ ) 
and horizontal velocity ( u , v ) through the integration of conservation equations over the fluid 
depth, from the bottom up to the free surface (z=0→h). Hazmat gas cloud behaviour is 
described in terms of cloud height (Eq. 3-63), depth-averaged cloud density (Eq. 3-65), two 
depth-averaged horizontal velocities (Eq. 3-66 and Eq. 3-67) and depth-averaged concentration 
(Eq. 6-68). It is assumed that h is the height below which a fraction f of 0.95 of the hazmat gas 
buoyancy g( ρ - ρa) of the hazmat gas is located (i.e., the cloud height) [Folch et al., 2009]: 
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The ρ(z) is the vertical distribution of density ρ estimated from its depth-value similarly to 
Hankin and Britter [1999c] (Eq. 3-64), ρa is the ambient air density, u and v are the horizontal 
mean velocities previously determined in ETM, and z is the vertical coordinate. 
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where S1=0.5 is a shape parameter. In a similar way, depth-averaged hazmat gas density ( ρ ) 
and the two horizontal velocities (u , v ) are defined based on the following equations: 
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The concentration vertical profile, c(z), is characterized by an exponential decay [Hankin and 
Britter, 1999a] and is given by Eq. 3-68 in (µg.m-3)  
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Shallow water equations are adapted in order to predict the hazmat gas cloud behaviour 
during the dispersion phenomena. Assuming an incompressible homogeneous fluid 
behaviour and a hydrostatic pressure distribution, the shallow water equations are adapted to 
hazmat gases having a non-uniform vertical profile and therefore given by [Hankin, 1997; 
Hankin and Britter, 1999a] 
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In which uentr and uinf are the air entrainment (Eq. 3-76) and dense gas inflow velocities, 
respectively, esf is the terrain surface elevation, t it the time after starting the simulation, x and 
y are the horizontal spatial coordinates, ρg is the hazmat gas density, ua and va are the ambient 
air horizontal velocities along x and y, respectively, ki is an semi-empirical coefficient (Eq. 3-
73), CD is the drag coefficient (Eq. 3-74), Vx and Vy (Eq. 3-75) are the turbulent shear stress 
forces along x and y, respectively. 
As mentioned in Folch et al. [2009] Eq. 3-69 to 3-72 express, respectively, the balances of 
volume, mass and components of momentum. Left-hand side terms of Eq. 3-71 and Eq. 3-72 
include time evolution, the effect of convection, the pressure gradient for the case of 
hydrostatic but non-uniform density profile, the effect of the ground, the surface shear stress 
(proportional to CD), the force per unit area applied by turbulent shear stress and the leading 
edge terms that consider the interaction among dense gas and ambient air. The last one 
provides a correction of the shallow water equations that may produce erroneous results for 
the leading edge, as they assume that the pressure distribution is hydrostatic, which is also 
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proportional to ki. The ki is estimated based on the front Froude number, Fr, usually set to 1 
[Hankin and Britter, 1999a]: 
2
1
2
FrS
ki =                   Eq. 3-73 
Additionally, CD, Vx and Vy are estimated based on Eq. 3-74 and Eq. 3-75: 
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The constant of proportionality of turbulent shear stress, ζ, is commonly set to 0 [Folch et al., 
2009]. The uentr is estimated by empirical formulations as described by Hankin and Britter, 
[1999a]. 
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In which I2=0.7, I3=1.3 and I7=0.45 are empirical constants. This equation describes the top 
entrainment of ambient air into the dense gas cloud. In the present modelling approach, edge 
entrainment is not considered. 
Hazmat gas concentration is calculated through Eq. 3-69 to Eq. 3-72, together with the closure 
relationships Eq. 3-73 to Eq. 3.75 [Hankin and Britter, 1999b]. Moreover, the flux corrected 
transport scheme suggested by Zalesak [1979] is implemented to maintain a certain simplicity 
and fast run for the estimation of concentration fields as a function of time. Similarly to Folch 
et al. [2009], incoming flux concentrations at boundaries are null (i.e. h=0, ρ =ρa =a, u =0 and 
v =0) and zero derivative conditions are assumed for the outgoing flux.  
Even detected a somewhat longer simulation time requirements than ‘traditional’ CA Class II 
models (Type II – IV models), it is counter-balanced by the increased capability to account the 
influence of obstruction on the released hazmat gas, allowing considering variations of 
meteorological conditions along the period of simulation highlights the higher complexity of 
the developed EDM.  
Predicted the 2D concentration fields as a function of time, it is possible to determine the 
potential consequences on human health from the exposure to levels of concern for the 
released hazmat gas. With the intention to prepare the information in a way that facilitates 
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their interpretation, EDM main outputs are processed in EEM, according to user defined 
control and post-processing options and purposes. 
3.6 EEM – EFRHA Effects Module 
The EEM is designed to post-process the main outputs of EDM based on the comparison of 
estimated concentrations fields with reference safety threshold limits. Following the same 
design of previous modules, EEM is structured to initially verify the consistency of input data 
and quantify the consequences and effects according to user defined formats, as schematized 
in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 – EEM basic structure with the different stages of process. 
A preliminary consistency check of this module’s input data intends verifying if hazmat gas 
concentrations fields are effectively produced, but also if the selected/defined safety threshold 
limits are appropriated for further comparison with estimated concentrations. In spite of using 
the Emergency Response and Planning Guideline (ERPG) values compiled in EFRHA chemical 
properties database by default, the user can manually define different threshold values 
concerning toxicological and/or flammability limits. Therefore, the analysis of selected 
threshold limit values assures the use of acceptable data. Although modelled concentration 
fields encompass both regular and discrete receptors grids, a special attention is taken to 
discrete receptors information (if included). 
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Depending on user modelling options, the main outputs of this module may be presented in 
different formats, from summary text files to table information, as a function of time and/or 
spatially distributed. Nonetheless, main output infotmation is formatted to be used in 
visualization and plotting tools to generate maps and graphical data. With the purpose of 
determining threat and damage temporal and spatial distribution, direct comparisons 
between modelled concentration fields and safety threshold limits are performed. In this 
analysis, both regular and discrete receptors points are covered. Hence, points in which 
concentrations are higher that reference limit values are identified as potentially affected 
spots. In case of spatial distribution analysis, consequence contours maps are generated at 
different periods of time after the accident. Alternatively, time evolution of concentrations can 
be analyzed for a specific spot of interest (e.g. vulnerable spot’) and graphically plotted.  
If spatial distribution of population is available, the direct overlap of information allows 
estimating the total number of people (potentially or effectively) exposed to certain levels of 
hazmat gas concentrations after the accident event. This capability represents an enhanced 
tool to determine threat and damage areas and therefore evacuate the population in case of 
real accident scenarios. 
The integration of this module intends to produce EFRHA main outputs in formats able to be 
easily evaluated by analysts and unspecialised users, in particular decision and emergency 
response operators. 
3.7 Main input and output data of EFRHA model 
Apart from the amount of information required for a proper estimation of short-term 
pollution episodes and consequences in case of accidents involving the release of hazmat 
gases, EFRHA model is designed in a way that main outputs from one module are used as 
inputs in the subsequent. This structure enables defining a minimum list of strict mandatory 
parameters that must be provided by the user, independently of the degree of completeness of 
input datasets. Moreover it is assured a constant data consistency evaluation. Main inputs and 
outputs can be categorized as control options; meteorological conditions; terrain 
characteristics; source term conditions; and effects threshold limits (see Table B.1 in Appendix 
B). 
Control parameters specify the selected modelling options for the simulation and the 
correspondent input/output data links. Meteorological conditions comprise surface and 
upper air meteorological and ABL parameters during the period of analysis. Terrain 
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characteristics include information concerning geographic location, topography, source 
location and buildings distribution within the study domain. Source term conditions 
characterize hazmat storage/transportation conditions and leakage phenomena. Finally, the 
effects threshold limits inputs consist of sets of relevant limit values to estimate potential 
human exposure effects to hazmat gaseous concentrations distribution. 
Notwithstanding the definition of the minimum list of strict mandatory parameters, the user 
may also provide all available input and interim information. If all input parameters are 
available, EDM, through the continuous consistency check test verifies the validity and quality 
of the introduced information. The same procedure is also performed if bypass option is 
selected. In this case, control parameters can be defined manually or internally as a function of 
initial consistency tests. Additionally, specific control parameters are also considered in each 
module to assure an appropriated estimation of interim and main output information. 
The main outputs of the EFRHA model are generated in text and table data formats to make 
the format compatible with other software. Overall, main output data comprises the hazmat 
gas concentration fields given as temporal and spatial distributions for the receptor grids. 
Concentration values are expressed as micrograms per cubic meter of air (µg.m-3). The spatial 
concentration distribution output data can then be represented with any 2D surface 
visualization and data treatment software. Table B.2 (Appendix B) summarizes the principal 
output parameters generated during the simulation.  
As for input data, main outputs can be divided in accordance to the model phase and type of 
data. Moreover with the exception of the EEM, most outputs from previous modules can be 
considered to be main inputs for, at least, one of the EFRHA modules. Aiming to enables post-
processing of main output parameters, all outputs are generated in separated files depending 
on the module along the simulation. This option allows verifying the main features and 
performance of individual modules but above all, the entire model set up. Additional control 
messages are generated in case of errors or missing data detected during the calculation 
process. 
3.8 Synthesis 
This chapter presented the structure of the developed model, describing the various modules 
and modelling approaches implemented. Unlike most modelling systems currently applied in 
CA studies, EFRHA integrates a set of numerical approaches, usually separated, in an attempt 
to reduce well-known constrains and limitations frequently linked to the unavailability of 
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relevant information or specialized knowledge. Moreover, EFRHA attempts contributing for 
the application of alternative Class II modelling systems suitable to predict, as realistic as 
possible, the consequences of hazmat dispersion in industrial and built-up areas and to be 
applied in CA studies. The set of five main modules encompass the variety of information 
required to reliably perform a CA study. Nevertheless, as shown, the development, 
integration or even adaptation of available and developed modelling approaches and tools 
may result in a somewhat complex algorithm, which may require multiple information types 
and process techniques. 
As described in this chapter, the developed tool comprises several modelling approaches 
and/or numerical methods, in an attempt to enable a broader application to different study 
scenarios and/or sets of available input data. However, it is necessary to evaluate if the 
sequential data flow is consistent, but most of all, if implemented atmospheric dispersion 
modelling approach and assumptions provide reliable results. For that reason, a set of 
validation exercises was performed, comprising the various modules and particularly the 
implemented modelling approaches and assumptions. With this purpose, Chapter 4 presents 
the set of performed validation exercises and main findings. 
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4. VALIDATION OF EFRHA MODEL 
 
 
This chapter contains the EFRHA model validation. An overview of the methodology, quality 
indicators and stages is provided. Next, quality analyses of modelled results based on four 
independent stages of evaluation are addressed. Finally, main findings from the validation 
study are discussed, emphasizing its reliability to predict hazmat gas accidental release and 
atmospheric dispersion in industrial and build-up areas. 
4.1  Overview of the methodology 
Models of whatever type are only of use if their quality (fitness-for-purpose) has been 
quantified, documented, and communicated to potential users. In this sense, evaluation plays 
a key role to assure quality and demonstrate that a model can provide reliable results for a 
desirable purpose. According to Britter and Schatzmann [2007a], model evaluation is a six 
steps process comprising the scientific evaluation, code verification, model validation with 
data, and user oriented operational assessment. Notwithstanding the relevance of scientific 
evaluation and code verification, model validation can be considered the mandatory 
requirement to assess the capability to numerically describe the various conditions and/or 
phenomena experimentally observed, and to have confidence on modelled results. 
Considering that scientific evaluation and model verification have been tested along the 
development process, the present evaluation methodology will focus on model validation, in 
order to demonstrate EFRHA reliable application and further user-oriented assessment. 
Despite the lack of a generally accepted simple technique to determine whether a model is 
good or bad, there is an extensive experience and scientific background on Class II models 
validation methods, as discussed by Britter and Schatzmann [2007a,b]. Significant research has 
been conducted, over the last yeas, into devising structured methods for assessing model 
quality, based on direct comparisons of modelled outputs with reference experimental 
observations or results from models that have themselves undergone formal validation 
[Hanna et al., 1991]. Although experimental observations are recommended to be used as 
reference data, modelled results can also be used in case of unavailable or limited 
measurements. Still, given their intrinsic uncertainties, modelled outputs should be used as 
Validation of EFRHA model 
 
118                                                                                   Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 
guidance to test consistency and similarity between modelled outputs [Hanna and Chang, 
2001]. 
In view of EFRHA model Class, as well as main purpose of application, the model validation 
methodology suggested by Britter and Schatzmann [2007b] in the ‘Model Evaluation Guidance 
Protocol Document’ (MEGPD), was adopted. The MEGPD was developed in the frame of the 
COST Action 732 [URL4.1] compiling guidance, qualitative and quantitative analyses 
validation techniques, and quality indicators (metrics). It is based on preceding research 
initiatives, such as the work conducted by Hanna et al. [1991; 1993, 2004], European Research 
Community on Flow, Turbulence and Combustion (ERCOFTAC) [Casey and Wintergerste, 
2000], Oberkampf et al. [2004], Chang and Hanna [2005], as well as, guidance documents, such 
as the German Association of Engineers (VDI) guidelines [VDI, 2005], the Model Evaluation 
Group (MEG) Guidelines [1994a,b] or the Scientific Model Evaluation of Dense Gas Dispersion 
models (SMEDIS) Protocol [Carissimo et al., 2001]. 
Qualitative analysis can be considered a preliminary exploratory data evaluation based on 
visual inspection of modelled results graphical representations, like scatter, quantile-quantile 
or time/space evolution plots. This is a well suited approach to highlight observable features 
in predictions and reveal model shortcomings. Scatter plots show the degree of correlation 
between paired point-by-point modelled and reference values, their trends and offsets. 
Quantile-quantile (q-q) plots permit direct comparison of modelled and reference ranges of 
values, removing the pairing aspect of comparison. These plots are deduced by ranking both 
datasets from the highest to the lowest value and plotting ranked modelled against reference 
data pairs. According to Schatzmann et al. [2010] q-q plots are adequate to assess Class II 
models concentration outputs quality (more than scatter plots), because the user has to be sure 
that especially the highest values or high percentiles are reliably calculated; allowing the 
judgement of whether hazmat risk thresholds will be violated or not. Additionally, 
time/space evolution plots show the degree of agreement between modelled and reference 
data trends and ranges of values during a period of time or distance. 
Quantitative analysis can be considered a more accurate and detailed study, based on the 
direct comparison of modelled results against reference data, in the form of statistical (quality) 
metrics, such as the ones defined by the American Society for Testing and Materials [ASTM, 
2005]. The set of paired and unpaired quality metrics used in EFRHA validation study were: 
fractional bias (FB), geometric fraction within a factor of 2 (FAC2), correlation coefficient (r), 
normalised mean square error (NMSE), geometric mean bias (MG), geometric variance (VG), 
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squared bias (SB) and the difference between the standard deviations of modelled results and 
observations (SDSD). The expressions for the calculation of each of these metrics are 
summarized in Table 4.1, along with acceptability limits and ‘perfect model’ guidance values 
suggested for research-grade experiments, as given in the literature [Chang and Hanna, 2004]. 
Table 4.1 – Statistical parameters for the assessment of modelling performance. Si is the ith 
simulated value, Mi is the ith measured value, and x is the quantity under analysis [Abramowitz 
and Stegun, 1972; ASTM International, 2005; Chang and Hanna, 2005]. 
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1 The limit values for all the criteria represent typical thresholds on air quality modelling studies 
[Chang and Hanna, 2005]. 
While NMSE and VG reflect both systematic and unsystematic (random) errors; FB and MG 
only indicate systematic errors. The FB is a symmetrical and bounded metric, with values 
ranging between -2.0 and +2.0 for, respectively, extreme over- and underestimation [Britter 
and Schatzmann, 2007b]. The r describes the correlation between the two datasets. The range 
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of modelled results levels can also be assessed by the unpaired-points SB and SDSD metrics. 
The SB describes the differences between modelled and reference mean values; while SDSD 
indicates possible failures on predicting the magnitude of fluctuations of reference data. Given 
their nature, SB and SDSD are mainly used in evaluation of concentrations datasets. Each 
metric has intrinsic characteristics that make it more or less proper for a desirable application; 
yet no single quantified metric is generally applicable to all conditions. Hence, simultaneous 
analysis of multiple metrics is recommended to verify model performance quality. Whilst FB 
and NMSE are deeply influenced by extremely high and low values, MG and VG guarantee a 
balanced treatment. Moreover, FB and NMSE make no sense for data that take both positive 
and negative values [Schatzmann et al., 2010]. Even so, when both reference and modelled 
values vary significantly along the datasets, FAC2 becomes the most robust indicator since it is 
not strongly affected by the deviations on the magnitude of the parameters [Chang and 
Hanna, 2005]. 
With the purpose of demonstrating the EFRHA aptness to produce quality assured results, but 
also identify its main features and weaknesses, a validation exercise comprising four 
independent stages was performed, as schematized in Figure 4.1. Performance quality and 
consistency of the EFRHA’s modelled parameters (outputs and/or interim variables) was 
validated through its application to typifying test cases and direct comparisons of modelled 
results against reference data. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Schematic summary of stages of EFRHA model validation exercise. 
Stage 2: Source term 
Stage 3: Terrain/obstructions and Dispersion 
-  Dispersion in obstructed areas 
-  MUST -45º test case 
- Comparison of concentration fields 
Stage 4: EFRHA Model 
-  Accidental release and dispersion in flat terrain 
-HGD test cases  
- Comparison of concentration fields  
Stage 2: Source term 
- SRC test cases 
- Comparison of source term parameters 
Stage 1: Meteorology 
- MET test cases 
- Comparison of ABL scaling parameters 
Preliminary validation study 
Validation of EFRHA in its entire scope 
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Preliminary analysis comprises the individual validation of EMM, ESTM and ETM+EDM 
(stages 1 to 3); whereas the last stage is the validation of the developed model in its entire 
scope. First, EMM and ESTM consistency to produce ‘interim data’ required for subsequent 
modules is analyzed individually in the first two stages. Next, the suitability of implemented 
modelling approaches in ETM and EDM to account the influence of obstructions in hazmat 
gas dispersion are jointly evaluated in the third stage. Finally, EFRHA aptness to reproduce 
quality assured short-term pollution episodes in case of hazmat gases accidental release and 
atmospheric dispersion is demonstrated in the last stage. 
Direct comparisons of EFRHA’s modelled outputs against extensively validated and used 
experimental observations or modelled results were carried out following the MEGPD 
validation techniques recommendations. EEM was not validated due to the nature of the 
implemented modelling and data processing approach. 
4.2 Stage 1: Meteorology 
In view of the influence of meteorological conditions in ESTM and EDM modelled outputs, 
the first stage of the validation consisted of the analysis of EMM performance quality. In view 
of this module’s main purpose – input meteorological data treatment and estimation of ABL 
scaling parameters – direct comparisons between EMM modelled outputs and reference data 
were conducted. Test cases were defined and the following estimated ABL scaling parameters 
analyzed: Monin-Obukhov length (L), surface friction velocity (u*), convective velocity scale 
(w*), sensible heat flux (H), convective (zic) and mechanical mixing heights (zim). 
Considering that examined parameters are not commonly measured in routine monitoring 
stations, results from models that satisfy Hanna et al. [1991] recommendations can be 
alternatively used as reference data. Hence, in the lack of measured data, the AERMOD model 
meteorological pre-processor AERMET [USEPA, 2004a,b; URL4.2] modelled outputs were 
used as reference data to assess EMM performance. This is a well-established and extensively 
validated meteorological pre-processor [Cimorelli et al., 2004], developed to process input 
meteorological data for the atmospheric dispersion AERMOD model [USEPA, 2004a]. Both 
EMM and AERMET follow similar MOST principles, which make possible direct comparisons 
of modelled ABL scaling parameters results. Moreover, different assumptions and modelling 
approaches, in particular for missing or over-ranged data records, can be compared. 
Aiming to cover a broad range of meteorological conditions and input content completeness, 
two distinct test cases were defined for the application of EMM and comparison with 
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AERMET outputs. The test cases summarized in Table 4.2 are based on extensively validated 
hourly surface and twice-daily upper air measured meteorological datasets recommended by 
USEPA for ‘exemplifying’ AERMET runs [URL4.2]. 
Table 4.2 – Summary of MET test cases used in EFRHA validation Stage 1. 
Run ID Location Period of time # records [h] # missing data [h] 
MET1 Albany County, NY 01/03/1988 – 04/03/1988 96 0 
MET2 Houston, Texas 01/07/1996 – 31/12/1996 4,416 1,520 
The MET1 test case can be considered a short-term complete input dataset, based on surface 
and upper air profiles meteorological observations measured in Albany County, New York 
(USA) between March 1st and 4th, 1988 (96 recorded hours). On the other hand, MET2 
illustrates a long-term period comprising input surface and upper air datasets with limited 
(missing) contents. It consists of surface and upper air meteorological data measured in 
Houston, Texas (USA), between the 1st July and 31st December 1996 (4,416 recorded hours), 
with a total of 1,520 missing records, including surface and upper air records (≈34% of the 
total number of recorded hours). Whereas MET1 aims demonstrating EMM consistency with 
theoretical MOST approach principles and therefore, its aptness to estimate ABL scaling 
parameters; the application to MET2 intends verifying the suitability of implemented 
modelling algorithms and assumptions to deal with missing input meteorological data. 
In any case, the same surface observations datasets were directly used by both models, but 
distinct upper air databases were required, due to various constrains on data availability and 
formats. Whilst data from the Meteorological Resource Centre database [URL4.3] was directly 
used in AERMET runs, data from the Department of Atmospheric Science of the University of 
Wyoming database [URL4.4] was processed for EMM runs. Anyway, detected differences 
between databases are only related to storage formats and number of parameters compiled. 
With the purpose of demonstrating EMM consistency and performance quality, but also the 
reliability of implemented modelling assumptions, direct qualitative and quantitative 
comparisons of EMM and AERMET modelled results were conducted for the defined test 
cases. Visual inspection of scatter plots intends examining the level of correlation between 
modelled results. Additionally, quality metrics were estimated and results analyzed to check 
the degree of agreement between modelled outputs. 
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present the comparison between EMM and AERMET modelled ABL 
scaling parameters in the form of scatter plots for MET1 and MET2, respectively. 
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Figure 4.2 – Scatter plots of EMM modelled ABL scaling parameters for the MET1 test case period. 
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Figure 4.3 – Scatter plots of EMM modelled ABL scaling parameters for the MET2 test cases period. 
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Overall, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 illustrate the strong approximation and high levels of 
correlation between EMM and AERMET modelled values, evidenced by the estimated linear 
trend lines (r2 ≥ 0.977 in MET1 and r2 ≥ 0.982 in MET2). Nonetheless, some positive and 
negative deviations from reference values can be observed in both test cases, particularly for L, 
w*, zic and zim parameters scatter plots. In general, the results indicate that EMM tends to 
present a somewhat increased degree of variation from AERMET outputs under neutral 
(|L|>150 m) and convective (|L|<0 m) conditions. Supported by the analysis of time 
evolution plots presented in Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 (Appendix C), it is noted the larger 
differences between modelled results during daytime and the transition periods, apart from 
the resemblances (in some cases near overlapping) in terms of temporal variation and ranges 
of values. In spite of the detected increased sensitivity of modelling algorithm for neutral and 
convective conditions, it is evident the consistency between modelled datasets. 
The results show the strong influence of implemented algorithm, assumptions and calculation 
techniques, considering that the numerical methods follow the same theoretical approach. As 
expected, differences between calculation approaches, especially in the iterative procedures 
for the estimation of L, u* and H can be detected on their own deviations, but also in a 
‘cumulative’ way in w*, zic and zim results (see Figure 3.3). Moreover, in the case of zim, despite 
the strong resemblances with u* trend, it is also noted the influence of the smoothing 
technique, particularly for lower zim values (zim<1000 m). Even so, it is visible the good 
correlation between modelled datasets, illustrating the reliable performance of EMM.  
The analysis of MET2 modelled results evidences the reasonability of implemented modelling 
assumptions for missing data. Although presenting higher deviations in w* and zic modelled 
results, it is also highlighted the good correlation between modelled datasets (through the 
analysis of estimated linear trend line r2). Therefore, it is possible to mention that, despite 
punctual deviations, EMM reasonably reproduces meteorological and ABL conditions even in 
case of missing data, in particular during daytime periods. 
Notwithstanding the visually demonstrated high degree of correlation between EMM and 
AERMET modelled datasets and consistency of implemented modelling approach, the set of 
quality metrics summarized in Table 4.3 was estimated for the modelled ABL scaling 
parameters, for each MET test cases, and compared with guidance model acceptance criteria 
(listed in Table 4.1) assuming AERMET modelled outputs the reference databases. Bearing in 
mind the use of AERMET datasets as reference data, it would be expected that estimated 
quality metrics concur with theoretical ideal values. Nonetheless, it was observed that the 
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values of FAC2 for L and H do not fit so well with the expected ‘ideal value’ and acceptance 
criteria (see footnote of Table 4.3) These results indicate that, even the AERMET results for 
these parameters are not within a factor of 2. Such results must be taken into account during 
the analysis of EMM outputs. 
Table 4.3 – Summary of quality metrics for modelled ABL scaling parameters for MET test cases 
(parameters not satisfying guidance acceptability limits are in bold).  
Parameter MET FB FAC2 r NMSE MG VG 
1 -0.007 0.302 
(a)
 0.989 0.078 0.89 1.09 
L (m) 
2 -0.049 0.511
(b)
 0.998 3.900 0.99 1.01 
1 0.021 1.000 0.994 0.040 0.95 1.02 
u* (m.s
-1
) 
2 0.001 1.000 1.000 0.0 1.00 1.00 
1 0.017 0.333
(a)
 0.995 0.0 0.93 1.04 
H (W.m
-2
) 
2 0.010 0.551
(b)
 1.000 0.0 1.0 1.12 
1 -0.029 1.000 0.995 0.0 0.97 1.00 
w* (m.s
-1
) 
2 -0.023 0.997 0.996 0.0 0.97 1.01 
1 -0.126 1.000 0.994 0.020 0.88 1.03 
zic (m) 
2 -0.103 0.988 0.991 0.020 0.88 1.05 
1 0.014 0.969 0.994 0.150 0.93 1.05 
zim (m) 
2 -0.015 0.987 0.997 0.010 0.97 1.04 
(a)
 AERMET model L – FAC2=0.333, H - FAC2=0.333 
(b)
 AERMET model L – FAC2=0.511, H - FAC2=0.559 
Despite the slender deviation tendencies previously observed in some modelled parameters, 
the analysis of quality metrics listed in Table 4.3 indicates that estimated quality metrics are 
overly within acceptance criteria, replicating the good correlation between EMM and 
AERMET modelled results. Additionally, the closeness of EMM results to reference guidance 
values for some parameters also demonstrates its good performance in both applications. 
The FB between -0.126 and 0.017 reflects the mixed under- (u*, H and zim (MET1)) and 
overestimation (FB<0 - L, w*, zic and zim (MET2)) of EMM modelled outputs in relation to 
reference AERMET data. With the exception of L for MET1, the estimated FAC2 values satisfy 
the recommended acceptance criteria with a noticeable nearness to reference ideal values, 
particularly for u*, w* and zic. Bearing in mind the exceptionality of AERMET reference FAC2 
for L and H parameters (see footnote of Table 4.3), it is also visible the substantial resemblance 
between AERMET and EMM estimated metrics, demonstrating the overall good correlation 
between modelled results. As expected, r values are markedly close to 1.0, supporting 
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previous visual inspections main findings. As regards to NMSE, only L (MET2) does not 
satisfy the acceptance criteria. However, following Schatzmann et al. [2010] indication that this 
metric does not make sense for datasets that take negative values (e.g. L and H), it is possible 
to mention that this result is not be considered in the overall analysis. Furthermore, 
supporting quality of modelled outcomes, the analysis of FB, NMSE, MG and VG results as a 
whole, illustrates that, no obvious influence of systematic or random deviations from 
reference data are detected in EMM outputs when applied to both test cases. 
Overall, both qualitative and quantitative analyses demonstrate EMM aptness to process 
meteorological and ABL scaling parameters, even with large fractions of missing surface 
and/or upper air meteorological input data. Known the influence of L, u* and H on w* zic and 
zim values, related quality metric indicate that EMM modelling approaches and assumptions 
for missing data make possible the estimation of reasonable values. Additionally, the use of 
different upper air input databases did not visibly affected EMM modelled results quality, in 
spite of the fairly overestimation trend. Quality metrics also show that EMM modelling 
assumptions to extrapolate missing records and smoothing technique can produce reasonable 
zim values, especially during the transition between night and daytime periods (and vice-
versa). 
Therefore, based on EMM application to both test cases and performance quality analyses, it is 
possible to state that this module is reliable to internally process meteorological information 
and estimate ABL scaling parameter required in subsequent modules. Its integration in 
EFRHA model not only reduces the number of strict mandatory input meteorological 
information, but also allows considering datasets with missing records, which are frequently 
considered/available in emergency response or planning studies. 
4.3 Stage 2: Source term 
An accurate description of hazmat gas outflow behaviour is crucial for a realistic prediction of 
atmospheric dispersion, particularly in accidental release scenarios. Although ESTM is 
designed to process instantaneous, continuous and transient release scenarios, the greater 
challenges and uncertainties are related to transient outflow conditions modelling, which 
require a special attention. Thus, assuming the effortlessness of instantaneous and continuous 
release scenarios data processes, this stage focuses on evaluating ESTM reliability to properly 
describe hazmat gas transient release scenarios. Moreover, known that ESTM incorporates 
well-established and validated models in the various sub-modules, in addition to the internal 
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chemical properties database (see Section 3.3), its performance quality strongly depends on 
the implemented modelling approaches and assumptions, as well as on the interaction 
between models and chemical properties database. For that reason, the main purpose of this 
stage is not to verify the performance quality of any specific model(s), but to assess the 
consistency of modelling approaches, assumptions, and interaction between the various 
components of ESTM, based on its application to the set of release scenarios summarized in 
Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 – Summary of test case scenarios defined for the ESTM validation study.  
Run ID Sub-Module Release scenario 
SRC1 ESTM1 
- Transient release scenario of 95 m
3
 of compressed hydrogen gas, initially stored 
at 50 bars and 15 ºC, through a small hole in the vessel side-wall. 
SRC2 ESTM2 
- Transient release scenario of 5,280 m
3
 of liquid acrylonitrile though a small hole in 
the vessel side-wall close to the bottom base surface. 
SRC3 ESTM3 
- ‘Champagne release’ from a safety relief valve of pressurized liquefied propane 
initially stored at 10.8 bars and 30 ºC, through a small hole in a 4.7 m3 vessel top 
side-wall. 
SRC4 ESTM4 
- Evaporation of an already formed liquid gasoline pool of about 1,500 m
3
 at 
ambient temperature and pressure. 
The set of SRCs is based on typifying outflow scenarios commonly used in exemplifying 
applications of theoretical methodologies or source term models [VROM, 2005a; TNO, 2007]. 
Information used for the definition of the SRC accident scenarios is summarized in Tables C.1 
to C.4 (Appendix C). 
Direct comparisons of ESTM modelled results and outputs from the well-established EFFECTS 
7.5 model [TNO, 2007; URL4.5] were performed for the various outflow scenarios. This 
software tool is specifically designed to support CA studies and predict accidental release and 
atmospheric dispersion of hazmat gases. It also incorporates a set of extensively validated and 
used modelling approaches/models to estimate outflow conditions for typifying accident 
scenarios considered in CA studies. Because ESTM and EFFECTS 7.5 [TNO, 2007] integrate 
similar theoretical modelling methods, it is possible to carry out direct comparisons of 
modelled outputs and therefore verify the consistency of ESTM modelling approaches and 
assumptions, in particular for the reduction of the number of minimum mandatory input 
parameters in ESTM. A clear difference between models is the chemical properties databases 
used. Whereas ESTM uses the principles of Yaws [1999], EFFECTS 7.5 integrates the DIPPR 
database [URL4.6]. 
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In spite of the number and variety of parameters estimated, this chapter presents the analysis 
of three parameters for each SRC scenario that can be considered relevant for demonstrating 
ESTM consistency and aptness to predict the accident scenarios. For SRC1, the evaluation of 
ESTM performance is based on direct comparison of mass outflow rate (qs), gas temperature 
(T) and orifice pressure (P). In case of SRC2, direct comparisons of modelled and reference 
values were performed for liquid mass flow rate (qsL), liquid filling degree (φL) and total liquid 
mass released (ML). Given the complexity of the theoretical methodology developed for SRC3, 
the validation exercise comprises the comparison of gas mass flow rate (qsV), φL and vapour 
fraction released (Φm). Finally, in SRC4 direct comparisons between ESTM4 modelled outputs 
and reference data were carried out based on the analysis of the following parameters: gas 
mass flow rate (qsVp), liquid temperature (T) and liquid pool depth (hL). Additional parameters 
could have been included in the comparison study; nonetheless, taking into account the 
implemented methodologies and correlations, the results would present significant 
resemblances on overall variations, replicating the analysis of the selected illustrative 
parameters. 
A preliminary qualitative analysis of ESTM consistency and performance was carried out 
based on visual inspection of time evolution plots of the modelled parameters presented in 
Figure 4.4. At a first analysis, time evolution plots highlight the overall resemblances between 
ESTM and EFFECTS 7.5 modelled outputs for the set of SRC test cases. Nonetheless, some 
differences can also be detected on ESTM outputs, particularly in SRC3 and SRC4 tested 
parameters.  
As regards to SRC1 modelled outputs (Figure 4.4. a), almost imperceptible overestimation of qs 
and T values are obtained with ESTM1, in contrast to the small underestimation trend of P 
values. Given the apparent overlapping of corresponding datasets, mentioned deviations from 
reference data can be considered negligible. Therefore, it is possible to state that implemented 
modelling approaches and assumptions and the chemical properties database are consistent 
with reference EFFECTS 7.5 outputs, in case of initially compressed gas. 
Visual inspection of Figure 4.4b indicates that ESTM2 modelled spill phenomenon stops 
earlier than reference EFFECTS 7.5 values. Such difference is mainly caused by the slight, but 
still relevant, overestimation trend of qsL values. Consequently, this deviation generates the 
overestimation of ML and underestimation of φL. Nonetheless, overall analysis of modelled 
results time evolution plots shows that ESTM2 modelled parameters follow the same variation 
and ranges of reference values, demonstrating the good correlation between datasets.  
Validation of EFRHA model 
 
130                                                                                   Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 
The time evolution plots of ESTM3 main outputs (Figure 4.4c) show that, even with 
perceptible deviations from reference data, the results tend to follow the overall behaviour of 
EFFECTS 7.5 model values. A general overestimation of qsV and Φm is observed along the 
simulation period, in particular during the initial instants of the release, opposing the 
underestimation of φL modelled values.  
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Figure 4.4 – Time evolution of source term parameters of EFRHA (red) and EFFECTS 7.5 (blue) 
models for: (a) SRC1, (b) SRC2, (c) SRC3 and (d) SRC4 test cases. 
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Since input data and mathematical principles are identical in both approaches, the main cause 
of the estimated differences is the implemented code algorithm, modelling assumptions and 
chemical properties parameters used along the numerical procedure (e.g. ρL, vapour saturation 
pressure (Pvº) or liquid and vapour heat capacities (CpL, Cpv)). Disparities (even just small 
differences) on chemical properties databases values combined with modelling assumptions 
will endorse larger deviations along the calculation process, resulting in the observed 
variation on modelled results. Even with the detected deviations from reference values, the 
visual inspection of time evolution plots illustrates ESTM reliability to produce reasonable 
outputs. 
Finally, visual inspection of Figure 4.4d enables realizing the consistency of ESTM4 modelling 
approach. There is a trend of ESTM4 to underestimate qsVp, and subsequently overestimate hL 
values, mainly due to the direct dependency of remaining liquid fraction in the pool on the 
degree of evaporation. Although not so visible, especially during the initial instants, a general 
tendency to underestimate T can also be noted. Once again there is an influence of EFRHA 
chemical properties database in these results, since near identical mathematical methodologies 
are implemented in ESTM and EFFECTS 7.5.  
Notwithstanding the good correlation and consistency between the ESTM and the EFFECTS 
7.5 outputs, a quantitative analysis of quality metrics was also carried out and main results are 
listed in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 – Summary of quality metrics of ESTM modelled source term parameters for the set of 
SRC test cases. 
SRC Parameter FB FAC2 r NMSE MG VG 
qs (kg.m
-3
) -0.004 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.00 1.00 
T (K) -0.004 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.00 1.00 1 
P (bar) 0.005 1.0 1.0 0.003 1.03 1.02 
qsL (kg.m
-3
) -0.007 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 
φL (m3.m-3) 0.013 0.98 1.00 0.00 1.05 1.09 2 
ML (kg) -0.005 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
qs (kg.m
-3
) -0.114 1.00 0.92 0.02 0.90 1.02 
φL (m3.m-3) 0.030 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.03 1.00 3 
Φm (kg.kg
-1
) -0.217 0.94 0.99 0.22 0.79 1.27 
qsVp (kg.m
-3
) 0.029 1.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.00 
T (K) 0.001 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 4 
hL (m) -0.020 1.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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As expected, all estimated metrics are within acceptability limits and remarkably close to 
recommended guidance perfect model thresholds. The FB values between -0.217 and 0.03 
reveals the slender deviations from EFFECTS 7.5 modelled outputs. The estimated deviations 
may result from the uncertainties associated with mathematical expressions used along the 
calculation process, but also from implemented modelling assumptions and divergences on 
chemical properties databases. With the exception of qsVp in SRC4, there is an overall tendency 
to overestimate mass flow rate (qs, qsL and qsVp). Visually detected differences between ESTM 
and EFFECTS 7.5 modelled outputs are replicated in FB values, in practically all SRC test 
cases. Furthermore, the values of FAC2, r, NMSE, MG and VG close to ‘ideal values’ 
emphasize the elevated level of agreement (in some cases ‘almost perfect’) between ESTM and 
EFFECTS 7.5 datasets.  
Overall, the application of ESTM to the set of SRC test case demonstrates its consistency and 
reliability to generate valid results in case of transient release scenarios. It is also shown that 
implemented modelling approaches and assumptions respect theoretical/mathematical 
methodologies principles. Apart from slender deviations, especially in liquid or PLG source 
term modelling outputs, the main advantages of the chemical properties database integration 
to estimate valid interim data, in an attempt of reducing the number of required user defined 
input parameters, don’t causes significant errors or critical deviations from reference values.  
4.4 Stage 3: Dispersion in obstructed areas 
In order to demonstrate EFRHA aptness to include the influence of obstructions, in particular 
obstacles, on modelled concentration fields and provide reasonable results, the third stage of 
EFRHA validation exercise focuses on the evaluation of ETM and EDM modelling approaches. 
With this purpose, a joint application of both modules to the Mock Urban Setting Test (MUST) 
-45º wind inflow experimental set up was carried out. Direct comparisons of modelled and 
measured values of mean concentrations were conducted in the form of exploratory data 
graphical representations (qualitative) and quality metrics (quantitative) analyses. 
4.4.1 The Mock Urban Setting Test experiment 
 The MUST experiment was originally a set of full-scale field tests focused on investigating the 
transport and atmospheric dispersion behaviour of plumes and their detailed concentration 
structure within an idealized urban atmospheric boundary layer under real atmospheric 
conditions. The set of tests was conducted at West Desert Test Centre of Dugway Proving 
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Ground, a US Army test facility in Utah (USA) in September 2001 [Yee and Biltoft, 2004]. The 
experimental set up centred in an area of 200 by 200 m long, consisted of a nearly regular 
array of 12 by 10 aligned obstacles composed by 119 shipping containers (12.2 m long, 2.42 m 
wide and 2.54 m high), together with the so-called ‘VIP car’ (6.10 m long, 3.51 m high and 2.44 
m wide) located near the centre of the obstacles array, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The VIP car 
served as a measuring point for sampled wind and concentration data. 
 The test site can be described as flat open terrain 
homogeneously covered by sparse vegetation 
[Yee, 2004]. Most of the tests were conducted at 
the late evening and night under slight to strong 
stable ABL stratification conditions with 
prevailing south-easterly and lower than 3 m.s-1 
winds (at building height) [Bezpalcova, 2007]. 
Short (quasi-instantaneous) and long (quasi-
steady state) duration point sources with varying 
locations were tested and flow and dispersion 
measurements performed; however in the scope of EFRHA validation study only long 
duration point sources were taken into account. Several meteorological and concentration 
sensors were placed around, above, and throughout the array on various towers [Yee, 2004]. 
Detailed descriptions of MUST field experiments instrumentation, inflow and dispersion 
conditions are given in Biltoft [2001], Yee [2004] and Yee and Biltoft [2004]. 
 Notwithstanding the relevance of full-scale experiments, small-scale wind-tunnel 
experiments were also conducted aiming to reproduce the field experiments, obtaining more 
accurate and complete information of flow and dispersion [Schatzmann et al., 2010]. For that 
reason, measured data from the -45º MUST test case wind-tunnel experiment reported by 
Bezpalcova and Harms [2005] and Bezpalcova [2007] was used in this stage of the EFRHA 
validation. The experiments were carried out in the large boundary layer wind tunnel facility 
‘WOTAN’ at the Environmental Wind Tunnel Laboratory (EWTL) of Hamburg University, 
shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.5 – 3D perspective of MUST case 
obstacles array with identification of VIP 
car 
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Figure 4.6 –The MUST wind tunnel model set up in WOTAN facility [Bezpalcova and Harms, 2005]. 
 The scaled 1:75 model set up of field test containers array, including slight irregularities in the 
obstacles placement, was placed on the wind tunnel’s turn table (see Figure 4.6), modelled in a 
stably stratified boundary layer flow [Bezpalcova, 2007]. To assure the consistency of wind 
tunnel measurements, the experimental coordinate system was subsequently converted into 
real scale coordinates, enabling further comparisons and data analysis based in a unified 
coordinate system as schematized in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7 – MUST test set-up reference coordinate system for the -45º MUST case. 
Measurements of flow properties were recorded at different positions and heights within the 
obstacles array [Bezpalcova and Harms, 2005]. The results of flow observations were non-
dimensionalized by an inflow measured wind velocity at a given reference height (7 m.s-1 at 9 
m height). In terms of dispersion modelling, the point source and concentration measurements 
locations schematized in Figure 4.8 were used to describe, as detailed as possible, modelled 
mean concentrations spatial distribution within the obstacles array and the source locates at 
the point (-102, -7) m according to the ‘normalized coordinates system. 
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Figure 4.8 – Location of point source (orange spot) and concentration sensors (black spots) 
considered for the -45º MUST case validation study. 
A quasi-stationary ethane outflow emission rate of about 7 g.s-1 was tested in the wind tunnel 
experiments, to simulate the dispersion of a neutrally buoyant tracer [Bezpalcova, 2007]. Yet, 
due to technical reasons, wind tunnel modelled point source was located at ground level, with 
a corresponding diameter of 0.75 m at full scale, instead of the 0.05 m diameter elevated pipe 
used during the field tests. Mean concentration in the 256 points around the obstacles (Figure 
4.8) were measured at a height of 1.275 m [Bezpalcova and Harms, 2005]. To make possible 
concentration data rescaling adapted for any user or model specific needs, measurements of 
mean concentrations were normalized and estimated in the form of dimensionless 
concentrations (C*) [Schatzmann et al., 2010] as follows: 
s
bdref
q
HCu
C
2
*
=                  Eq. 4-1 
In which C is the measured volume concentration (background-corrected), uref is the reference 
wind velocity (measured at 9 m), Hbd is the container height (2.54 m) and qs is the source mass 
outflow rate [Schatzmann et al., 2010]. 
4.4.2 EFRHA modelling set up and validation for the -45º MUST case 
With the purpose of accounting the presence of obstructions, EFRHA model is designed to use 
surface base elevation and buildings spatial characterization based on the combination of their 
top elevation/height and surface roughness height (z0) description (see Section 3.3). Bearing in 
mind that different combinations of input data can be used to numerically describe the 
presence of obstacles, it is of major importance to demonstrate the most appropriate Input 
Obstructions Configurations (IOMC) to predict, hazmat dispersion in industrial and urban 
areas. For that reason, the set of six different IOMCs listed in Table 4.6 was defined, based on 
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ETM buildings description techniques and z0 values applied to the -45º MUST case buildings 
configuration.  
Table 4.6 – Overview of the IOMC runs and input parameters for the -45º MUST case. 
Run ID Obstacles z0 [m] Comment on z0 definition 
IOMC1 Buildings heights 0.300 Wind profile in the middle of the building array. 
IOMC2 Buildings heights 0.1*Hbd Recommended in MEGPD. 
IOMC3 Buildings heights 0.035 Wind profile above the source location. 
IOMC4 No 0.300 Wind profile in the middle of the building array. 
IOMC5 No 0.1*Hbd Recommended in MEGPD. 
IOMC6 No 0.035 Wind profile above the source location. 
Simple and complex ways to include the obstructions were examined using the joint ETM-
EDM modules system. The most complex ways to integrate buildings were used in IOMC1 to 
IOMC3, considering the 120 individual buildings spatial distribution based on their top height 
variation in relation to the ground level, independently of the z0 value. On the other hand, in 
IOMC4 to IOMC6 assume a flat terrain without any kind of physical obstruction.  
Additionally, the influence of surface roughness characterization was tested by defining 
different values for z0 in both sub-sets of IOMCs. Both guidance (theoretical) and experimental 
(from the wind-tunnel tests) based data were considered and representative values input in 
the various IOMC configurations (with and without obstacles). In IOMC1 (with), and IOMC4 
(without) a value of z0 = 0.300 m derived from wind profile observations measured in the 
middle of the obstacles array [Bezpalcova and Harms, 2005] was used. Following the MEGPD 
recommendations, a value around 10% of Hbd was provided for z0 (≈0.254 m) in IOMC2 (with) 
and IOMC5 (without). Whereas in IOMC3 (with) and IOMC6 (without) was employed a z0 = 
0.035 m, deduced from wind profile observations at the source location [Schatzmann et al., 
2010].  
In order to properly apply ETM-EDM to the -45º MUST test case, a simulation domain with 
450x450 m with a horizontal grid resolution of 5x5 m was applied, in which concentrations 
were estimated at a height of 1.275 m from the ground, as experimentally performed. To 
assure the proper comparison between modelled and measured concentration values, the 
spatial distribution of the 256 sensors locations was also considered, based on experimental 
data previously documented in the scope of COST Action 732 [URL4.1].  
Taking into consideration that EFRHA modelling parameterizations are not capable to 
accurately describe the flow behaviour around buildings, like Class III CFD models, the 
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validation study was conducted based on the analysis of modelled mean concentrations 
spatial distribution for the set of IOMC runs as recommended in MEGPD for ‘non-CFD 
models’ [Britter and Schatzmann, 2007a; Schatzmann et al., 2010]. Therefore, aiming to validate 
EFRHA performance, q-q and scatter plots, plume features and quality metrics calculated 
using the ‘Excel sheets’ [Olesen and Berkowicz, 2008] developed for the evaluation of Class II 
models in the frame of COST Action 732 work [URL4.1] were analyzed. 
To evaluate the degree of correlation between modelled and measured ranges of 
concentrations visual inspection of q-q plots was performed without considering their co-
incidence in time and space, avoiding the ‘spatial dependence’ of scatter plots point-by-point 
validation as recommended in MEGPD [Britter and Schatzmann, 2007a] and by Schatzmann et 
al. [2010]. Figure 4.9 presents the set of q-q plots obtained for the IOMC modelled data against 
measured concentrations for the -45º MUST case. 
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Figure 4.9 – Q-q plots of the IOMC modelled against measured concentrations for the -45º MUST 
case. 
At a first analysis, it is visible an overall better performance for IOMCs with obstacles (IOMC1 
to IOMC3), illustrating the added-value of the implemented modelling approach in ETM-
EDM. In general, results from IOMCs with obstacles tend to approximate more to reference 
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observations, evidenced by the estimated linear trend lines and related r2 values; but at the 
same a clear overestimation of intermediate values is also detected. On the other hand, IOMCs 
without any consideration of obstructions (IOMC4 to IOMC6) present a considerable 
underestimation trend in all ranges of concentration values and less favourable trend lines. As 
regards to the potential influence of z0, it is possible to observe a somewhat opposing 
behaviour for ‘extreme’ values (0.035 m and 0.30 m), if obstacles are considered or not. Even 
hardly noticeable, a somewhat increase of the degree of correlation is observed for higher z0 
values in case of IOMCs with obstacles (IOMC1); in contrast to the worsening trend noted in 
IOMCs without any obstacle.  
Although IOMC1 and IOMC2 show larger overestimations of higher values, as stated by 
Schatzmann et al. [2010], it is preferable a Class II model that produces somewhat 
overestimated data in order to assure a more credible performance. For that reason, and based 
on the overall analysis it is possible to mention that, q-q plots clearly demonstrate the 
increased performance quality when considered the ETM-EDM modelling approaches to 
account the presence of obstacles. 
To support the previous analysis, Appendix C contains the comparison and analysis of data 
based on scatter plots and conclusions are similar. Even not being over-interpreted, scatter 
plots also highlight the added-value of implemented modelling approach for the presence of 
obstacles, as well as, the stronger tendency of overestimation in IOMC1 to IOMC3, when 
compared with IOMC4 to IOMC6. It also presents the spatial distribution of concentration 
residuals (ratios between modelled results and measurements), highlighting the somewhat 
differences between concentration fields with and without obstacles. Moreover, the results 
evidence the substantial resemblances with similar Class II dispersion models. 
Verified the relative consistency of measured values along the trajectory, Schatzmann et al. 
[2010] deduced an approximation of observations to a Gaussian fit, enabling the direct 
comparison between modelled and measured concentrations in the form of descriptive plume 
feature parameters. Gaussian fitting of measured concentrations consisted on fitting a 
Gaussian curve to each measured cross-section along the dispersion trajectory x-axis allowing 
estimating a representative maximum concentrations (C*max) in the plume centre line and the 
correspondent standard deviation of the horizontal distribution (σy) along the x-axis trajectory. 
Similarly to previous q-q (and scatter) plots, the ‘Excel sheet’ developed by Olesen and 
Berkowiks [2008] in the frame of COST Action 732 were used to calculate and plot both 
estimated C*max and σy along trajectory centrelines (x-axis) [Schatzmann et al., 2010] for each 
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IOMC run outputs. Figure 4.10 shows the estimated C*max in the plume according to 
measurements and IOMC runs results. The source was located at the point (-102;-7) m. 
Overall, Figure 4.10 shows the typical variability of concentrations spatial distribution 
previously discussed by Hankin [1997]. Visual inspection of modelled C*max shows that, even 
with a clear overestimation tendency, all IOMC modelled results tend to follow the variation 
trend and ranges of measured observations, especially the ones with the definition of 
obstacles. Despite the fairly resemblances of IOMCs estimated C*max at distances near the 
source (until x ≈ 40 m), it is perceptible the overall influence of the inclusion (or not) of the 
obstacles modelling approaches, in particular for x > 40 m points. Even presenting a larger 
variableness of C*max (with varying degrees of magnitude), in particular at farther distances 
from the source (x ≥ 40 m), IOMCs with obstacles tend to be closer to measured values than 
IOMCs without with a smaller variability tendency.  
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Figure 4.10 – Estimated maximum concentrations using Gaussian fitting, with distance x from the 
source (with obstacles IOMC1 – IOMC3; without obstacles: IOMC4 – IOMC6). 
Corroborating q-q plots visual inspection, it is also noted the influence of z0 values. Opposing 
the less favourable performance for IOMC4 and IOMC5, IOMC6 presents a clearly better 
performance for estimated C*max, values that tend to approximate more to measured data, with 
ranges of values quite similar to IOMCs with obstacles at farther distances. As regards to 
IOMCs with obstacles, such differences are not so evidenced along the x distance.  
The analysis of C*max distribution along the x-axis trajectory evidences the overestimation 
tendency previous detected in q-q plots, but most of all, highlights the reasonability of ETM-
EDM modelling approaches to account the presence of obstructions. Contrarily to previous 
main findings, differences between estimated C*max from IOMCs with obstacles are hardly 
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noticeable, even so it is also demonstrated the wider approximation of IOMC1 and IOMC2 
results to reference measured and estimated C*max values.  
Aiming to evaluate C*max lateral consistency along x-axis, correspondent σy values were 
estimated for both measured and modelled concentrations and plotted in Figure 4.11. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
-120 -80 -40 0 40 80 120x (m)
σ
y 
[m
]
measured
(gaussian fit)
IOMC1
IOMC2
IOMC4
IOMC4
IOMC4
IOMC6
 
Figure 4.11 – Estimated plume width, using Gaussian fitting, with distance x from the source for 
the IOMCs. 
The analysis of Figure 4.11 shows the general propensity of IOMC modelled results to 
underestimate measured (Gaussian fitting) σy values, regardless the noticed analogous 
tendency ‘shape’ along distance x. A pronounced influence of z0 values is also displayed 
through the significantly lower values of IOMC3 and IOMC6 (z0=0.035 m), particularly for (x ≥ 
-40 m). In general higher z0 (0.3 m and 0.254 m) values produce a better and consistent 
agreement with correspondent σy measured observations. Contrarily to previous analysis, 
IOMC6 shows the less favourable results of IOMCs without obstacles, significantly similar to 
the IOMC4 σy values. Such results are mainly due to the strong influence of σy values in the 
cloud lateral dispersion.  
Overall, examined σy values are consistent to previous C*max and spatial variation. In contrast 
to previous main findings from Figure 4.10, variability of EDM modelled results is not as 
obvious as for C*max plots. Yet, clear divergences are detected, not only in the closer distances 
from the source, but also along the plume trajectory.  
Regardless Schatzmann et al. [2010] stating that the analysis of paired point-by-point quality 
metrics is not totally recommended and may not make sense for EDM’s Class model, both 
paired and unpaired point-by-point quality metrics were estimated for the set of IOMC runs 
following MEGPD recommended methodology. Direct comparisons of paired point-by-point 
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modelled and measured concentrations were considered as in the scatter plots represented in 
Figure C.3 (Appendix C). Quality metrics were also estimated using the COST Action 732 
developed Excel sheet [Britter and Schatzmann, 2007b; Olesen and Berkowicz, 2008]. Table 4.7 
summarizes the estimated quality metrics for the set of IOMCs. The best results for each 
metric are highlighted in bold and the ones that satisfy acceptance limits underlined. 
Table 4.7 – Summary of quality metrics estimated for IOMC runs modelled concentrations of -45º 
MUST case (with: IOMC1 – IOMC3; without: IOMC4-IOMC6). 
Run ID FB FAC2 NMSE r MG VG SB SDSD 
IOMC1 0.071 0.254 4.47 0.697 1.41 4.78 7.5E-7 6.4E-5 
IOMC2 0.008 0.267 4.54 0.689 1.36 5.00 1.2E-8 8.3E-4 
IOMC3 0.343 0.243 5.84 0.533 1.11 7.95 2.7E-5 2.0E-4 
IOMC4 1.160 0.335 13.57 0.619 1.98 4.03 8.7E-5 2.0E-4 
IOMC5 1.160 0.314 13.54 0.625 1.94 4.11 8.7E-5 2.2E-4 
IOMC6 0.933 0.251 9.93 0.579 1.79 4.09 6.5E-5 1.5E-4 
The overall analysis of estimated metrics summarized in Table 4.7 shows that, even not 
fulfilling most of proposed acceptance criteria, IOMCs with obstacles (IOMC1, IOMC2 and 
IOMC3) have the best results for the set of quality metrics, in contrast with the IOMCs without 
any obstacle (IOMC4, IOMC5 and IOMC6), with the less favourable results. Therefore, it is 
‘quantitatively’ shown the ‘better’ performance quality of IOMC test cases with the inclusion 
of obstacles structures and consequently ETM-EDM modelling approach to account the 
presence of obstacles when applied to the -45º MUST test case wind-tunnel experimental set 
up. Moreover, quality metrics replicate previous qualitative analysis main findings, i.e. the 
best results are obtained for IOMC1 and IOMC2 in case of IOMCs with and without obstacles, 
respectively; whilst the worst results are obtained for IOMC4 and IOMC5 (IOMCs without 
obstacles). 
As regards to the FB, the values between 0.008 and 1.16 highlight the underestimation of 
concentrations tendency, also presented in scatter plots (Figure C.3 of Appendix C). 
Nonetheless, only IOMC1 and IOMC2 satisfy the acceptance criteria and IOMC4 and IOM5 
are the less favourable results, demonstrating the relevance of account the presence of 
obstacles. None of IOMCs satisfy FAC2 and NMSE acceptance criteria showing the somewhat 
degree of deviation from measured concentrations that may result from systematic or random 
errors [Chang and Hanna, 2005]. The better result for FAC2 is estimated in IOMC4, whereas 
the worst value is estimated for IOMC3 data. On the other hand, for NMSE an opposite result 
is obtained, in which the better results are estimated for IOMC1 and the worst for IOMC4. 
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Despite not considering a reference acceptance limit for the r, it is clear the ‘better 
performance’ of IOMC1 and IOMC2 corroborating previous observations. 
Concerning MG, only IOMC3 satisfies the acceptance criteria, yet the overall estimation of 
values higher than 1.0 reflect the general tendency to ‘systematically underestimate’ the 
observed concentrations as mentioned by Chang and Hanna [2005]. Despite having a better 
performance when MG values are analyzed, IOMC3 show the lesser favourable results for VG. 
Contrarily to other metrics, IOMC runs without any obstacles (IOMC4 – IOMC6) show 
slightly higher performance quality trends. Overall, the results for VG combined with MG, 
reflect the visually noted systematic tendency to underestimate measured concentrations. As 
regards to the unpaired in space point-by-points based quality metrics results (SB and SDSD 
values), the less favourable results are obtained in IOMCs without obstacles, showing the 
improved degree of correlation in terms of concentration magnitudes ‘quality’ when obstacles 
are taken into account. These parameters (SD and SDSD) replicate the previously discussed 
results from the q-q plots (Figure 4.9). Whereas SB shows in general substantially reduced 
values given the ranges of concentrations, SDSD estimated values are at least one order of 
magnitude higher, reflecting the deviations of modelled concentrations, but also the influence 
of the presence of not of obstacles. 
Even the analysis of quality metrics should not be over-interpreted [Schatzmann et al., 2010], 
the overall performance of the various IOMC configurations demonstrates the suitability of 
ETM-EDM modelling approaches to account the presence of obstacles through the effective 
description of the obstacles spatial distribution, than just increasing the z0 values. From the 
analysis of the various IOMC configurations results it is obvious that the performance of the 
model is strongly dependent on the chosen input configuration and the selection of input 
parameters, such as the inclusion of buildings spatial distribution and z0 values. 
When compared the various IOMCs modelled outputs, it is visible the improvement of results 
if buildings are numerically described, even using simple modelling approaches as in ETM-
EDM for IOMC1 and IOMC3 input data configurations. Despite the improvements, z0 values 
can also influenced the estimated results. For instance, for IOMC1 and IOMC3 which use the 
same modelling approach to numerically describe the influence of buildings, but different 
values for z0 (0.3 and 0.035 m, respectively) strongly affect the estimated concentration fields. 
Therefore, in order to predict, atmospheric dispersion of hazmat gas in obstructed areas, or 
not (given IOMC4 and IOMC6 had comparable dissimilarities), the definition of proper z0 
values is important for the overall performance quality. 
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On the whole, the third stage of the validation exercise demonstrated EFRHA’s aptness to 
account, even in a relatively simple way, the effects of the presence of obstacles in atmospheric 
dispersion of hazmat gases in industrial and/or built-up areas. Although the implemented 
approach is not capable to accurately describe the flow around the obstacles, but considering 
the main purpose of application, it is demonstrated the suitability to provide ‘better’ results 
than ‘traditional’ Class II models, and therefore be used as an alternative, especially for CA 
studies in industrial and built-up urban areas. The results highlight the variability and general 
tendency to overestimate measured concentrations, even so, and if compared with the set of 
models considered in Schatzmann et al. [2010], visual inspection reflects the improved 
capability to account the presence of obstructions. Nonetheless, in case of dispersion in 
obstructed areas, it may also underestimate, in particular the lateral concentrations, but also, 
the accurate flow around the obstacles.  
4.5 Stage 4: Dense gas accidental release and dispersion 
Taking into consideration that most industrial hazmat when released into the atmosphere can 
form dense gas clouds during (at least) the early moments of the dispersion, the last stage of 
the validation study intends demonstrating EFRHA suitability to produce quality assured 
short-term concentration fields when applied to (heavy) hazmat gas accidental release and 
dispersion scenarios, in its entire scope. With this purpose, the set of Dense gas Dispersion 
(DGD) test cases summarized in   Table 4.8 was defined to validate the developed model. The 
set of examined DGD test cases are based on well-established experimental tests from full-
scale field trials (Thorney Island, Burro, Desert Tortoise and Lathen field trials), extensively 
used in model validation exercises. Several release, dispersion, meteorological and 
obstructions conditions were considered in the applied test cases. As regards to hazmat gas 
release conditions, instantaneous gaseous (DGD1 and DGD2), liquefied gas spill with 
subsequent evaporation (DGD3, DGD4) and continuous vapour jet (DGD5, DGD6, DGD7 and 
DGD8) release scenarios were tested. Different meteorological conditions were also examined, 
particularly, atmospheric stability, ambient temperature and wind velocity, as summarized in  
Table 4.8.  
Additionally, flat unobstructed (DGD1, DGD3, DGD4, DGD5 and DGD6) and obstructed 
(DGD2, DGD7 and DGD8) terrain conditions were taken into account based on the 
information summarized in Table 4.8. 
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Reference measured observations and predominant ambient (meteorological and terrain) 
conditions information were mostly collected from the REview and DIssemination of PHysical 
Effect Models (REDIPHEM) database [Nielsen and Ott, 1996] and Mannan review [2005]. 
The REDIPHEM database compiles experimental set up, meteorological and measured 
concentration fields data for a large number of well-know and extensively studied 
experimental tests [Duijm et al., 1995; Nielsen and Ott, 1996]. The selection of the test cases was 
based on the available data, as well as, type of release and dispersion conditions reported from 
the experiments. 
Following a brief description of the various full-scale experimental test trials is provided. 
Quality performance analysis of the set of defined test cases is provided based on visual 
inspection of time evolution and q-q plots, in addition to the evaluation of estimated quality 
metrics based on direct paired point-by-point comparisons of modelled and measured values. 
4.5.1 Experimental test trials 
To illustrate instantaneous gaseous 
release scenarios, DGD1 and DGD2 
are based on tests 8 and 21 from the 
‘Thorney Island test trials’ [McQuaid 
and Roebuck 1983]. Dispersion over 
unobstructed (test 8) and obstructed 
(test 21) flat terrain is considered. In 
test 21 a rectangular fence structure 
with 5 m high, nearly 50 m away 
from the source was included 
[Nielsen and Ott, 1995]. A collapsible 
tent, with 14 m across and 13 m high (see Figure 2.7) was used to discharge the different 
amounts of mixtures of Freon-12 and nitrogen, in an attempt to illustrate a vessel’s total 
collapse release scenario [McQuaid, 1987].  
Around 250 instruments including concentration and meteorological sensors were distributed 
in the test site [Puttock, 1987a]. Figure 4.12 illustrates a schematic representation of the test 
trials layout presented by Hansen et al. [2010]. A more concentrated array of sensors was used 
in the near field to enable measuring more accurately the initial stages of the dispersion 
behaviour. Far-field sensors (over 200 m away from the release) were placed on a uniform grid 
 
Figure 4.12 – Schematic representations of Thorney Island 
trials site layout [Hansen et al., 2010]. 
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spaced 100 m. Concentration sensors were fixed to masts with various levels between 0.4 m 
and 4.15 m above the ground [Johnson, 1985]. Data from concentration sensors located at the 
lowest level (0.4 m from the ground) was used for the validation of EFRHA modelled outputs. 
The DGD3 and DGD4 were defined based on tests 3 and 9 from the Burro full-scale field trials. 
This series of experiments were conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL), at the Naval Weapons Centre, China Lake, California in 1980 [Koopman et al., 
1982a,b; Goldwire et al., 1983], to determine the dispersion characteristics of large LNG gas 
clouds on a flat and unobstructed terrain area. The experiments consisted on varying spillages 
of LNG onto the centre surface of a 58 m diameter water pond with evaporation and further 
dispersion into the atmosphere (see Figure 2.6) [Ermak, et al., 1981; Koopman et al., 1982a]. Gas 
concentration measurements were performed in sensor masts distributed aligned with 
prevailing wind direction along various arcs downwind from the spill as illustrated in Figure 
4.13 [Koopman et al., 1982b; Ermak, et al., 1981]. 
 
Figure 4.13 – Scheme of Burro test series measurement array. The closed circles represent masts with 
concentration sensors and the open circles indicate poles with meteorological sensors [Nielsen and 
Ott, 1996]. 
The EFRHA model was applied assuming an initial continuous spillage of LNG pure liquid 
fraction and subsequent vaporization estimated by ESTM4 to predict the various phases of the 
experiment. Terrain features of China Lake test site were neglected and terrain downwind of 
the spill pond was assumed as flat and the pool surface considered at terrain level.  
Considering the frequency of accidental or deliberated hazmat gases release from small 
punctures in vessels or pipes, as well as, safety relief valves, the last four test cases are based 
on tests from the Desert Tortoise [Goldwire et al., 1985] (DGD5 and DGD6) and the Lathen 
[Builtjes, 1992] (DGD7 and DGD8) full scale experiments.  
The DGD5 and DGD6 simulate the set up and ambient conditions from two of the four Desert 
Tortoise full-scale field trials conducted by the LLNL at the Frenchmans Flat site, Nevada 
(USA) in 1983 [Goldwire et al., 1985]. This series of tests was designed to measure the 
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atmospheric dispersion of spilled pressurized liquefied anhydridous ammonia in flat and 
unobstructed areas [Goldwire et al., 1983]. The liquefied gas was emitted via a two-phase jet 
directed horizontally downward at 1 m from the ground level. An orifice plate placed at the 
jet aperture enabled near instantaneous evaporation of the liquid fraction generating a two-
phase jet. Due to the reduced liquid fraction deposition observed during the experiments, the 
released material was considered a vapour jet [Nielsen and Ott, 1996]. Concentration and 
meteorological measurements were performed in various locations within the test site, as 
schematized in Figure 4.14. 
 
Figure 4.14 – Scheme of Desert Tortoise test series measuring array. The closed circles represent 
masts with concentration sensors and the open circles indicate poles with concentration sensors 
[Nielsen and Ott, 1996]. 
The array of meteorological and concentration sensors was mostly concentrated along the test 
grid centreline. Ammonia concentrations were obtained from towers placed along arcs at 
distances 100 and 800 meters downwind at various heights at the test site grid centreline.  
Additionally, aiming to evaluate the EFRHA’s aptness in case obstructions are taken into 
account, the DGD7 and DGD8 test cases were defined based on EEC63 and EEC64 tests, 
respectively, from the EEC experiments series, also known as Lathen Dense gas field 
experiments [Heinrich and Scherwinski, 1990]. This set of full-scale field experiments 
comprised continuous two-phase propane releases [Nielsen and Jensen, 1991]. They were 
carried out in the frame of the EC MTH Project BA ‘Research on Instantaneous and continuous 
dense gas releases’ [Builtjes, 1992] by Technischen Überwachungsverein Norddeutschland e. 
V. (TüV) and Risö at Lathen, Germany in 1988 and 1989 [Nielsen and Ott, 1996]. The examined 
tests consisted on propane release and dispersion in the presence of a simple fence of 5 m high 
placed nearly 50 m from the source location (see Figure 4.15).  
The horizontal mean gas concentration distribution was measured with an array of up to 36 
concentration sensors at various heights. In the specific case of the examined EEC63 and 
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EEC64 test cases, gas concentration sensors were distributed up- and downwards the obstacle, 
as schematized in Figure 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.15 – Scheme of Lathen test series measuring array. The open spots represent 2 m poles with 
concentration sensors and dashed line represents the fence [Nielsen and Ott, 1996]. 
4.5.2 EFRHA modelling set up and validation for the set of DGD test cases 
Aiming to evaluate EFRHA performance in its entire scope, the model was applied to the set 
of DGD test cases and simulated peak concentration values were compared with 
measurement observations. In each case, concentration fields were estimated at the lowest 
level of measurements (between 0.4 and 1.5 m high from the ground level) to maintain a 
somewhat consistency in the analysis, but also, for corresponding to ‘normal heights of 
exposure to hazmat gases’. Depending on the number and spatial distribution of 
concentration sensors reported in each test case, different dimensions of simulation domains 
and discrete receptors were considered. 
The validation study was conducted based on direct comparisons of modelled against 
measured peak concentrations at the sensors locations, following the recommendations of 
MEGPD [Britter and Schatzmann, 2007a]. In order to demonstrate the overall findings, time 
evolution and q-q plots and quality metrics estimated using the statistical BOOT Software 
[Chang and Hanna, 2005] were analyzed for the set of test cases. An initial comparison of 
modelled and observed concentrations is based on visual inspection of EFRHA modelled peak 
concentrations time evolution and q-q plots. Figure 4.16 presents the time evolution plots of 
modelled and measured peak concentrations during the initial 500 s after the release start, for 
the set of defined DGD test cases.  
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Figure 4.16 –Comparison of the time evolution of measured and modelled peak concentrations 
[%vol/vol] at plume centreline for (a) DGD1, (b) DGD2 (c) DGD3, (d) DGD4, (e) DGD5, (f) DGD6, (g) 
DGD7 and (h) DGD8 test cases runs during the initial instants after the release. 
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Cont. Figure 4.16 
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In general, EFRHA simulated peak concentrations follow the behaviour and ranges of 
measured values. For instance DGD1 (Figure 4.16a) and DGD6 (Figure 4.16f) simulated results 
tend to substantially approximate to (and in some instants nearly overlap) experimental 
observations during the analyzed period of time. However, there is a visible overestimation 
tendency in a large fraction of the simulation periods, in most of DGD test cases, with the 
exception of DGD5 (Figure 4.16e) and DGD6 (Figure 4.16f). In some cases, the overestimation 
is linked with a sort of delay in predicting the decrease of concentrations, such as for DGD2 
(Figure 4.16b), DGD3 (Figure 4.16c), DGD4 (Figure 4.16d), DGD 7 (Figure 4.16g) and DGD8 
(Figure 4.16h). On the other hand, noticeable underestimations, particularly in the final 
instants of the dispersion period can also be observed for DGD4 (Figure 4.16d), DGD5 (Figure 
4.16e) and DGD6 (Figure 4.16f). Notwithstanding the visible deviations, the application of 
EFRHA model to the set of DGD test cases highlights its capability to predict the different 
release and dispersion conditions in a reasonable way. 
When applied to instantaneous release scenarios (DGD1 and DGD2), it is evident the 
overestimation during the first 30 s in DGD1 and initial instant for DGD2. This tendency is 
mainly due to the implemented modelling approach for the definition of hazmat gas 
instantaneous releases. For this type of accident it is assumed that at the initial instant of the 
release, a nearly cylindrical cloud is already formed based on the user defined volume and 
dimensions. This will result in the direct estimation of the ‘overlapping’ initial peak 
concentration, even if in reality did not reached the easement sensor. Moreover, simulated 
values clearly approximate to measurements during a large fraction of time. 
Visual inspection of DGD2 and DGD3 outputs evidenced the previously mentioned 
overestimation of peak concentrations decay. Consequently, it is also observed the 
underestimation of peak concentration in DGD4 (Figure 4.16d). Such behaviour may result 
from the estimated evaporation rate and duration of the release gas outflow. The assumption 
of a continuous release may not be the most correct for further estimation of evaporation rate. 
Nonetheless, the lack of precise information concerning evaporation rate, duration of the 
emission and other relevant information disables the evaluation of accuracy and consistency 
of modelled results.  
Finally, when tested vapour jet releases in unobstructed (DGD5 and DGD6) and obstructed 
(DGD7 and DGD8) areas, simulated concentrations show visibly distinct behaviours. Whilst in 
DGD5 and DGD6 simulated concentrations tend to nearly overlap measured valued at during 
a large fraction of the dispersion. Even so, distinct behaviours are observed in DGD5 and 
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DGD6. In case of DGD5, modelled results tend to underestimate measures after 250 s; whereas 
in DGD6, the simulated results tend to underestimate measured data after 380 s. On the other 
hand, a more or less opposite tendency is observed for DGD7 and DGD8 test cases, noticeable 
by the overestimation during the last instants of the period of simulation. While for 
unobstructed areas, the degree of dilution of the cloud is modelled faster than it is really 
observed; the previously mentioned delay is once again detected in both DGD7 and DGD8 
time evolution plots. Furthermore, these test cases, also highlight the capability to simulate the 
release and dispersion, since in al cases, it is simulated the initial increase of peak 
concentration values with a substantial closeness to measured data. 
The analysis of DGD test cases time evolution plots shows the reasonable agreement between 
simulated and measured peak concentrations for various typifying conditions. Therefore it is 
evident EFRHA capability to numerically describe the various phases of release and 
atmospheric dispersion for different release types and meteorological conditions in both 
obstructed and unobstructed areas. 
Regardless the reasonable results of time evolution plots; a more detailed evaluation of the 
level of correlation between measured and modelled ranges of values was performed based 
on the analysis of the set of unpaired point-by-point q-q plots presented in Figure 4.17.  
On the whole, Figure 4.17 shows that most of modelled results tend to present a relatively 
good correlation with experimental observations, demonstrating the capability to estimate the 
ranges of concentration values measured during the examined dispersion period. However, it 
is also observed the previously identified and discussed overestimation (e.g. DGD1, DGD3 or 
DGD4) and underestimation (e.g. DGD5 and DGD6) tendencies. An overall trend to 
overestimate lower concentrations is also detected in most q-q plots, particularly in DGD3, 
DGD7 and DGD8 test cases. Regardless the identified deviations, as evidenced by the estimate 
linear trend lines r2, all analyzed test cases present a reasonable correlation degree with 
measured observation during the period of simulation. 
As regards to instantaneous release scenarios (DGD1 and DGD2), it is the reasonable 
correlation between modelled and measured values. In particular for DGD1, it is also 
noticeable the acceptable correlation even for lower concentration values, often more sensate 
to larger deviations. Hardly noticeable, is the overestimation of a reduced number of 
concentration values (Cmodelled≈1 % VS Cmeasured≈0.1), that influences the somewhat 
overestimation trend for lower concentration values. This discrepancy results from the 
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previously identified overestimation during the initial instants after the release (see Figure 
4.16a). 
                         DGD1                                                         DGD2                                                   DGD3 
y = 1.0173x + 0.4372
r
2
 = 0.919
0.1
1
10
0.1 1 10
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
y = 0.9188x + 2.8224
r 2
 = 0.754
0.1
1
10
100
0.1 1 10 100
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
y = 1.12x + 3.5363
r 2
 = 0.933
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
                         DGD4                                                         DGD5                                                   DGD6 
y = 1.352x - 0.0082
r 2  = 0.962
0
3
6
9
12
15
0 3 6 9 12 15
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
y = 1.2284x - 1.1879
r 2
 = 0.9113
0
3
6
9
12
15
0 3 6 9 12 15Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
y = 1.4608x - 1.8655
r 2
 = 0.956
0
3
6
9
12
0 3 6 9 12
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
 
                         DGD7                                                         DGD8 
y = 0.7671x + 1.1412
r 2 = 0.824
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
y = 0.7211x + 0.6354
r 2 = 0.844
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Cmeasured [%]
Cm
o
de
lle
d 
[%
]
 
Figure 4.17 – Quantile-quantile plots of modelled results against measurements concentrations [% 
vol/vol] for set of DGD test cases. 
Despite the general tendency to overestimate intermediate and higher concentration values, it 
is visible the reasonable correlation between modelled and measured concentration datasets. 
From the set of tests, it is possible to verify that, at a first analysis, DGD2 shows the less 
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favourable correlation between modelled and measured concentrations. Even the estimated 
trend line is quite close to the ‘ideal trend’, in fact the estimated r2 highlights less favourable 
correlation between modelled and measured concentrations. Supported bit the analysis of 
Figure 4.6b it is clear that the larger deviations result from the notable overestimation 
tendency observed especially after 250 s, counter-balanced by the underestimation of the 
initial peak concentrations. Nonetheless, it can be also observed the stronger correlation at 
lower and intermediate concentrations. However, opposing results are observed for DGD4 
and DGD6 in that tend to present the higher correlations, demonstrating the reasonably of 
EFRHA model to predict reliable results.  
As regards to DGD1, a general good correlation is observed, also evidenced by the estimated 
r2. Still, it can be also observed the punctual strong underestimation of some records, 
reflecting the strong underestimation observed for the peak measured concentrations 
resulting from the delayed increase of modelled concentrations, as observed in Figure 4.16a. 
Distinct behaviours are observed for DGD3 and DGD4. Whereas in DGD3 it is noticeable a 
larger overestimation for lower concentration values; such positive deviation is observed in 
DGD4 for higher concentration values. As expected, the results for jet release scenarios 
evidence the differences between considering the obstructions or not. In both DGD5 and 
DGD6 test cases, the noted underestimation results from the previously observed 
underestimation during the second half of the period of simulation. For instance in DGD5, 
modelled results reach null concentrations much faster than measured. Nonetheless such 
result may ca cause by some variation on meteorological conditions during the test not 
considered in the simulation. Contrasting, both DGD7 and DGD8 present the distinguishable 
overestimation trend of lower concentration values, given the previously observed 
overestimation tendency during the last instants after the release. Nonetheless, in the four test 
cases, higher concentrations tend to approximate to reference concentrations, highlighting the 
reasonability of the EFRHA model. 
Nonetheless, as for previous stages of the evaluation, paired and unpaired point-by-point 
quality metrics were estimated for the set of modelled concentration datasets and results 
analyzed. Table 4.9 lists the estimated quality metrics for the set of DGD scenarios analyzed in 
this stage. 
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Table 4.9 – Summary of quality metrics for the set of DGD test cases. 
Run ID FB FAC2 NMSE r MG VG SB SDSD 
DGD1 -1. 340 0.570 0.95 0.57 0.70 2.03 0.592 0.130 
DGD2 -0.410 0.510 1.30 0.74 0.71 1.71 0.940 0.930 
DGD3 -0.240 0.506 0.66 0.56 0.43 8.71 0.170 0.100 
DGD4 -0.288 0.673 0.23 0.79 1.03 1.92 0.489 0.010 
DGD5 0.121 0.450 0.36 0.84 1.95 2.72 0.160 0.810 
DGD6 -0.059 0.730 0.12 0.83 1.50 3.95 0.31 0.980 
DGD7 -0.031 0.700 0.20 0.63 1.94 4.90 0.004 0.063 
DGD8 -0.298 0.670 0.38 0.36 1.52 1.72 0.514 0.026 
The analysis of Table 4.9 shows that, in general EFRHA model satisfies the acceptance criteria 
or the estimated results are close to them. Therefore, even not ‘over-interpreted’ as 
recommended by Schatzmann et al. [2010], the analysis of EFRHA modelled results, 
quantitatively demonstrates it reliability to provide acceptable results when applied to 
accidental release scenarios. From the analysis of Table 4.9 estimated quality metrics it is noted 
that DGD8 has the less favourable results; yet, estimated quality metrics tend (in general) to 
approximate to acceptability limits. On the other hand, DGD4 – DGD6 test cases show 
reasonable (if not possible to mention good) results, given the quality metrics results.  
The FB results clearly demonstrate and corroborate the previously observed overestimation 
tendency in the examined test cases with a particular signal in DGD1 and DGD2 resulting 
from the larger overestimations also observed in previous graphical representations. The only 
exception is DGD5, for which the positive FB values indicate an underestimation trend, 
strongly influenced by the negative deviations of lower and intermediate concentrations. As 
regards to FAC2, acceptance criteria are satisfied by all test cases, excepting DGD5, which 
presents a value relatively close to the acceptance limit. If combining FAC2 with r it is possible 
to mention that, modelled concentrations tend to present a reasonable correlation with 
reference measured observation, even in DGD5 (given r = 0.83). All DGD test cases satisfy 
NMSE acceptance limits, therefore, if combining the correspondent FB, NMSE, MG and VG it 
is possible to mention that, the observed deviations are mainly caused by systematic errors, in 
particular the overestimation trends in most test cases. In this case, potential occurrence of 
random errors is small. Since all test cases satisfy NMSE and the majority satisfies or is close to 
acceptance criteria for FB and VG. 
As regards to the unpaired quality metrics it is also possible to observe relatively small values, 
evidencing the previously good correlation between ranges of modelled and measured values. 
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Considering that both metrics depend on analyzed concentration ranges, it is possible to 
verify that once again EFRHA generates reasonable outputs. 
Overall, qualitative and quantitative analysis of DGD test cases modelled results shows the 
reasonable capability to EFRHA reproduce numerically the various phases of release and 
dispersion of hazmat gases. Moreover, despite some noticeable deviations, it is demonstrated 
the reliability to account different and typifying release conditions commonly analyzed in the 
frame of CA studies.  
4.6 Synthesis 
With the purpose of demonstrating EFRHA skills to provide reasonable information about 
short-term pollution episodes and consequences from accidents involving the release and 
dispersion of hazmat gases, a validation exercise consisting of four independent stages of 
evaluation was performed following the MEGPD recommendations for ‘non-CFD’ Class II 
models.  
The first stage consisted on the validation of the meteorological component (EMM). Direct 
comparisons between EMM and AERMET modelled outputs for two distinct test cases were 
carried out demonstrating its capability to generate valid meteorological and ABL scaling 
parameters required in subsequent modules, especially in case of input data with large 
fractions of missing data.  
As regards to the source term component, the second stage consisted on direct comparisons 
between ESTM and EFFECTS 7.5 models results for a set of typifying release scenarios. Given 
the effortless of instantaneous and continuous release scenarios, only transient release 
scenarios were tested. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses demonstrate ESTM 
suitability to produce acceptable results, evidencing its capability to numerically describe 
transient hazmat gas release source term component for different types of release scenarios, 
but also the appropriateness of implemented chemical properties database.  
EFRHA’s increased capability to account the presence of obstructions (complex terrain and/or 
buildings) was demonstrated through the joint ETM-EDM application to the -45º MUST test 
case experimental set up. Direct comparison with experimental observations shows its 
reliability to provide reasonable results for situations involving the dispersion of hazmat gases 
in obstructed areas. Even, quality metrics do not fully satisfy acceptance criteria, when 
compared with other Class II models results it is possible to observe a consistent and more 
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accurate behaviour providing valid results. It is also highlighted the relevance of defining 
realistic z0 values.  
Demonstrated the suitability of the various modules to produce acceptable results, EFRHA’s 
performance quality was evaluated in its entire scope. Overall, the fourth stage of the 
validation exercise demonstrates its capability to produce reasonable results, in terms of peak 
concentrations time evolution, but also ranges of values based on the application to a set of 
well-know experimental full-scale tests. Direct comparison between modelled and measured 
peak concentrations was performed demonstrating EFRHA’s reliability to produce reasonable 
and acceptable results. Despite some generalized overestimation tendency and less favourable 
results when applied to obstructed areas, it is possible to conclude that the developed model is 
capable to numerically describe the various stages of release and atmospheric dispersion of 
hazmat dense gases in industrial and built-up areas; and therefore, support CA studies and 
emergency planning and response measures. 
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5. APPLICATION OF EFRHA TO A CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS STUDY 
 
 
This chapter presents the EFRHA model application in the scope of a demonstrative CA 
study. The selected case study and defined accident scenarios are described, without 
forgetting the characteristics of the industrial activity, surrounding built-up area and 
prevailing ambient conditions. Finally, main findings from the estimation of short-term 
pollution episodes and consequences at neighbouring population from a set of accident 
scenarios are discussed illustrating EFRHA’s suitability to support decision and emergency 
planning, training or response actions. 
5.1 Selection of the case study 
Taking into consideration the present thesis’s main purpose and the EFRHA model’s core 
features, the case study area should incorporate both ‘hazardous’ activity (industrial 
establishments and/or transportation routes) and potentially affected neighbouring built-up 
areas, in order to characterize ‘realistic’ accident scenarios. Bearing in mind these 
‘requirements’, the set of criteria listed in Table 5.1 was used for the definition of the case 
study. 
Table 5.1 – Summary of criteria considered for the selection of the demonstrative case study. 
Se
le
ct
io
n
 c
ri
te
ri
a
 - Presence of ‘hazardous’ Seveso chemical establishments; 
- Nature and quantities of hazmat handled (processed, stored and transported); 
- Geographical location and nearness to built-up areas (residential, services or urban); 
- Available information of industrial processes, safety and control measures; 
- Potential most-plausible and worst case accident scenarios; 
- Relevancy to economical and chemical industrial sectors (local to national levels). 
The selection of the case study focuses on chemical industrial activities covered by the Seveso 
Directive, given the requirements on safety, prevention and control of MIA involving hazmat 
and their consequences, but also, available information. At a first analysis, spatial distribution 
of Seveso establishments (upper and lower-tier) was checked at European and Portuguese 
levels (see Figure 1.18 and Figure 1.17). 
Portuguese Seveso establishments represent about 1.7% of the total number of EU covered 
establishments [EEA, 2010] and the majority is heterogeneously distributed in clusters of 
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establishments, the so-called ‘industrial complexes’, generally organized by sectors of activity 
[Gaspar, 2005]. According to Vieira [2011], most of Portuguese Seveso establishments belong 
to the chemical and petrochemical sectors of activity, deployed in industrial complexes, like 
the ones located in Barreiro, Estarreja, or Sines [URL5.1]. Apart from the recognized 
economical and logistic advantages from this type of set up, when close to built-up areas 
(either urban, services or residential) technological hazards may generate accentuated risks. 
As a result, potential consequences to human health and the environment in case of accidents 
at local (within the complex) and regional (complex and surrounding area) scales must be 
considered and evaluated in CA studies, decision and emergency planning and response. 
In fact, potential for MIA hazards and consequences of Portuguese Seveso establishments 
clustered in industrial complexes have already been highlighted and discussed within in 
various European [URL5.2], National [Serviço Nacional de Protecção Cívil (SNPC), 1994; 
Gaspar, 2005] and Regional [Tavares et al., 2007; Zêzere et al., 2010] scientific studies and 
research projects. In the frame of the European ESPON project [URL5.2] MIA hazards were 
estimated and mapped EU-wide, as a function of chemical and petrochemical establishments 
density per km2 per NUT3 [Schmidt-Thomé and Kallio, 2006], as illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Spatial distribution of MIA hazards estimated based on the density of chemical and 
petrochemical establishments per km2 per NUT3 EU-wide [Schmidt-Thomé and Kallio, 2006]. 
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According to Schmidt-Thomé and Kallio [2006], a sparse distribution of Seveso chemical and 
petrochemical establishments capable to cause severe MIA hazards can be observed EU-wide, 
in particular, across central European region (France, UK, Germany, Belgium) within the so-
called ‘hazardous pentagon’. At Portuguese level, despite the relatively heterogeneous set up of 
Seveso establishments [Vieira, 2011], two high density ‘spots’ are identified in the districts of 
Aveiro and Setúbal (see Figure 5.1). This spatial distribution, shows a particular concentration 
of establishments along Portuguese coastal areas, illustrated with more detail in Figure D.1 
(Appendix D), which is influenced by the location of major communication networks 
(maritime, road and railways) and sea ports usually linked with hazmat transportation routes. 
The results of ESPON project [URL5.2] and Gaspar [2005] concur with the ‘high risk district’ 
classification of the districts of Aveiro and Setúbal (in addition to Lisbon and Porto), lawfully 
established by the Portray 1033/95 of 12th August. Furthermore, Gaspar [2005] stated that 
estimated high density MIA hazard and risk ‘spots’ at Aveiro and Setúbal are mainly caused 
by the presence of some of the most important chemical and petrochemical industrial 
complexes (Estarreja and Ílhavo in Aveiro; Barreiro and Sines in Setúbal) and sea ports (Ílhavo 
and Sines). The SNPC [1994] also highlighted the very high propensity for MIA hazards at 
both Estarreja and Barreiro industrial complexes and resulting risks to neighbouring areas. At 
regional scale, Zêzere et al. [2010] and Tavares et al. [2007] highlight the very high 
technological and social hazards and risks susceptibility in the Municipalities of Barreiro and 
Estarreja, respectively, due to the installed industrial chemical complexes and hazmat 
transportation routes. 
In view of the intended application of the developed model and of the available information 
from the various studies and regulations, two ‘relevant’ Portuguese chemical complexes with 
major economical significance and impact at local to national levels were selected, namely the 
Estarreja Chemical Complex (ECC) and the Barreiro Chemical Complex (BCC). Both 
complexes have in common the nearness to built-up areas and the presence of Seveso chemical 
establishments (both upper and lower-tier), including a wide variety and large quantities of 
processed and stored hazmat, also commonly identified as potential sources of risks and 
consequences to neighbouring areas [Gaspar, 2005; Zêzere et al., 2010]. 
Notwithstanding the potentially higher risks and consequences from neighbouring closer 
built-up areas in BCC (in comparison with ECC), the limited access to information regarding 
industrial activities or hazmat handle and transported disables a proper (and realistic) 
characterization of this case study area and the definition of reliable accident scenarios. For 
that reason, the ECC (industrial facilities and neighbouring area) was selected as an 
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illustrative case study area for the definition of accident scenarios and further application of 
EFRHA model. 
5.2  Estarreja Chemical Complex 
Nowadays, the ECC is considered the 3rd largest cluster of Portuguese chemical industry 
comprising some of the most important industrial facilities of the chemical sector, with an 
occupied area of 2 km2 [Costa and Jesus-Rydin, 2001]. It is installed in the ‘Quinta da 
Indústria’, at 3 km N-NW from the geographical and administrative centre of the Municipality 
(and city) of Estarreja, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Location of ECC and Estarreja Municipality areas [URL5.3]. 
5.2.1 Overview of the ECC 
Apart from ECC modern set up, numerous and significant modifications have been registered 
over the last decades with the installation of new industrial establishments, production units 
or technological upgrades on already installed facilities, as schematized in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3 – Chronogram of relevant dates of ECC development. 
The first records of ECC industrial activity date back to the 1930s, with the settlement of a 
chlorine and soda production unit of the Belgian SAPEC Company [Nunes, 2005]. However, 
the major expansion occurred after the 2nd World War with the beginning of ammoniac 
production [Atkins Portugal, 1997], turning ECC one of the most important Portuguese 
chemical clusters. The escalating energy demand during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly at 
ECC, contributed for the construction of hydropower structures in Douro region (Cávado and 
Douro), in the frame of the ‘National Hydropower Plan’ and the ‘I and II National Promotion 
Plans’ [Madureira, 2005]. In 1960, was established the first joint-venture between Portuguese 
(European) and Japanese industrial companies pioneering the production of polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) with the installation of the Companhia Industrial de Resinas Sintéticas (CIRES) 
industrial facilities [URL5.4]. Later, the first formal Portuguese oil refining and petrochemical 
cluster was formed in 1979, between the petrochemical complex of Matosinhos and Quimigal 
[Atkins Portugal, 1997]. In 1982 former ISOPOR starts the production of methyl-di-isocyanate 
(MDI) and later entirely joins Dow Portugal (the national subsidiary of Dow Chemical 
Company) in 1989. 
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In the late 1980s and 1990s a general technological upgrade made possible Dow Portugal 
(former ISOPOR), Companhia União Fabril – Químicos Industriais (CUF-QI) and Air Liquide 
establishments to set up a ‘dynamic products chain supply’ of various materials produced 
internally (i.e. in the various ECC units) [Nunes, 2005]. The closeness of the various ECC 
industrial establishments contributed to the extension of the piping system to all installed 
facilities improving the raw materials transfer networks inside the complex, but also with 
other complexes, such as the Port of Aveiro [URL5.5]. This strategic upgrade of the internal 
transportation system, stirred the strong expansion of the entire production capacity and 
importance at national and international contexts. 
At present, ECC is composed by some of the most important industrial production units of the 
Portuguese chemical sector, namely Air Liquide (former Oxinorte), Aliada Química 
Portuguesa (AQP), CIRES, CUF-QI (which includes former Amoníaco de Portugal, Anilina de 
Portugal, Quimigal and Uniteca units) and Dow Portugal (former ISOPOR) establishments 
[Nunes, 2005; Vieira, 2010]. Excepting AQP, installed chemical establishments are covered by 
the Decree-Law 254/2007 (which transposes the Directive 2003/105/CE to the Portuguese 
legislation), and therefore classified as Seveso establishments given the quantity and nature of 
handled and transported hazmat. Whereas CIRES, CUF-QI and Dow are classified as upper-
tier establishments, Air-Liquide is a lower-tier establishment. 
In spite of the continuous modifications observed over the last years, with upward production 
capacity competitiveness and safety/control measures, Dow, Air Liquide and CUF-QI 
establishments started, in 2008, a substantial expansion of their production capacity, 
reinforcing units with up-to-date technological and safety levels [Instituto do Ambiente e 
Desenvolvimento (IDAD), 2007a,b].  
5.2.2 Hazmat production and transportation 
The various establishments settled in ECC work in different fields of chemistry, such as the 
production of organic and inorganic compounds, industrial gases, health and environment 
appliances, and polyurethanes. In fact, current production in ECC establishments includes 
mainly: hydrogen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen, argon and compressed 
air into liquid air (Air-Liquide); aluminium salts (AQP); PVC resins (CIRES); aniline, 
ammonia, chlorine, nitrobenzene, sulhpanilic acid (CUF-QI); styrofoam and MDI (Dow), 
among other products commonly ‘used internally’ [Nunes, 2005]. 
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Strongly influenced by the constant technological upgrade, a complex and dynamic 
production chain system linking internally the various production units, but also externally 
connecting the ECC with other (national and international) industrial complexes is installed in 
ECC, as schematized in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4 – Scheme of relevant products chain in ECC [based on Teixeira, 2010; URL5.6]. 
 Figure 5.4 shows the complex chain of production (including some of the most 
important/hazardous products), in which materials produced in one establishment are used 
in others as raw material. This materials network connects the various installations internally, 
but also link ECC to external complexes, such as the port of Aveiro, the Petrochemical 
complex of Matosinhos, the CUF-QI unit of BCC [Teixeira, 2010] or even the Spanish Elnosa 
industrial facilities located in Pontevedra. For instance, Air Liquide produces industrial gases, 
providing carbon monoxide and nitrogen to Dow, or nitrogen and hydrogen to CUF-QI. 
Additionally, Dow Chemical receives chlorine from CUF-QI and produces chloridric acid that 
is used internally and supplied to CIRES [Nunes, 2005]. 
Notwithstanding the continuous technological and safety upgrade or even the implemented 
chain of materials in ECC, large quantities of hazmat continue to be processed and stored in 
fixed installations, as well as, transported or transferred by road and railways and piping 
(pipes and pipelines) equipments.  
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A large variety of products is stored and processed in the various establishments [Nunes, 
2005; Serviço Municipal de Protecção Cívil (SMPC), 2006a]; including substantial amounts of 
hazmat in production and/or transportation systems. As regards to fixed installations, Table 
5.2 summarizes some of the most relevant hazmat stored and process amount capacities 
installed in the various ECC establishments that may cause significant risks and consequences 
in case of accident [SMPC, 2006a].  
Table 5.2 – Relevant hazmat storage/process capacity present in ECC in 2004 [SMPC, 2006a].   
Product Company 
Existent nominal capacity 
[ton] 
Max. concentrated capacity 
[ton] 
Ammonia 
CUF-QI 
Dow 
Air-Liquide 
CIRES 
390.0 
12.0 
12.0 
1.7 
130.0 
12.0 
9.0 
0.88 
Benzene CUF-QI 1,300 1,300 
Chlorine 
Dow 
*
 
CUF-QI 
0.5 
510.0 
0.5 
100.0 
Phosgene Dow 17.0 5.0 
**
 
Vinyl chloride CIRES 500.0 200.0 
*   Pipeline between Dow and CUF-QI. 
** During 10% of the time stores 5 tonnes; the rest 90%, 2.5 tonnes 
The existent nominal capacity refers to the theoretical maximum product storage/process 
capacity installed (including all types of equipments); whereas the maximum concentrated 
mass capacity refers to the largest storage/process equipment (including piping) [SMPC, 
2006a]. At a first analysis, it is shown that CUF-QI has the largest quantities of hazmat 
nominal capacity values, illustrated by the 1,300 tonnes storage/process capacity of benzene 
(in just one structure). Despite some exceptions, it is possible to verify that maximum 
concentrated capacity is significantly lower than maximum theoretical nominal capacity, but 
also, that quantities vary significantly (0.5 tonnes of chlorine in Dow to 1,300 tonnes of 
benzene in CUF-QI). If maximum concentrated capacity equals maximum theoretical nominal 
capacity it means that such volume is stored or processed in a ‘single production or transfer 
equipment’. For instance, in Dow’s listed information, whilst ammonia values refer to a 
storage vessel; in case of chlorine it corresponds to a transfer pipeline connecting Dow to CUF-
QI. Phosgene storage/process capacity is relatively small, given the degree of hazardous, but 
also as a result of technological upgrade and lesser volumes requirements allied with a ‘near 
real time’ transportation capacity from the Port of Aveiro [IDAD, 2007b].  
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Overall, Table 5.2 illustrates the large volumes of hazmat presently handled in ECC, 
highlighting the necessity to predict potential consequences in case of accidental release 
scenarios. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that information listed in Table 5.2 does not 
necessarily correspond to the products with the largest values of storage/process capacity 
installed in ECC, but to the ones considered the more dangerous. A detailed list of the 
products stored/processed in the various establishments is compiled by SMPC [2006a].  
Apart from fixed storage and process installations, the different transportation modes 
identified in ECC also represent key elements to assure the reliability of products chain 
production system along the various establishments [SMPC, 2006a; Silva, 2007]. The ECC is 
served by the ‘traditional’ road and railway (including a terminal inside the complex) 
communication accessibilities, in addition to the complex piping systems network (pipes and 
pipelines) linking the various establishments internally and externally with other complexes. 
Notwithstanding the benefits, transportation equipments and routes may also contribute to 
local and regional technological hazards from ECC. For that reason, in view of defining most-
plausible and worst-case accident scenarios, most common ways of transportation and 
quantities were also analyzed and taken into account. 
Continuous technological upgrade and implementation of the piping system contributed to 
the overall drop of road and railway transported hazmat quantities over the last decades 
[Silva, 2007]. For instance, the pipeline system connecting ECC with the Port of Aveiro enables 
transferring LNG, phosgene and vinyl chlorine [Tavares et al., 2007; ANPC, 2009] substantially 
reducing stored quantities, as well as, roadway transportation risks. Still, traditional 
transportations models continue to be largely used, linking the ECC with other Portuguese or 
international industrial complexes (see Figure 5.4). 
Despite ECC comprising an internal railway terminal, only few products are currently 
transported by train cisterns or in solid form. In addition, ‘classical’ roadway transportation 
mode continues active and represents an important fraction of hazmat (either raw material or 
final product) transfer outside the ECC, mostly by roadway cisterns and containers. Due to 
database protection measures, it was not possible to characterize piping and pipeline systems 
and railway transportation mode, yet Table 5.3 summarizes some of the most relevant hazmat 
transportation modes to and from ECC establishments [SMPC, 2006; Silva, 2007; Tavares et al., 
2007].  
Table 5.3 shows that, even with the complex piping system, a large amount and variety of 
products is still transported by road transportation modes, particularly, heavy duty vehicles 
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with cisterns. Given the location of the railway terminal, CUF-QI is still supplied by this 
transportation mode. Additionally, most of industrial gases are transported by heavy duty 
vehicle cisterns from the ECC. 
Table 5.3 – Summary of transportation modes and nominal capacity of hazmat in ECC [SMPC, 2006a]. 
Product Company Quantity       Transportation mode 
Ammonia CUF-QI 45 ton Train – wagon cistern 
Aniline 
Dow 
CUF-QI - Dow 
CUF-QI 
25 ton 
(unknown) 
25 ton 
50 ton 
Road – cistern 
Piping system 
Road – cistern 
Train – cistern 
Argon Air Liquide 28 m
3
 Road – cistern 
Benzene CUF-QI 25 ton Road – cistern 
Carbon dioxide Air Liquide 20 ton Road – cistern 
Chlorine 
CUF-QI 
CUF-QI – Dow 
18 ton 
(unknown) 
Road – container 
Piping system 
Hydrogen 
Air Liquide – CUF-QI 
CUF-QI – CUF-QI 
(unknown) 
(unknown) 
Piping system 
Piping system 
Hydrogen peroxide CUF-QI 23 ton Road – container 
Isocyanide difenil methane Dow 25 ton Road – container 
LNG Port of Aveiro – ECC (unknown) Pipeline 
Monochlorobenzene Dow 22 ton Road – cistern 
Monotitrobenzene CUF-QI 
25 ton 
50 ton 
Road – cistern 
Train – cistern 
Nitrogen Air Liquide 28 m
3
 Road – cistern 
Oxygen Air Liquide 28 m
3
 Road – cistern 
Pentane Dow 15 ton Road – cistern 
Phosgene Dow 25 ton Road – cistern 
Vinyl chlorine Port of Aveiro – CIRES (unknown) Pipeline 
Reflecting the present dimensions of ECC establishments, CUF-QI has the largest number of 
cisterns transporting raw or manufactured material, nearly doubling Dow and Air Liquide 
[SMPC, 2006a]. 
The inclusion of these transportation equipments in CA studies is crucial, as well as safety and 
emergency instruments measures taking into account their potential for causing risks and 
consequences to nearby built-up areas in case of accidental release of hazmat along the 
transportation routes. 
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5.2.3 Safety and accident prevention measures 
In view of the Decree-Law 254/2007 (that transposes Seveso II Directive and Directive 
2003/105/EC) Seveso establishments of the ECC must implement and regularly update 
internal security control and prevention assessment systems. These measures include the 
definition of Internal Emergency Plans (IEP), which compile recommendations and 
procedures to prevent and control potential effects of accidents occurring inside the industrial 
facilities, as well as information of installed processes, operation and control systems. 
Additionally, the Estarreja External Emergency Plan (EEEP) is also prepared to assure an 
integrated emergency response at Estarreja Municipality level (regional scale) in case of 
accident in ECC. Contrarily to IEP, which is only applied and prepared by the establishment, 
EEEP is coordinated by the Estarreja Civil Protection Municipal Service (ECPMS) and set up in 
conjunction with the various ECC establishments and local authorities (administrative, safety 
and health bodies). This instrument also considers planning and training exercises involving 
workers and local authorities for emergency response actions in case of accidents. Given the 
nature of transported material from and to ECC establishments, hazmat transportation modes 
(road, rail and piping) are also incorporated in prevention and control measures, and 
consequently in both IEP and EEEP documents at municipal and district levels [SMPC, 2006a]. 
The various ECC establishments are considered an example, at both national and international 
context, given the adoption of the Responsible Care Program initiative principles and actions 
[URL5.6]. For instance, PACOPAR was the winner of Cefic’s first pan-European Responsible 
Care Award in 2005. The main goal of this program is the adoption of a compromise with 
neighbouring community, in which chemical establishments are voluntarily committed to 
continuously improve their health, safety and environmental performance within an 
integrated sustainable development context, and to provide information of their progress 
[Oliveira, 2008]. The initiative started in 1993 with the incorporation of former Quimigal and 
Uniteca (CUF-QI), Air Liquide, CIRES and Dow in the local initiative of the Responsible Care 
Program. Later, the Portuguese Association of Chemical Industries (APEQ) also integrated the 
group. Aiming to ‘make it official’, the PACOPAR – Community Advisory Panel of the 
Responsible Care Programme, was created in January 2001 [URL5.6]. 
Nowadays, this consolidated and structured organization integrates not only industrial 
companies, but also administrative, educational, safety, health and social bodies. Such broad 
organization promotes an active interaction between local community and ECC industrial 
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companies [URL5.6], but also, the improvement of local and regional safety and prevention 
measures for emergency response in case of MIA.  
5.3 Estarreja municipality characterization 
Estarreja municipality and city is located in the coastal zone of Centre Region of Portugal and 
belongs to the district of Aveiro, integrated in NUT 2 – Centre Region and NUT 3 – Baixo 
Vouga Sub-Region. The municipality is administratively divided into seven parishes: Avanca 
and Pardilhó (north), Beduído (administrative and city centre) and Veiros (centre), and Salreu, 
Canelas and Fermelã (south), as illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
The municipality has an approximated area of 108.4 km2 mainly used as urban (18%), 
agricultural (54%) and forested land (27%) [Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), 2001]. The 
larger parishes are Avanca and Beduído, with an area higher than 20 km2 each; whilst the 
smallest are Canelas and Veiros with 10.2 km2 and 11.2 km2, respectively. Estarreja is 
confronted by the Municipalities of Ovar (north), Murtosa (west), Aveiro (south) and Oliveira 
de Azemeis and Albergaria-a-Velha (east) (see Figure 5.2). 
Taking into account the relevance and influence of physical, demographic and economical 
characterization of Estarreja municipality area for a suitable and realistic prediction of hazmat 
gas accidental release and dispersion in ECC, a brief overview is further presented. 
5.3.1 Physical characterization 
Geo-morphologically, the municipality of Estarreja can be characterized as a low-lying coastal 
nearly plane buffer region, flat at west and slightly hilly at east, ranging between 0 and 50 m 
(in hypsometric terms), divided in three main zones [SMPC, 2006a]. The ‘lower zone’ (levels < 
10 m), includes the most humid and lower areas of Pardilhó, Veiros, Salreu, Canelas and 
Fermelã parishes close to ‘Ria de Aveiro’ lagoon. The ‘intermediate zone’ (levels between 10 
and 50 m) comprises agricultural and built-up (residential, industrial and services) areas in all 
parishes. The ‘upper zone’ (levels higher than 50 m) binds mostly the eastern areas of Avanca, 
Beduído, Canelas and Fermelã forest areas, in addition to the upper agricultural and forest 
areas of Salreu [SMPC, 2006a]. 
Estarreja is integrated in a temperate climate region with a strong Mediterranean and oceanic 
influence, characterized by short and dry summers and mild and rainy/wet winters. Figure 
5.5 and Figure 5.6 show the monthly temperature and precipitation observations in the region 
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of Estarreja based on measurements in Aveiro, between 1971 and 2010 [Instituto de 
Meteorologia and Agencial Estatal de Meteorologia (IM and AEMET), 2010]. 
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Figure 5.5 – Climate normal values of temperature 
in Aveiro District (1971-2000) [IM and AEMET, 
2010]. 
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Figure 5.6 – Climate normal values of 
precipitation in Aveiro (1971-2000) [IM and 
AEMET, 2010].  
Average mean temperatures vary between 10.2 ºC (January) and 20.2 ºC (August), with an 
estimated mean value of about 15.4 ºC. In general, minimum mean temperatures are observed 
during winter period (January, February, March, November and December); whilst the 
maximum mean temperatures are measured in summer period months (between May and 
September) [SMPC, 2006a]. A nearly regular variation of average minimum and maximum 
mean temperatures is observed along the year, with amplitude of about 8 ºC. Similar temporal 
evolutions are observed for both absolute maximum and minimum temperatures. Whereas, 
the lowest absolute minimum temperature of -3 ºC was observed in January and December; 
the highest absolute maximum temperature of 39 ºC was recorded in July. 
A somewhat ‘heterogeneous’ variation of mean precipitation values is observed along the 
year, in addition to perceptible differences between average total precipitation and daily 
maximum precipitation values. In case of average total precipitation, the highest values are 
recorded in September (79 mm) and December (81.2 mm), in contrast to the minimum that 
takes place in March (29.5 mm) and August (32.4 mm); with an estimated mean annual 
averaged total precipitation value of about 52.6 mm. As regards to daily maximum 
precipitation, the maximum valued are detected in December (131.9 mm) and November 
(129.2 mm), whilst the minimum are obtained in July (11.8 mm) and August (17.8 mm). A 
mean annual daily maximum precipitation of about 75.5 mm is mean annual is estimated. 
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Similarly to precipitation, no general time evolution tendency with traditional differences 
between winter and summer is observed for both relative humidity and number of days with 
rain means monthly values summarized in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 – Averaged monthly relative humidity and number of days with rain in the District of 
Aveiro [SMPC, 2006a].  
Parameter J F M A M J J A S O N D 
Rel. humidity [%] 79 78 72 77 80 77 79 80 80 80 79 77 
Days with rain 17 11 12 19 16 8 9 7 12 17 14 17 
As concerns to relative humidity, an estimated mean annual value of about 78%, with a 
minimum of 72 % is measured in March, in contrast to the maximum of 80% observed in May, 
August, September and October. In terms of average number of days with rain, whereas 
summer months register the lesser values (8, 9 and 7 during June, July and August, 
respectively); the higher values are detected in April (19 days) and January, October and 
December with 17 days [SMPC, 2006a]. Even so, no general tendency is observed, in particular 
during winter months. 
Regarding ABL stability conditions, according to Domingos [1980] a prevalence of neutral 
(≈35%) and strong stable (≈25%) conditions are estimated for the region of Aveiro, reflecting 
the closeness to Atlantic Ocean coastal line and the substantial influence of the Atlantic 
cyclone system and humidity conditions, particularly during winter and night periods.  
Concerning wind data, an averaged mean annual value of about 4.25 m.s-1 is observed at 
Aveiro region [Castro, 2010]. Figure 5.7 shows distinct prevailing wind behaviours during 
winter and summer periods. [SMPC, 2006; Castro, 2010]. 
                                     (a)                                                                    (b) 
 
Figure 5.7 – Prevailing wind direction measured in S. Jacinto meteorological station at (a) winter and (b) 
summer periods (1954-1980) [SMPC, 2006a; Castro, 2010]. 
Application of EFRHA model to a consequence analysis study 
 
Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 175 
In any case, stronger winds (>13.5 m.s-1) present a somewhat similar behaviour in both 
periods. For lower wind velocities, distinct behaviours are observed. As regards to winter 
time, a clear prevalence of N-NW (5.5 - 13.5 m.s-1) counterbalanced by S-SE (1.5 - 5.5 m.s-1) 
wind directions is observed for medium velocity winds, and weaker winds (< 1.5 m.s-1) are 
mainly blowing from East. On the other hand, during summer time, a general predominance 
of N-NW winds is observed in all ranges of wind velocities. Nonetheless, a somewhat 
frequency of S-SW is also observed at mid-range wind velocities.  
5.3.2 Demographic and economical characterization 
Based on the most recent census statistics, the total number of resident population in Estarreja 
municipality is 27,119 inhabitants representing a population density of about 250.6 inhab.km-2 
[INE, 2011]. Table 5.5 summarizes demographic statistics in the municipality of Estarreja, by 
parish, for the most recent census (2001 and 2011).  
Table 5.5 – Population distribution in the municipality of Estarreja divided by parish [INE, 2011]. 
Resident inhabitants Parish Area 
[km
2
] 2001 2011 
Population density in 2011 
[inhab.km
-2
] 
Avanca 21.5 6,474 6,213 289.0 
Beduído 20.2 7,794 7,657 379.1 
Canelas 10.2 1,486 1,438 141.0 
Fermelã 13.0 1,482 1,336 102.8 
Pardilhó 15.9 4,175 4,163 261.8 
Salreu 16.2 4,153 3,825 236.1 
Veiros 11.2 2,618 2,487 222.1 
Municipality 108.2 28,182 27,119 250.6 
Between 2001 and 2011 an overall decrease of 3.8% is observed in the total number of resident 
inhabitants, more noticeable in Fermelã (-9.9 %) and Salreu (-7.9 %), whereas in Pardilhó is 
registered a nearly imperceptible variation of -0.3%. Consequently it is estimated a decline of 
about 9.8 inhab.km-2 in the population density between 2001 (206.4 inhab.km-2) and 2011 
(205.6 inhab.km-2). A heterogeneous distribution of the population is also observed in the 
various parishes. The northern parishes (Avanca, Pardilhó and Beduído) constitute around 
66.5% of the resident population.  
Beduído parish (the administrative city and municipality centre) has the highest number of 
resident inhabitants (7,657), comprising 28.2% of the total number of inhabitants.  On the other 
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hand, southern and more rural parishes (Salreu, Canelas and Fermelã) represent 19.4 % of the 
total resident population, showing a decline of about 5.6 % between 2001 and 2011. This 
distribution is influenced by the location of industrial facilities in Beduído and Avanca, as well 
as, major communication road and railway accessibilities. 
When the distribution per ages is analyzed (see Figure 5.8), between 2001 and 2009 (data from 
census 2011 is not yet available), it is observed a drop (-5% total) in younger inhabitants (<25 
years), counterbalanced by an increase (+5%) of the number of inhabitants older than 25 years 
[INE, 2010]. This raise is a result of the variation of 4% in adult population (25-65 years) and 
1% in elder population (>65 years).  
 
Figure 5.8 – Distribution of resident population of Estarreja municipality by ages in 2001 and 2009 
[INE, 2001, 2010]. 
In general, a large fraction of adult active population works in the secondary (transforming 
industrial, construction and energy production activities) and tertiary (services) sectors (about 
96% in 2001). The primary sector (agriculture) markedly decreased between 2001 and 2009, 
representing only 4% of the total number of adult workers population [INE, 2010]. These 
numbers clearly point up the importance of industrial sector in Estarreja region.  
Estarreja is served by a dense road and railway networks providing the municipality of good 
communication accessibilities and transportation routes (see Figure 5.9). The municipality is 
covered by an extended road net (from local/municipal to highways) with a total length of 
about 400 km. Four major road transportation routes cross the municipality, namely, the A1 
and A29 highways from south to north, connecting Lisbon – Porto and Albergaria – Porto, 
respectively; and the National Roadways EN109 and EN224 that connect Leiria – Porto and 
Aveiro – Castelo de Paiva, respectively. Supporting the major roads, a widely spread 
municipal and inter-municipal road system facilitates local and regional communication 
accessibilities.  
Figure 5.9 shows the spatial distribution of road and railway networks within the municipality 
of Estarreja, the ECC is also highlight to demonstrate the approximation to main 
communication accessibilities. 
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Figure 5.9 – Main road and railway networks in Estarreja municipality area [URL5.3]. 
Additionally, the Northern line of the Portuguese Rail Network (CP) between Aveiro and 
Porto, transverses the central area of the municipality from the south to the north, with train 
stations at Beduído (Estarreja city centre), Avanca, Canelas and Salreu, as well as a terminal 
inside the ECC administrative area. 
In view of the main purpose of CA studies, it is important to identify ‘vulnerable spots’ with 
particular relevance if potentially affected in case of accident scenarios within the municipality 
area. Hence, based on up-to-date information [SMPC, 2006; URL5.3] it is possible to identify a 
total of 99 vulnerable spots listed by the main types of activity and ‘local safety classification’ 
in Table D.1 (Appendix D), covering a wide variety of types of activity and structures (e.g. 
administrative services, educational or health centres). As expected, administrative spots (e.g. 
city hall and parish administrative centres) are generally located at the central area of 
correspondent parishes. Safety spots (police station and Firefighters headquarter) are mainly 
concentrated in both Beduído and Avanca parishes. In spite of the variety and nature of 
identified public places, it is also visible their agglomeration at Beduído area, reflecting the 
relevance of the municipality central administrative area, relatively close to the ECC. 
Education and health services are widely spread along the various parishes, in general at 
parish central areas. Even being considered the most relevant source of MIA hazards, the ECC 
must be also considered a vulnerable spot, given the degree of potential consequences and 
effects on workers in case of MIA not, only from the affected establishment but also from the 
neighbouring installations. 
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Figure 5.10 shows the spatial distribution of the set of vulnerable spots in the municipality 
area. 
 
Figure 5.10 – Spatial distribution of vulnerable spots and communication ways in Estarreja 
Municipality area [URL5.3]. 
5.4 Accident scenarios 
Aiming to demonstrate EFRHA model suitability to be applied in the scope of a CA study 
based on the ECC, a set of accident scenarios was defined and the predicted short-term 
pollution episodes and consequences of exposure to the released hazmat gas analyzed. A 
‘pure DTA approach’ was adopted for the definition of potential most-plausible and worst-
case accident scenarios. This process took into account the available information concerning 
the ECC industrial activity (fixed and transportation equipments) and surrounding area 
(Estarreja municipality). 
Plausible and worst-case scenarios were established based on information about the nature 
and risk of handled hazmat, fixed and transport equipments, prevailing ambient conditions, 
safety and control guidance, as well as from previous studies main findings [SMPC, 2006; 
Silva, 2007; Oliveira, 2008; Pereira, 2008], but also, expected outcomes. Notwithstanding the 
assured existence of proficient safety and control equipment system installed in the various 
facilities at ECC and emergency response procedures in the context of both IEP and EEEP to 
reduce or limit the consequences [SMPC, 2006; Pereira, 2008], only the presence of passive 
retention mechanisms in fixed installations, such as liquid bunds or barriers was assumed. 
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This approach aims testing EFRHA model with somewhat straightforward, but at the same 
time, realistic accident scenarios.  
Table 5.6 summarizes the set of accident scenarios defined for the demonstrative application 
of EFRHA model and analysis of short-term pollution episodes and consequences on people.  
Table 5.6 – ECC plausible and worst-case scenarios involving the release of hazmat. 
Code Scenario Type Location Substance Released Mat. 
[ton] 
CE1 Rupture in pipeline Finite-duration Near ECC Chlorine 0.55 
CE2 Total collapse of vessel Instantaneous Dow Phosgene 5.0 
1
 
CE3 Small hole in vessel wall Transient CIRES Vinyl chloride 200.0 
CE4 Road traffic accident Near-instantaneous City centre Benzene 25.0 
1 Despite this amount being registered in 10% of production time (during 90% of process period it is stored 2.5 
tonnes of phosgene) [SMPC, 2006a], it is assumed the worst-case accident scenario. 
The set of accident scenarios consists on illustrative release conditions for various hazmat that 
may generate dense gas clouds when accidentally released into the atmosphere. Initial 
containment conditions include both fixed and transport equipments (pipeline, vessel and 
cistern). Spatial distribution and quantities considered for the accident scenarios are based on 
possible equipments location and correspondent hazmat amounts according to Table 5.2 and 
Table 5.3 listed information [SMPC, 2006a]. Figure 5.11 shows the location of the accident 
spots considered in the ECC CA study.  
 
Figure 5.11 – Location of accident points (red spots) considered in the ECC CA study. 
Scenario CE1 is based on the theoretical release conditions defined in the frame of the 
emergency response training exercise carried out in Estarreja on the 22nd November 2006 
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[SMPC, 2006b] coordinated by ECPMS and, involving the participation of all ECC Seveso-
establishments and local entities (e.g. administration, communication, education, health, safety 
bodies and local population). The exercise assumed the occurrence of a ‘hypothetical’ 
earthquake causing, among other damages, a rupture of the chlorine pipeline connecting the 
Port of Aveiro and ECC at the southern frontier of ECC (see Figure 5.11). It was reported the 
release of gaseous chlorine until the arrival of the emergency response team to repair the 
failure and ‘shut-down of piping system’ (about 5 minutes) [SMPC, 2006b]. In view of the lack 
of detailed technical information regarding the type and conditions of the release, it was 
considered a continuous chlorine release during a period of about 5 minutes. 
Hypothetical plausible and worst case accident scenarios are considered in CE2, CE3 and CE4 
in ECC fixed and transportation equipments in accordance with available documentation and 
previous studies [e.g. SMPC, 2006a,b; Silva, 2007; Oliveira, 2008; Tavares et al., 2010]. In case of 
CE2, it is assumed a worst case scenario, in which is assumed a total rupture/collapse of a 
vessel storing phosgene (at its full capacity) within the Dow storage production facilities, and 
subsequent near instantaneous release of the stored volume. As regards to CE3 accident 
scenario, it is illustrated the transient release of vinyl chloride from a small break in a storage 
vessel piping valve at CIRES process unit. Finally, with the intention to cover a different 
transportation equipment, and given the relevance of road transportation mode, the CE4 
accident scenario represents a ‘near-instantaneous’ release of the total content of benzene from 
a cistern, resulting from a road traffic accident close to Estarreja’s administrative and 
geographic centre (see Figure 5.11). 
In addition to the relevance of the first three accident scenarios to represent typifying CA 
study accidents, the definition of CE4 scenario aims highlighting the need of evaluating this 
type of accidents and safety and emergency response actions, but also to present EFRHA’s 
increased capability to account the influence of built-up structure on hazmat gas dispersion 
behaviour and main outputs. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 5.11, and contrarily to 
previous accident scenarios sites, in CE4, the crashed cistern truck is located in a central 
roundabout surrounded by a ‘dense’ built-up structure of residential and public services 
buildings. 
The selection of two highly toxic and flammability (benzene and vinyl chloride) and two 
highly toxic (chlorine and phosgene) also intends to analyze the influence of the chemical 
properties, in particular, in terms of magnitude of consequences and dispersion behaviour. 
Considering that, most toxic hazmat can disperse faster covering larger areas than flammable 
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hazmat [CCPS; 2000; Uijt de Haad and Ale, 1999], it is of major relevance to determine analyze 
the generated hazmat gas cloud footprint along the simulation period, in addition to the 
magnitude of concentrations estimated [Pontiggia, et al., 2009]. 
Taking into account the relevance and influence of meteorological conditions on hazmat gas 
release and atmospheric dispersion behaviour, and subsequently on the predicted 
consequences, prevailing meteorological conditions at the region of were tested. The set of 
most representative average meteorological parameters, summarized in Table 5.7, were 
defined and applied for the prediction of prevailing ambient conditions. 
Table 5.7 – Meteorological conditions considered for the ECC accident scenarios EFRHA runs. 
        Parameter ME1 ME2 ME3 
PG Stability class A D E 
Temperature [⁰C] 20.2 15.1 10.2 
Wind direction [º] N-NW N-NW N-NW 
Wind velocity [m.s
-1
] 1.5 5.0 2.5 
Relative humidity [%] 78.5 77.5 77.5 
Cloud cover 0.1 0.8 0.4 
Three distinct predominant ambient conditions were tested, representing summer (ME1), 
average annual (ME2) and winter (ME3) mean ABL and meteorological conditions at the 
region of Estarreja. Reported/compiled data from IM and AEMET [2010] and the surface 
meteorological station of the University of Aveiro were used according to the input data 
requirements of EFRHA (EMM). With the purpose of evaluating the influence of 
meteorological conditions, a common wind direction was defined to be used in all MEs with 
adapted wind velocities values to properly represent the different ABL stability conditions 
(convective, neutral and stable). The selection of the N-NW wind direction was mainly due to 
the potentially affected area – Estarreja municipality centre and most urbanized area. To 
assure the ABL stability conditions, meteorological parameters were adapted within the 
measured ranges to properly reproduce the desired ABL conditions. 
Aiming to cover both ECC and neighbouring built-up structures/areas, two study area 
domains were established for this exercise, namely the domains D1 and D2, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.12 – Dimensions of domains D1 and D2 used in CA study of ECC. 
The middle point of both simulation domains is the Estarreja’s municipality administrative 
and geographic centre. Whereas the domain D1 was defined for CE1 to CE3 scenarios, 
covering an area with approximately 15 x 13 km2 and a grid resolution of 25 m; the domain D2 
was set up for CE4 scenario, consisting of a smaller area of 850 x 750 m2 with a finer grid 
resolution of 5 m, in an attempt to characterize the surrounding built-up area with a superior 
detail. Furthermore, the definition of D2 resulted from a preliminary application of the 
EFRHA model using the domain D1, which was not able to accurately describe the built-up 
spatial distribution and the influence of obstacles because of the coarse grid resolution.  
Bearing in mind EFRHA model main purpose and features, land use and built-up structures 
were characterized for each selected simulation domains. In view of the relatively small 
variation of surface base elevations within the simulation domain, especially in the area 
surrounding ECC, dispersion in a nearly flat terrain area was assumed. An averaged and 
homogeneous z0 of about 0.604 m was estimated from available up-to-date GIS databases 
[URL5.3]. Distinct approaches were implemented for built-up structures information, 
depending of the simulation domain and correspondent grid resolution. Whereas for CE1, 
CE2 and CE3 only structures close to the accident location (if relevant) were defined; in CE4 a 
detailed description of the surrounding built-up structure was included. The definition of the 
equipment (vessel, cistern and pipeline) dimensions was done in accordance to reported 
information by SMPC [2006a] and the information listed in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. As regards 
to the failure dimensions and conditions, recommended information listed in the literature 
was also considered [see Fingas, 2002; Mannan, 2005; Casal, 2008] for the definition of the 
information listed in Table D.1 (Appendix D)  
In order to analyze the magnitude of potential consequences at ‘locations of interest’ (e.g. city 
hall building, schools or health centres), the set of vulnerable spots listed in Table 5.8 and 
spatially distributed in Figure 5.13 was selected and identified in both simulation domains. 
Application of EFRHA model to a consequence analysis study 
 
Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 183 
The selection of this set of spots, instead of using all identified was mainly to demonstrate the 
feasibility of the developed tool to determine the magnitude of potential consequences on 
specific spots. The selection of these spots was mainly based on the type of accident, location 
at the downwind area under the already defined meteorological conditions, prevailing 
ambient conditions and relevance to emergency response actions. Considering the importance 
of Estarreja central urban area, different types of activities are included in the set, namely, 
administrative, safety, education and health services, as well as, public spaces located at the 
southern area (downwind area) of the sources locations. In addition to potentially sensible 
groups (e.g. schools or health centres), the set of listed points also includes spots of crucial 
importance in case of control and manage of emergency response, such as the city hall 
building or even the Firefighters and police headquarters. In case of domain D2, a significantly 
smaller number of spots were defined given the limited dimensions and covered area.  
Table 5.8 – Identification of vulnerable spots considered in the application of EFRHA model to ECC 
accident scenarios. 
Vulnerable Spot ID Type 
Domain D1 Domain D2 
Covered structures 
Administrative 
P1.1/1 
P1.6/2 
P2.1 
P2.2 
- Estarreja city hall 
- Estarreja courthouse 
Education 
P1.10/3 
P1.11/4 
P1.15/5 
P1.12/6 
P1.13/7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- Padre Donaciano Elementary and High School 
- Estarreja Secondary High School 
- Beduído parish Elementary School 
- Salreu Elementary School 
- Veiros Elementary School 
Health 
P1.4/8 
P1.5/9 
- 
- 
- Hospital Visconde de Salreu 
- Beduído Parish health centre 
Safety 
P1.3/10 
P1.2/11 
- 
- 
- Police station 
- Firefighters headquarter 
Public 
P1.8/12 
P1.7/13 
P1.9/14 
P1.15/15 
P2.3 
P2.4 
P2.5 
- 
- Fair park 
- Train station 
- Library 
- Sports hall 
Accident P1.16 P2.6 Accident location 
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Figure 5.13 – Location of vulnerable spots in domains D1 and D2. 
The location of the source is also analyzed as a vulnerable spot (P1.16 in D1 and P2.6 in D2), 
since it is where, significantly elevated concentration levels are measured, at least while the 
source remains active. Moreover, it is of substantial importance to verify the local impacts of 
the released cloud. In this case, covers the industrial facilities (CE1 to CE3) but also the centre 
of Estarreja municipality area (CE4). Point P1.16 is not identified in domain D1 at Figure 5.13 
since it ‘overlaps the location of the source for each scenario in Figure 5.11. On the other hand, 
in domain D2, it is represented point P2.6 because it is only one location. The selection of the 
source location also allows evaluating the potential level of risk that emergency operators or 
industrial works would be exposed during the emergency response, within the industrial 
facilities or just in a central road way. Moreover, the selection of the N-NW wind direction is 
mainly due to the coverage of the most populated area of the municipality (Beduído central 
area). Nonetheless, this process was also the result of previous analysis or tests [e.g. SMCP, 
2006b; Silva, 2007; Oliveira, 2008; URL5.6]. 
5.5 Results 
With the purpose of estimating the magnitude of consequences on people within the source 
location and affected surrounding area, direct comparisons of modelled outputs with 
reference threshold limits were performed for each scenario and hazmat. Despite the wide 
variety of safety and prevention threshold limits suggested and extensively used in the 
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literature [e.g. Lees, 1996; Yaws, 1999; CCPS, 2000; VROM, 2005b,c; American Industrial 
Hygiene Association (AIHA), 2008; Green and Perry, 2008], or even in the legislation, the 
present analysis considered the toxicological Emergency Response and Planning Guidelines 
(ERPG) threshold limit values summarized in Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9 – Reference ERPG threshold limits considered for the analyzed hazmat [AIHA, 2008] 
ERPG [ppm] 
Product 
ERPG1 ERPG2 ERPG3 
Chlorine 1 2 3 
Phosgene - 0.2 1 
Vinyl chloride 500 5,000 20,000 
Benzene 50 150 1,000 
The ERPG limits provide estimates of exposure damages based on three distinct concentration 
ranges that a person may reasonably anticipate observing adverse different ‘degrees’ of effects 
as a consequence of being exposed for up to one hour to the hazmat in question’ [AIHA, 2008], 
i.e. establishes concentrations of concern that people may suffer certain symptoms from 
exposure. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines for short-term exposures up to one hour 
(3600 s) of duration of contact to the hazmat in question. The range of symptoms varies 
between light mild transient adverse health effects (ERPG1) to life-threatening health effects 
(ERPG3). To simplify the analysis, the EFRHA model concentration values were analyzed in 
ppm for direct comparisons with standard ERPG threshold limits. Although Portuguese 
legislation (Decree-Law 254/2007) recommended the preferential use of the Acute Exposure 
Guideline Limit (AEGL) values, based on levels of concern for various periods of exposure 
time (from 10 minutes to 1 hour) for the analysis of EFRHA modelled results were considered 
the correspondent ERPG values. Taking into account the type of acute (peak concentrations) 
exposure and scenarios considered, the analysis of the maximum observable concentration 
values can be directly compared with the ERPG since it is mentioned the exposure to levels of 
concern up-to 1 hour. Additionally, the use of these parameters also facilitates the analysis of 
instantaneous peak concentrations and therefore, peak/episodic exposure episodes, 
commonly detected in MIA, strongly felt by the industrial operators during the initial instants 
after the incident. Detailed definition of the ERPG limits is presented in Appendix D. 
Taking into account the nature of the event and generated information, the analysis of the 
EFRHA modelled outputs is divided in two main steps. The first one comprises the inspection 
of peak concentrations time evolution and spatial variation at various instants in order to 
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assess the magnitude of consequences and extent of the affected area. Additionally, a more 
detailed evaluation of predicted consequences is carried out in the second step, based on the 
comparison between ERPGs and the ‘maximum’ concentrations estimated at the vulnerable 
spots locations during the period of simulation.  
Aiming to evaluate the magnitude of estimated concentrations, direct comparisons between 
modelled and reference ERPG limits were carried out, in the form of the time evolution plots 
presented in Figures 5.14 to 5.17 for the set of examined accident scenarios. This preliminary 
analysis enables verifying if harmful ‘life-threatening’ concentration levels are reached during 
the period of simulation after the incident. 
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Figure 5.14 – Modelled chlorine maximum concentration time evolution and ERPG limits for CE1 
scenario conditions during the initial 3600 s. 
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Figure 5.15 – Modelled phosgene maximum concentration time evolution and ERPG limits for CE2 
scenario conditions during the initial 3600 s. 
Application of EFRHA model to a consequence analysis study 
 
Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 187 
0
10
20
30
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600
Time [s]
Co
n
c
e
n
tr
a
tio
n
 
[10
3  
pp
m
] ME1 ME2 ME3
ERPG1 ERPG2 ERPG3
 
Figure 5.16 –Modelled vinyl chloride maximum concentration time evolution and ERPG limits for 
CE3 scenario conditions during the initial 3600 s. 
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Figure 5.17 – Modelled benzene maximum concentration time evolution and ERPG limits for CE4 
scenario conditions during the initial 1800 s. 
Overall, Figures 5.14 to 5.17 show that, ERPG3 limits are exceeded by simulated 
concentrations in all accident scenarios, at least under one ME condition, causing the potential 
exposure to threatening concentration levels. For instance, while in CE1, CE2 and CE4, 
estimated concentrations surpass ERPG3 value at least in one moment, under all tested 
meteorological conditions, in CE3 scenario it is only overtaken for ME3 (stable) conditions. 
Therefore, in any case, the magnitude of consequences from exposure would require the need 
to activate the IEP and the EEEP to assure a proper emergency response and safety measured 
within the affected areas. 
Whereas for CE1 (Figure 5.14) and CE2 (Figure 5.15) the magnitude of estimated peak 
concentrations significantly exceeds the reference ERPG3 limits; in case of CE4 (Figure 5.17) 
and CE3 under ME2 (Figure 5.16) the difference is somewhat lower. Moreover, the period of 
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time that the maximum concentrations are observed, is in general proportional to the duration 
of the active source. This is particularly visible in the case of the continuous and transient 
releases of chlorine (CE1) and vinyl chloride (CE3), respectively. Eventually, the maximum 
concentration values correspond to the accident location while the source remains active. On 
the other hand, considering the dimensions of the container and initially stored amount (see 
Table5.7), as well as the range of concentration values estimated, it is possible to check the 
more or less slender decrease of phosgene and benzene concentrations after the initial peak 
value (see Figures 5.15 and 5.17). Although CE2 and CE4 have the same type of outflow (near-
instantaneous), the range of values ‘involved’ and the nature/properties of the analyzed 
hazmat gas generate distinct behaviours. The fall of benzene concentrations is more abrupt 
than in case of phosgene dispersion. This variation depends on the amount of product 
released, but also, its intrinsic chemical properties. For instance, whereas phosgene has a 
molar mass of about 98.92 g.mol-1 and density of 4.35 kg.m-3 (gas @ 15 ºC and 1 atm); benzene 
has a molar mass of 78.11 g.mol-1 and density of 3.48 kg.m-3 (gas @ 15 ºC and 1 atm). 
Considering the type of accident scenario, but also the thermodynamics presented, under 
similar conditions, phosgene can be considered denser than benzene and the initial dense gas 
behaviour/phase will last longer, affecting the cloud dispersion phenomena and the estimated 
concentration values. On the whole, the results indicate that, during the initial instants if 
anyone would be ‘unexpectedly’ exposed to the released hazmat gas, would required 
emergency and medical assistance, since at least ERPG2 limit (symptoms that could impair 
individual’s to take protection action) is overlapped under any of the tested meteorological 
conditions. 
As regards to meteorological conditions, it is also observed a general and somewhat uniform 
tendency in CE1, CE2 and CE3 accident scenarios peak concentrations behaviour. From 
Figures 5.14 to 5.16, it is visible that larger values tend to occur under stable conditions (ME3) 
during a significant fraction of the analyzed periods, whilst the smaller are observed for 
convective conditions (ME1). Even so, it can be also noted that, in practically all scenarios 
(including CE4), concentrations under convective conditions after presenting the significant 
initial decrease, have the tendency to remain at magnitudes of concern that in general overlap 
ERPG2 (CE2) or ERPG1 (CE1 and CE3) during longer periods of time (also in CE4). On the 
other hand, even showing levels of concentrations higher than under convective conditions, 
during the initial instants of the dispersion, concentrations under neutral conditions (ME2) 
have the lesser overall ‘harmful levels’, especially in the second half of the analyzed period of 
time, where in fact leans to be null earlier than in other meteorological conditions. 
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As previously mentioned, the CE4 accident scenario presents a distinct temporal variation and 
overall concentrations behaviour for the various meteorological conditions analyzed. Figure 
5.17 shows that initial concentrations are almost identical, independently of the meteorological 
conditions considered. The clear differences from the general behaviour observed in previous 
accident scenarios may indicate that, in this case the dispersed cloud behaviour is influenced 
by other factors in addition to the meteorology, such as the description of the surrounding 
obstacles. During the initial instants of the dispersion it is visible the strong resemblances of 
concentrations under the tested meteorological conditions (see Figure 5.17). Only after 180 s, 
modelled peak concentrations tend to diverge. Furthermore, similarly to the other scenarios, 
peak concentrations under convective (ME1) conditions tend to overlap ERPG1 during most 
of the analyzed period of time. In this particular case, concentrations under convective 
conditions last significantly longer than under neutral (ME2) or stable (ME3) conditions. The 
results highlight EFRHA’s suitability to account the presence of obstacles during the 
dispersion phase, in order to provide ore realistic information. 
In general, the analysis of time evolution of hazmat modelled concentrations shows the overall 
tendency to overlap reference emergency limits, evidencing the need to analyze the extent of 
potentially affected areas along the dispersion period. Considering the ranges of ERPG values, 
and modelled concentration, it is possible to mention that, based on this initial analysis, CE2 
would represent the less favourable conditions and potentially more affected people and area.  
It is also observed the direct influence of meteorological conditions on predicted 
concentrations. Based on the estimated values it is possible to mention that the most harmful 
conditions, i.e. the higher concentration values, would occur under stable conditions (typical 
of winter or night time periods), are observed under stable conditions in all examined accident 
scenarios. On the other hand, it is noted that convective conditions present lower 
concentration magnitudes, strongly influenced by the wider dispersion and mixing favoured 
by the atmospheric turbulence, lower wind velocity, but also higher temperatures. Taking into 
account the influence of temperature on gas density, under higher temperatures, the cloud 
tends to present lessen dense gas behaviour during the dispersion [Britter and McQuaid, 
1988]. However, ‘after a while’ it tends to present the higher ‘residual’ and nearly stable 
concentrations, that may overlap ERPG1 or ERPG2 limits and cause light mild and/or 
transient adverse symptoms. Moreover, even concentrations under neutral conditions present 
concentration values higher than under convective during the initial instants of the dispersion, 
the estimated levels of harmful concentrations tend to last less time than any other stability 
condition. 
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The analysis of peak concentrations time evolution demonstrates the need to evaluate the 
extent of the affected areas, especially if ERPG2 and ERPG3 levels are overlapped. Hence, in 
an attempt to analyze the extent of potentially affected areas and cloud behaviour, the set of 
contour maps presented in Figures 5.18 to 5.21 were examined. Taking into consideration the 
main differences between CE4 and the other scenarios, Figures 5-18 to 5-20 present 
instantaneous snapshots of the estimated concentration fields at 5, 15, 30 and 60 minutes after 
the accident for CE1, to CE3 scenarios; whereas Figure 5.21 includes snapshots of the 
predicted concentration fields at 2, 5 and 8 minutes after the accident in case of CE4. At a first 
analysis, Figures 5.18 to 5.20 will be analysed and then the distinct accident scenario 
conditions considered and predicted for CE4 are discussed next. 
The analysis of Figures 5.18 to 5.20 shows that the urban and administrative centre of Estarreja 
municipality would be strongly affected, at least by concentration levels above ERPG1 limit in 
all accident scenarios and correspondent meteorological conditions. Moreover, it is visible the 
larger extensions of affected areas under convective conditions. In a certain way, there results 
oppose idea that if it is reached the highest peak concentrations, it would directly 
correspondent to the worst scenario. For instance, even the higher peak concentrations are 
estimated under stable conditions (ME3), convective conditions tend to show the ‘worst 
accident scenarios’, not only in terms of the covered area, but also the duration of the 
generated cloud. In a certain way, the results replicate the previously observed ‘higher’ 
concentrations in the second half of the analyzed period of simulation. 
Moreover, contour maps confirm the previous idea that scenario CE2 would generate the 
‘most harmful’ results, not only in terms of magnitude of concentrations, but also the extent of 
affected areas (see Figure 5.19). Under ME1 and ME3 conditions, it is possible to observe levels 
of concentrations higher than ERPG3 in certain areas, 15 minutes after the accident, but also 
concentrations higher than ERPG2 are observed 60 minutes after the accident for the ME1 
conditions. If only analyzed the extension of affected areas it is possible to conclude that, in 
spite of previous idea concerning the possible direct link between the magnitude of 
concentrations/consequences and dangerousness of a scenario, the most harmful scenario 
would occur under convective and not stable conditions, given the predicted extension of the 
affected area during the initial 60 minutes after the accident (see Figure 5.19). 
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Figure 5.18 – Snapshots of modelled chlorine concentration fields [ppm] at 5 (a), 15 (b), 30 (c) and 60 
(d) minutes after the vessel piping rupture for the set of ME of CE1 scenario. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
ERPG3 ERPG2 ERPG1 Concentration [ppm] 
ME1 ME2 ME3 
Application of EFRHA model to a consequence analysis study 
 
192                                                                               Accidental release of hazardous gases: modelling and assessing risk 
 
Figure 5.19 – Snapshots of modelled phosgene concentration fields [ppm] at 5 (a), 15 (b), 30 (c) and 60 
(d) minutes after the vessel piping rupture for the set of ME of CE2 scenario. 
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Figure 5.20 – Snapshots of modelled vinyl chloride concentration fields [ppm] at 5 (a), 15 (b), 30 (c) 
and 60 (d) minutes after the vessel piping rupture for the set of ME of CE3 scenario. 
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Figure 5.21 – Snapshots of modelled benzene concentration fields [ppm] at 2 (a), 5 (b) and 8 minutes 
after the cistern truck accident and crash for the set of ME conditions of CE4 scenario.   
As regards to CE4 accident scenario, the analysis of Figure 5.21 snapshots clearly indicates the 
influence of obstacles in the benzene gas dispersion, in addition to the ‘traditional’ 
meteorological conditions. Nonetheless, a comparable behaviour to previous accident 
scenarios main findings is also observed. During the initial instants, the extent of affected area 
under ME2 and ME3 is substantially higher when compared with the smaller cloud observed 
under ME1 conditions. This initial expansion may result from the higher wind velocities and 
the ‘intensified’ dense gas dispersion behaviour under lower temperatures (for ME2 and 
ME3). Despite of being less evident for ME2 and ME3 conditions, it can be also observed the 
influence of the defined obstacles in the general dispersion behaviour. In case of ME1 
conditions, the 2 minutes snapshot presents the strong accumulation of benzene in the central 
open area and narrow streets close to the accident point. Moreover, the influence of obstacles 
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continues to be visible in the following contour maps, in which it is noted the cloud dispersion 
in the open spaces around central the obstacles, including Estarreja city hall building. In this 
case, it would be necessary to assure a fast response of emergency operators. Also, considering 
that this small area aggregates some of the most relevant administrative and services spots, 
the analyzed scenario could cause significant consequences in the first instant after the 
accident. 
In general, visual inspection of both peak concentration time evolution and spatial distribution 
of the generated cloud along the dispersion behaviour highlights the importance of properly 
defining input meteorological, source term and obstructions data. From the combined analysis 
of time and spatial evolution of concentrations it is possible to conclude that the less 
favourable accident scenarios, i.e. the scenario that could cause more consequences in the 
surrounding area, would occur mainly under convective conditions. Even not reaching the 
same levels of concentrations as estimated for ME3, the extent of affected areas is in general 
the larger and lasts longer than the ones determined for ME2 or ME3 conditions. Even so, it 
must be also noted that, distinct behaviour are also observed, that may generate distinct types 
of consequences. While ME2 and ME3 may generate acute exposure consequences, 
particularly in the initial instants of the dispersion; ME1 tends to present lower concentrations 
but during longer periods of time (at least until 60 minutes after the accident) and wider 
affected areas, especially after 15 min from the accident. 
Considering the higher temperature but at the same time lower wind velocity allied with the 
chemical properties (density), it is possible to mention that the ‘dilution’ of the cloud is 
reduced in a certain way during the dispersion process in ME1 conditions. Therefore, an 
accident occurring during daytime or summer periods would cause more impacts and 
consequences on local population than under neutral or stable conditions. Moreover, the 
analysis of CE4 concentrations contour maps shows EFRHA’s suitability describe, in a realistic 
way the dispersion of hazmat gas in obstructed areas, but also the influence of obstacles on 
hazmat gas atmospheric dispersion.  
In addition to the reliable information graphically presented, in case of emergency response, it 
is also important to evaluate the degree of exposure to hazmat levels of concern at specific 
spots within the potentially affected area. Aiming to demonstrate EFRHA reliability to 
generate this type of information, potential consequences on specific vulnerable spots were 
also analyzed. Tables 5.10- 5.13 summarize the obtained results from the direct comparison 
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between maximum concentrations modelled at the set of vulnerable spots during the period of 
simulation (listed in Table 5.9) and reference ERPG limits.  
Table 5.10 – Comparison of maximum concentrations estimated in vulnerable spots against reference 
ERPG values for CE1 accident scenario. 
ERPG limit reached 
Spot 
ME1 ME2 ME3 
P1.1    
P1.2    
P1.3    
P1.4    
P1.5    
P1.6    
P1.7    
P1.8    
P1.9    
P1.10    
P1.11    
P1.12    
P1.13    
P1.14    
P1.15    
P1.16    
ERPG ERP1 ERPG2 ERPG3 
Table 5.11 – Comparison of maximum concentrations estimated in vulnerable spots against reference 
ERPG values for CE2 accident scenario. 
ERPG limit reached 
Spot 
ME1 ME2 ME3 
P1.1    
P1.2    
P1.3    
P1.4    
P1.5    
P1.6    
P1.7    
P1.8    
P1.9    
P1.10    
P1.11    
P1.12    
P1.13    
P1.14    
P1.15    
P1.16    
ERPG ERP1 ERPG2 ERPG3 
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Table 5.12 – Comparison of vinyl chloride maximum concentrations estimated in vulnerable spots 
against reference ERPG values for CE3 accident scenario. 
ERPG limit reached 
Spot 
ME1 ME2 ME3 
P1.1    
P1.2    
P1.3    
P1.4    
P1.5    
P1.6    
P1.7    
P1.8    
P1.9    
P1.10    
P1.11    
P1.12    
P1.13    
P1.14    
P1.15    
P1.16    
ERPG ERP1 ERPG2 ERPG3 
Table 5.13 – Comparison of maximum concentrations estimated in vulnerable spots against reference 
ERPG values for CE4 accident scenario. 
ERPG limit reached 
Spot 
ME1 ME2 ME3 
P2.1    
P2.2    
P2.3    
P2.4    
P2.5    
P2.6    
ERPG ERPG1 ERPG2 ERPG3 
Each ERPG is identified by a colour: green (ERPG1), yellow (ERPG2) and finally red (ERPG3). 
If modelled concentrations in a certain spot do not reach (at least) ERPG1 limit, no colour is 
defined. In general, the analysis of Tables 5.10 to 5.13 confirms the higher concentration values 
previously observed under ME2 and ME3 conditions, as well as, that CE2 can be considered 
the worst accident scenario from the set of accidents analyzed. Taking into consideration the 
number of spots with concentrations higher than ERPG3 presented in Table 5.12 it is once 
again observed the magnitude and extension of damage and potential consequences to human 
health from the total collapse of a phosgene vessel inside the Dow establishment tested in 
CE2. The extension of the cloud can be also verified through the estimated concentration 
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levels at farther locations, such as the spot P1.6. Additionally, it is the only case with all spots 
affected by ERPG3 levels of hazmat gases under neutral and convective conditions, 
representing potential consequences and life-threatening health effects.  
On the other hand, CE3 can be considered the less dangerous accident scenario, when 
considered the same set of vulnerable spots, in particular at the source location, in which vinyl 
chloride concentrations only overlap ERPG3 under ME3. In this case, almost all vulnerable 
spots would suffer ERPG1 light health problems, or transient irritations with reduced health 
effects or consequences. Transient irritations or more dangerous and irreversible health 
problems would be observed close to the source, as indicated by the point P1.16 (Table 5.12). 
In spite of the estimated results, it must be kept in mind that, since the vulnerable spots are 
mostly located within or close the urban area, for this type of accident, the potentially most 
exposed persons would be the works and the first response emergency teams. The somewhat 
reduced level of dangerousness of this scenario is mainly due to the type and nature of the 
analyzed hazmat (vinyl chloride), the levels of concern established (see Table 5.9) and the 
correspondent potential consequences to human health, but also the way it is released. Being a 
transient release from a small valve, the main consequences will be mainly felt within and 
close to the release point, given the intense mixture and dilution resulting from the jet release. 
Additionally, it’s a fact that estimated consequences from CE4 accident scenario are essentially 
observed in the surrounding area of the accident. Nonetheless, the degree of resolution, 
particularly in terms of building structures, demonstrates EFRHA’s suitability to provide 
more realistic information, than commonly applied Class II CA models. 
The exercise also demonstrates that the degree of hazardous is not directly dependent on the 
amount of released material, but most of all their nature and level of concern. For instance, 
even CE3 considers the transient release of 200 tonnes of vinyl chloride it has been observed 
that it had the less dangerous ‘results. Alternatively, CE1 and CE2 based on the releases of 0.55 
tonnes of chlorine and 5 tonnes of phosgene, respectively considered the most dangerous 
accident scenarios, particularly CE2. Analyzing the ERPGs values it is clear that the degree of 
dangerousness of phosgene is extremely higher than any of the others. Even so, it has been 
also demonstrated the importance to analyze eventual failures at the pipeline connecting ECC 
with the Port of Aveiro and eventual consequences on the surrounding area. Moreover, the 
relevance of the type of accident and potential consequences must always consider the main 
purpose of the study and the type of accident and case study area. As observed, even CE4 
does not represent a major concern such as CE1 or CE2 scenarios, it is visible that potential 
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effects on the surrounding area, especially if it is similar to the analyzed, with important 
public services (e.g. banks, offices, restaurants) but also residential spots. 
Considering the overall results, it can be observed that, under the defined meteorological 
conditions, the southern area of the ECC or source location would be affected at least by 
ERPG1 concentration levels. In general, vulnerable spots would be affected by hazardous 
concentration levels in case of accident, which could required the evacuation of people inside 
or close of these structures. Taking into account the results obtained for the set of vulnerable 
spots, it is clear that, if a MIA does occur under similar meteorological conditions, the entire 
urban central and administrate area would be affected and exposed to serious hazmat levels. 
Given the location of safety, education, health and even administrative spots in relation to the 
ECC, it is required an efficient emergency control and evacuation plan, especially for spots 
with sensible groups of the local population (e.g. schools, hospital). Therefore, the present 
exercise shows the relevance and applicability of the developed tool to support CA studies, 
but also emergency planning and response in case of MIA, It is also evidenced that various 
types of analysis and interpretations from the modelled outputs. 
With the exception of CE4 results, it is also possible to determine the maximum distances of 
risk, and therefore the radius and potential affected area (around the source) along the 
dispersion under any wind direction and maintaining the other parameters constant. 
Considering that in the considered domain of simulation the topography or buildings do not 
present a significant influence on the main results, it is then possible to generalize the results 
and determine the radius of risk. As regards to CE4, the results cannot be ‘generalized’ for 
other wind directions, given the strong influence of the obstacles distribution in the estimated 
wind fields. In this case it would be necessary to repeat the simulations for different wind 
directions and verify the main outputs.  
5.6 Synthesis 
Aiming to demonstrate the main features and capacity to be used in the scope of CA studies, 
as well as to support decision and emergency response measures/actions, the EFRHA model 
was applied to a particular case study, based on the Portuguese industrial complex located in 
Estarreja municipality (the ECC). A set of four accident scenarios was defined: CE1 - leakage 
of chlorine from a full bore ruptured pipeline; CE2 - total rupture/collapse of a phosgene 
vessel; the CE3 - transient release of vinyl chloride from a small puncture in a vessel’s valve, 
and finally, CE4 - near instantaneous release of benzene from a crashed cistern in the 
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municipality central area. Typical convective (ME1), neutral (ME2) and stable (ME3) 
meteorological conditions were also defined to verify the influence of meteorological 
conditions on modelled outputs. The magnitude and extension of affected areas were 
analyzed based on direct comparisons of modelled concentrations and reference ERPG limits, 
in the form of peak concentrations time evolution plots, contour maps and maximum 
concentrations at selected vulnerable spots locations. 
The application of EFRHA model demonstrates the direct influence of various input 
‘elements’ on the main outputs, in particular the meteorological conditions, release scenario, 
chemical properties of the studied hazmat gas and the presence (or not) of obstructions 
(obstacles). The CE1 accident scenario shows that the pipeline system may also represent a 
source of danger if leakages into to the atmosphere do materialize. The worst case accident 
scenario CE2 would generate the ‘most dramatic’ effects in the ECC surrounding area, not 
only in terms of magnitude, i.e. concentrations in relation to correspondent safety threshold 
limits, but also extension of the affected area, particularly under stable conditions. The 
accident scenario CE3 would generate the ‘less dangerous’ effects, even being the scenario 
involving the higher amount of released material. Finally the CE4 scenario illustrates the 
added-value of defining the built-up structure, especially at a more detailed scale. 
Overall, the application of the EFRHA model to the set of accident scenarios demonstrates its 
reasonability to produce valid information for the estimation of consequence from the 
exposure to hazardous levels of hazmat gases accidentally released into the atmosphere. 
Therefore, it is presented its capability to be used in the scope of CA studies, but also, 
emergency response and planning. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The production, storage and transportation of hazmat activities are processes of vital 
economic importance for any advanced and technologically complex society, strongly coupled 
with an increased number and seriousness of industrial facilities and quantities of hazmat 
handled. However, as all physical human activities, involve risks to humans and the 
environment, particularly highlighted by the number of MIAs that continue to occur every 
year, causing severe consequences on workers and on progressively denser neighbouring 
populated areas. Subsequently, the increased public and researchers concern on the risks 
posed by industry and the use of hazmat, enforced regulatory authorities and industrialists to 
implement new and more complex instruments and measures for the control and prevention 
of such events. As a result, a series of legislation and regulatory instruments (e.g. Seveso 
Directives), have been published over the last decades, focusing on prevention and control of 
hazardous industrial activities and their potential consequences. Supported by these measures 
and constant scientific developments, QRA and CA methodologies became the ‘scientific 
pillar’ of regulatory, prevention and control actions and instruments of RA studies, to map 
and quantify specific consequences and risks in most hazardous industrial activities.  
Notwithstanding the wide variety of QRA approaches and techniques, long has been 
recognized that numerical models can provide valuable information for CA studies and 
emergency planning and response in case of accidents. Moreover, the need to understand and 
numerically describe the various stages of accident scenarios involving the release and 
dispersion of hazmat gases, gave computational models a unique value in CA modelling. 
Among the various types of models currently applied in CA studies, the dispersion modelling 
elements are often considered the main core of the entire modelling process, not only due to 
the complexity associated but also the production of information directly used for the 
estimation of the consequences from accident scenarios involving the release and dispersion of 
hazmat gases.  
Apart from the large number and variety of dispersion models currently available, the 
‘Traditional’ Class II, particularly Types II-IV models, are almost ‘exclusively’ applied in CA 
studies and more recently Class III models started to be also used for more complex 
environments or studies requiring a higher degree of accuracy. Class II models have been 
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extensively applied by analysts and emergency planning and response operators in CA 
studies of accident scenarios, due to their relative effortless and reasonable level of required 
expertise. Nonetheless, as evidenced in numerous studies, relevant constrains limit their 
application to broader accident scenarios, but also the quality of main outputs. Among others, 
the limited application to sets of typifying accident scenarios, their ‘simplicity’ do not enable 
considering the influence of obstruction in the dispersion of the accidentally release hazmat 
gas cloud. On the other hand, although Class III models clearly overcame most of ‘well-
known’ Class II limitations, the level of complexity, expertise and requirements on hardware 
capability and computational efforts, still limits their boarder use, mainly by unspecialized 
annalists and emergency responders. Therefore, the development of ‘intermediate’ models, 
capable to simulate the various phases of the hazmat gas release and dispersion, in a more 
realistic way, but at the same time maintaining a certain straightforwardness of Class II 
models can be considered a challenge to current engineering and applied environmental 
sciences. Moreover, the existence of Class II models, often forgotten by CA modelling prone 
communities, may also represent alternative ways to overcome the constrains of Class II Types 
II – IV models.  
This important framework determined the main goal of this thesis through the development 
of an integrated modelling system that incorporates an ‘alternative’ Class II modelling 
approach, capable of estimating short-term pollution episodes and consequences from the 
accidental release and dispersion of hazmat gases in industrial and/or built-up areas. To 
achieve this purpose, the developed model is designed to simulate the various stages of CA 
studies and correspondent modelling elements, with particular attention to the source term 
and dispersion phases, with similar of even less expert or technical requirements of 
‘Traditional’ Class II and Class III models often considered.  
To estimate short-term pollution episodes and consequences from accidents involving the 
release of hazmat gases in industrial and urban areas, the EFRHA model includes a shallow 
layer dispersion modelling approach, specifically developed for dense gas dispersion in 
complex environments. The implementation of this ‘often forgotten’ approach results from the 
intention to increase the accuracy of modelled results, in particular for hazmat gas accidental 
release scenarios in complex terrain and/or obstructed areas, but without the need of the 
Class III CFD models ‘complexity’. 
Considering the common limitations on accessing the required input information (e.g. 
chemical properties of the analyzed hazmat or ABL scaling parameter), an additional feature 
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of EFRHA is the integration of a set of ‘pre-processing’ modules, to assure the provision of 
necessary information for the reasonable description of a wide variety of accident scenarios. 
This procedure enables, not only controlling possible errors or mismatched input or interim 
information, but also to reduce the minimum strict mandatory input user defined data. 
Therefore, the integration of EMM, ESTM and ETM modules resulted in a clear easiness on 
preparing input information, as well as, the definition of accident scenarios and surrounding 
environment, especially by unspecialized users.  
In order to demonstrate the expected better accuracy on overall simulated information and 
effortless of input data provision through the integrated data flow chain structure, the 
EFRHA’s performance quality was evaluated against measured and/or modelled data from 
well-established and widely used databases in a series of validation tests. Taking into 
consideration the various modelling approaches/types implemented, four independent 
validation exercises were carried out illustrating its performance quality and reliability to be 
used in CA studies. Taking into account that there is no simple model evaluation guidance 
approach available for the type of modelling approaches implemented in eFRHA model, the 
validation exercise was based on the recommendation and quality metrics proposed in the 
Model Evaluation Guidelines (MEG) for ‘non-CFD' models. 
At a first analysis, the EMM and ESTM pre-processors modelling approaches and 
assumptions consistency were tested, based on direct comparisons of modelled results with 
reference data. Given the limited availability of measured information allowing a somewhat 
broad evaluation, modelled results from extensively validated models was considered. 
Bearing in mind the intrinsic uncertainties and possible ‘errors’ from both reference and tested 
datasets, it is verified the reliability of the implemented modelling algorithm and assumptions 
with respect to the theoretical principles and provide valid information. The strong 
approximation to reference data, shown by both qualitative and quantitative analyses, 
indicates that modelling approaches implemented in both modules respect the main 
theoretical principles and provide valid data.  
As regards to EMM, it is demonstrated the reasonability of implemented modelling 
assumptions to ‘overcome’ the main limitations of missing input information available. This 
feature allows applying the model in more test cases, especially in case of emergency response 
or planning studies in situations of large amount of missing input data. Additionally, it is 
highlighted the added-value of integrating the chemical properties database through the 
quality of ESTM modelled results. Nonetheless, in both cases, it can be observed the influence 
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of input datasets on modelled outputs. For instance, the ‘accumulated’ uncertainties and 
deviations generated along the calculation process of surface ABL scaling parameters, is 
perceptible on the estimated ABL mixing height variables. Moreover, the slight differences 
between chemical properties databases considered by EFRHA and EFFECTS 7.5 model, result 
in ‘amplified’ deviations in modelled results, especially in case of liquid and PLG release 
scenarios. 
The inclusion of ETM in EFRHA model represented an enhanced capability for reproducing, 
in a simple way, the influence of complex terrain and/or building in the hazmat gas 
atmospheric dispersion, and thus, overcoming one of the most known limitations of most of 
Class II models currently applied in CA studies. Notwithstanding the relative 
straightforwardness of ETM-EDM approach, it was observed the increase of modelling 
performance quality if this option is selected when applied to the well-known and widely 
used experimental set up -45º MUST test case. In this stage, the validation exercise consisted of 
direct comparisons of modelled against measured mean concentrations. At the same time, it 
was evaluated the most appropriate and realistic way to input obstructions and complex 
terrain data through the variation of surface roughness values and inclusion of obstacles or 
not.  
Based on the overall performance analyses, it was observed that, similarly to other ‘non-CFD’ 
Class II models (of varied Types) it does not satisfies most of quality paired point-by-point 
metrics, originally defined for more accurate and complex CFD models. Nevertheless, the 
results visibly show the added-value reflected on the better correlation when the influence of 
obstructions is considered in the dispersion simulation. Furthermore, if analyzed the ranges of 
concentration values and modelled plume features, it is also demonstrated the increased 
performance if the obstacles are considered. Hence, even considering a simple quasi-steady-
state modelling approach, it is highlighted the improved performance quality of including the 
presence of obstacles. Furthermore, the influence of surface roughness values on final results 
can be also noted. As presented in both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the selected of 
the most realistic value for z0 can also affect the quality of modelled results. Consequently, this 
preliminary evaluation analysis evidences the added-value of considering realistic input 
parameters, as well as, describing numerically the presence of obstacles in the simulation 
domain and their influence on generated concentration fields. The evidenced possibility to 
account the presence of obstacles and complex terrain is of particular importance, when 
applied to industrial and urban areas. 
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Finally, demonstrated the suitability of the various modules to produce valid and reasonable 
interim and output information (for the dispersion in obstructed areas), the developed model 
was validated in its entire scope through the simulation of a set of well-established and widely 
used field experimental. A special attention was given to the analysis of EFRHA’s 
performance quality when the released gases tend to shown dense gas behaviour, under 
difference outflow, meteorological and presence of obstructions situations.  
In general, despite some deviations from measured values, it was demonstrated its capability 
to model the various phases of the release and atmospheric dispersion phenomena. On the 
whole, quality criteria acceptability limits were satisfied, with a reasonable accuracy for 
‘typical’ accident scenarios. Noticeable overestimations were predicted in a large fraction of 
experiments, nonetheless, the overall temporal variation and ranges of values are predicted 
with an acceptable correlation degree. Moreover, as expected, less favourable correlations 
were observed for scenarios considering the presence of obstacles, specifically when compared 
with EFRHA’s performance results from comparable tests under similar conditions. 
Nonetheless, the exercise demonstrates its reliability to predict the various stages of the 
release and dispersion phenomena. 
After its successful validation, EFRHA model was applied to a set of accident scenarios based 
on the Portuguese ECC located in the Municipality of Estarreja. The concentration of various 
Seveso-establishments, nature and quantities of hazmat handled and transported, as well as, 
available technical information enabled the definition of potential accident scenarios, as 
realistic as possible, for the application of EFRHA model in view of CA purposes. Both fixed 
and transportation equipments were analysed. A set of four distinct accidents was considered, 
comprising plausible and worst-case release/leakage scenarios. Corroborating previous 
studies, it can be also observed the notable differences between highly toxic and highly 
flammable hazmat. Although flammable hazmat tends to present higher magnitudes/ranges 
of concentrations, toxic gases tend to disperse faster and therefore cause larger potentially 
affected areas. Overall the application of EFRHA showed the suitability and consistence of 
implemented modelling algorithms. The various simulations evidenced the potential use of 
EFRHA model to support CA studies or emergency decision and planning, given the relative 
low efforts and computational efforts, when compared with Class III models.  
The work developed within the scope of the present thesis intends responding to the need of 
new and more realistic modelling tools to support CA and emergency planning 
simultaneously assuring easiness and a relative straightforwardness to be applied by both 
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experts and unspecialized users. Even not so generalized, the integration of different models 
in one single modelling tool also represents a practical way to optimize time and work efforts. 
It is well known that integration of various models in one modelling system may increase 
potential uncertainties and errors, but if this tool is properly designed, may represent an 
alternative to existing models as demonstrated in this thesis.  
Notwithstanding the presented added-value of the developed tool, some constrains were 
detected during the application to the various test cases, stressing the need to improve some 
aspects of model in the future. Current version of the EFRHA model is only designed to 
simulate accident scenarios involving the release and atmospheric dispersion of hazmat gases, 
from a single incident event. Taking into account the relevance on considering the occurrence 
of multiple sources in case of two-phase PLG release scenarios, it is possible to apply the same 
modelling principle for multiple sources. Such feature will be of major significance, in 
particular for accident scenarios involving various equipments/structures, or even the 
potential domino effects. 
During the definition of the accident scenarios, it was also highlighted the potential 
consequences from fires and explosions, which cannot be directly handle by the implemented 
dispersion modelling approach. This integration will allow applying the model to more 
accident scenarios, but also, incorporating a more accurate description of the accident 
scenario, it also increases the accuracy and quality of main outputs. 
Meanwhile the model has only been applied in the scope of DTA modelling approaches. 
Considering the ‘expanding’ use of PRA approaches, the potential inclusion of probability and 
vulnerability methods, may also raise the quality of the definition of accident scenarios, as 
well as, the ‘realistic’ estimation of main consequences based on both failure type and 
probability of occurrence. The continuous development of new mathematical and 
computational methods represents a challenge to integrate more complex effects models, as 
well as, probabilistic (probit and dose response methods) methodologies. Such 
modifications/updates represent new challenges and the development of new and innovative 
products, not only for scientific community, but also, risk assessment and regulation 
authorities. 
Another relevant constrain is the strong dependency on modelled cloud density and 
difference with ambient air densities. Taking into account that for lower values, the cloud 
practically is not considered, it is important to apt the model for situations of passive gas 
dispersion behaviour. Although not considering in the present version of EFRHA model, it is 
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being tested the potential coupling of EFRHA dispersion model with the ‘up-to-dated’ new 
generation Gaussian models, enabling estimating the dispersion until the cloud reaches 
significantly reduced concentration levels. Even so, recognized the limitations of Class II 
models, in particular for considering the presence of obstacles, this procedure is still in the 
starting point. However, several examples have already been presented in similar studies. 
Among other challenges is the integration of a more accurate wind fields modelling approach 
in order to account the real flow around the obstacles. 
It’s a fact that continuous increase and development of computational and hardware 
capacities, pushes the development of new and more complex modelling tools, however it is 
important to establish links and compromises between communities promoting the 
development of new and more usable new tools, but at the same time, assuring a somewhat 
easiness enabling potential unspecialized end-users to apply and maybe implement these 
tools in other areas. Therefore, apart from the development of more complex models, it is also 
a test attempting to improve existing approaches, but maintaining its straightforwardness to 
endorse and emphasise their use not only in CA studies, but also by emergency response 
operators. Overall the present thesis demonstrates the possible application of alternative 
modelling approaches often forgotten with acceptable results, instead of the extensively used 
and still complex class III CFD models. Moreover, the increased risk of industrial and urban 
areas to be affected in case of industrial and/or deliberated release of hazmat gases enforces 
the development and proper application of more accurate and realistic, but at the same time, 
operational and somewhat fast-run tools. 
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Appendix A: Major Industrial Accidents 
 
A.1 – Time evolution of reported technological accidents worldwide since 1900 from EM-DAT 
database. 
 
Figure A.1 – Number of people reported (a) killed and (b) affected by technological disasters 1900 – 
2009 [URL1.1]. 
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A.2 – Industrial establishments covered by the two-tiers regime of Seveso II Directive 
Time 
 
Table A. 1. Number of ‘Seveso establishments by Member State [EEA, 2010]. 
Country 
Total number of 
plants 
Upper Tier Lower Tier 
Not known/ not 
applicable 
Germany 2119 1071 1048  
UK 1147 411 736  
Italy 1117 519 598  
France 1106 553 553  
Spain 673 267 406  
Netherlands 384 221 163  
Sweden 379 199 180  
Poland 366 158 208  
Belgium 365 174 191  
Romania 277 115 162  
Finland 264 128 136  
Czech Republic 190 115 75  
Greece 189 83 106  
Portugal 164 57 107  
Austria 146 80 64 2 
Hungary 144 64 80  
Bulgaria 135 54 81  
Denmark 121 31 90  
Ireland 88 34 54  
Slovakia 78 41 37  
Latvia 63 30 33  
Slovenia 60 23 37  
Lithuania 53 19 34  
Estonia 50 25 25  
Luxembourg 21 8 13  
Cyprus 16 10 6  
Malta 10 6 4  
TOTAL 9725 4496 5227 2 
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Table A. 2. Distribution of Number of ‘Seveso establishments by activity [EEA, 2010]. 
IndustryType Percentage 
Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.)  10.92% 
Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG)  10.36% 
General chemicals manufacture (not included above)  7.41% 
Power generation, supply and distribution  7.12% 
LPG storage  5.53% 
Production of basic organic chemicals  5.01% 
Production, destruction and storage of explosives  4.36% 
Processing of metals using electrolytic or chemical processes  4.30% 
Chemical installations - other fine chemicals  3.82% 
Chemical installations – Industrial gases  3.52% 
Other activity (not included above)  3.39% 
LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution  3.30% 
Plastic and rubber manufacture  3.10% 
Production and storage of pesticides, biocides, fungicides  2.95% 
Petrochemical / Oil Refineries  2.55% 
Production and storage of fertilizers  2.50% 
Manufacture of food products and beverages  2.38% 
Waste storage, treatment and disposal  1.90% 
Handling and transportation centres  1.80% 
Production of pharmaceuticals  1.53% 
General engineering, manufacturing and assembly  1.29% 
Production and storage of fireworks  1.15% 
Processing of ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.)  1.08% 
LNG storage and distribution  1.02% 
Production and manufacturing of pulp and paper  0.97% 
Processing of non-ferrous metals (foundries, smelting, etc.)  0.91% 
Agriculture  0.73% 
Electronics & electrical engineering  0.72% 
Water and sewage (collection, supply, treatment)  0.61% 
Ceramics (bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.)  0.54% 
Manufacture of glass  0.54% 
Processing of metals  0.45% 
Chemical installations - chlorine  0.36% 
Medical, research, education (including hospitals, universities, etc.)  0.33% 
Mining activities (tailings & physicochemical processes)  0.24% 
Wood treatment and furniture  0.24% 
Chemical installations - ammonia  0.21% 
Shipbuilding, shipbreaking, ship repair  0.18% 
Chemical installations - inorganic acids  0.15% 
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster  0.13% 
Chemical installations - fluorine or hydrogen fluoride  0.09% 
Chemical installations - hydrogen  0.06% 
Building & works of engineering construction  0.04% 
Textiles manufacturing and treatment  0.04% 
Leisure and sport activities (e.g. ice rink)  0.03% 
Chemical installations – carbon oxides  0.01% 
Chemical installations - nitrogen oxides  0.01% 
Chemical installations - sulphur oxides, oleum  0.01% 
Total 100.00% 
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Appendix B: EFFECTS OF RELEASED HAZARDOUS GAS MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
B-1 – EFRHA fluxogram showing the different modules and the main input data, data transferred 
between modules and output data. 
 
Figure A.1 – Basic fluxogram of EFRHA model data transfer and modelled outputs. 
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B-2: EFRHA model input/output data 
 
Table B.1 – Input parameters used by the EFRHA model. 
Symbol Input parameters Units 
EFRHA Control parameters 
Tsim Simulation period s 
Nt Number of time steps – 
Lat Latitude º 
Long Longitude º 
Hzone Time Zone h 
 Meteorological module  
Hm Measurement height m 
Tm Measured ambient temperature ⁰C 
Um Measured wind velocity m.s
-1
 
θm Measured wind direction º 
Pm Measured atmospheric pressure Pa 
Hrm Measured relative humidity % 
R Measured solar radiation W.m
-2
 
N Fractional cloud cover - 
r{φ} Albedo - 
Bo Bowen ratio - 
ºK Measured upper air temperature vertical profile K 
 Terrain module  
z0 Surface roughness length m 
zhill Surface height m 
Hsrc Source height m 
Xsrc, Ysrc Source centre location m 
z0bld Building base height m 
Hbld Building roof height m 
Ntier Number of tiers of the building – 
Xtier, Ytier Building tiers location m 
 Source term module  
hv Container height m 
lv Container length m 
lv Container width m 
T0 Product Temperature ⁰C 
P0 Product Pressure Pa 
– Product physical state – 
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Symbol Input parameters Units 
Φ Filling degree % 
hh Leak height m 
dh Leak size m 
Cd Discharge coefficient – 
 Dispersion module  
– 2D Receptor grid – 
zconc Height from the ground m 
Cthld Concentration threshold limits μg.m
-3
 
 
 
Table B.2 – Interpretation of the L with respect to PG Stability Class [Seinfeld and Pandis, 2006]. 
L (range) PG 
Small negative -100 m < L < 0 A 
Large negative -105 m ≤ L -100 m B-C 
Very large (positive or negative) |L| > 105 m D 
Large positive 10 m ≤ L ≤ 105 m E 
Small positive 0 < L < 10 m F 
 
 
Table B.3 – Output parameters estimated by theEFRHA model. 
Symbol Output parameters Units 
 Meteorology module  
L Monin-Obukhov length m 
Ri Richardson number – 
H0 Sensible heat flux J.m
-2
.s
-1
 
u* Surface friction velocity m.s
-1
 
w* Convective scaling velocity m.s
-1
 
θ* Temperature scale K 
zi Mixed layer height m 
zic Convective mixed layer height m 
zim Mechanical mixed layer height m 
– Atmospheric stability class – 
 Source term module  
hsc Source height m 
qs Gas mass flow rate kg.s
-1
 
usc Gas outflow velocity m.s
-1
 
Ρsc Gas density kg.m
-3
 
Tsc Gas temperature K 
Psc Gas pressure Pa 
Asc Source cross-sectional area m
2
 
- Physical state - 
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Symbol Output parameters Units 
 Source term module  
z0 Surface roughness length m 
ra(φ) Surface albedo - 
Bo Surface Bowen ratio - 
nXr Number of receptor points in X direction - 
nYr Number of receptor points in Y direction - 
ΔXr Distance between consecutive receptor point in X direction m 
ΔYr Distance between consecutive receptor point in Y direction m 
zr Receptor elevation from the terrain base m 
 Receptor hill height scale elevations m 
Hsrc Source height m 
Xsrc, Ysrc Source centre location m 
z0bld Projected building base height m 
Hbld Projected building roof height m 
Ntier Number of tiers of the building – 
Xtier, Ytier Building tiers location m 
 Dispersion module  
C Hazmat concentration  μg.m
-3
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Appendix C: VALIDATION OF EFRHA MODEL 
 
C.1 – Stage 1: EMM module  
Figure C.1 – Time evolution plots of AERMET (green) and EMM (red) estimated ABL scaling 
parameters for MET1 test case 
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Cont. Figure C.1 
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Figure C.2 – Time evolution plots of AERMET (green) and EMM (red) estimated ABL scaling 
parameters for MET2 test case 
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Cont. Figure C.2 
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C.2 – EFRHA model validation Stage 2: ESTM module  
 
Table C.1 – Summary of input parameters of SRC1 test case [VROM,2005a]. 
Parameter Inputs Units 
Chemical product Hydrogen - 
Filling degree 95 % 
Vessel volume 100 m
3
 
Vessel heigh 5.0 m 
Vessel diameter 4.1 m 
Type of leak Sharp edge orifice - 
Diameter of leak 0.1 m 
Height of leak from vessel’s base 3.0 m 
Initial temperature 15.0 ⁰C 
Initial pressure above liquid 50.0 bar 
 
 
Table C.2 – Summary of input parameters of SRC2 test case  [VROM,2005a]. 
Parameter  Units 
Chemical product Acrylonitrile - 
Filling degree 80.0 % 
Vessel type Vertical cylinder  
Vessel volume 6600.0 M
3
 
Vessel heigh 14.0 m 
Vessel diameter 24.5 m 
Type of hole Sharp edge orifice - 
Diameter of hole 0.1 m 
Height of hole from vessel’s base 0.0 m 
Initial temperature 15.0 ⁰C 
Initial pressure 1.0 bar 
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Table C.3 – Summary of input parameters of SRC9 test case  [VROM,2005a]. 
Parameter  Units 
Chemical product Propane - 
Filling degree 95.0 % 
Vessel type Vertical cylinder  
Vessel volume 4.7 m
3
 
Vessel heigh 2.00 m 
Vessel diameter 24.5 m 
Type of hole Sharp edge orifice - 
Diameter of hole 0.1 m 
Height of hole from vessel’s base 1.95 m 
Initial temperature 303.15 K 
Initial pressure 10.79 bar 
 
 
Table C.4 – Summary of input parameters of SRC4 test case  [VROM,2005a]. 
Parameter  Units 
Chemical product Gasoline - 
Total mass released 100,000 kg 
Initial liquid temperature 15.0 ⁰C 
Fixed pool surface 1500 m
2
 
Initial temperature subsoil 15.0 ⁰C 
Bund surface material Isolation concrete - 
Thermal conductivity 0.207 J.m
-1
.s
-1
.K
-1
 
Thermal diffusivity 2.5x10
-7
 m2.s
-1
 
Ambient temperature 288.15 K 
Thermal conductivity air 0.0257 J.m
-1
.s
-1
.K
-1
 
Prandlt number air 0.786 - 
Viscosity air 1.65x10
-5
 N.s.m
-2
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C.3 – EFRHA validation stage 3: Disperison in obstructed areas 
 
Analysis of estimated scatter plots for the set of defined IOMC runs 
In spite of Schatzmann et al. [2010] recommendation, the comparison of paired point-by-point 
mean concentrations between wind tunnel and IOMC modelled results in the form of scatter 
plots is nevertheless presented for information in Figure C.1. The analysis of scatter plots 
highlights the divergences between IOMC runs with and without the definition of obstacles. 
(a) 
                                        IOMC1                                    IOMC2                                    IOMC3 
 
(b) 
                                        IOMC4                                    IOMC5                                    IOMC6 
 
Figure C.3 – Scatter plots of IOMCs modelled results against wind tunnel mean concentration 
measurements for the -45⁰ MUST case – IOMC runs (a) with and (b) without obstacles definition. 
Visual inspection of Figure C.1 shows the underestimation trend lines for IOMC runs without 
any consideration of obstacles; in case of IOMC runs with the incorporation of obstructions 
estimated trend lines tend to approximate to the correspondent perfect model trend lines. 
In general, IOMC runs with obstacles (IOMC1- IOMC3) present an evident better agreement 
with observations, in contrast with the perceptible lesser correlation observed for IOMC runs 
without any consideration of obstacles (IOMC4 – IOMC6). This difference is clearly visible by 
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the number of overestimated points, but also, by the number of points close to perfect 
correlation trend line.  
As regards to potential influence of z0 values, exploratory analysis of Figure C.1 demonstrates 
that concentrations estimated using IOMC1 and IOMC4 (z0 = 0.3 m) and IOMC2 and IOMC5 
(z0 = 0.1*Hbd m) are quite similar. Therefore, it is possible to mention that the definition of more 
realistic values for z0 (0.3 m) estimated from the experimental wind profile value observations 
within obstacles array do not generates noticeable enhancements when compared with the 
MEGPD guidance value. Nonetheless there is a slight improvement with IOMC3 and IOMC6 
(z0 = 0.1 m). 
Although the analysis of scatter plots results shows a ‘poor behaviour’ of all IOMC 
configurations, it is to a great extent analogous to modelled results from a set of Class II 
models  reported by Schatzmann et al. [2010] in the frame of COST Action 732 as presented in 
Figure C.2. Regardless the majority of runs do not consider the presence of effective buildins, 
as in IOMC1 – IOMC3 runs, their comparison with ETM-EDM modelled results illustrates the 
typical results and ‘limitations’ of Class II models. A special attention should be given to 
ADMSa runs, because these are the only ones in which buildings spatial distribuiton are 
considered. Detailed description of input configurations and results from the application of 
the various ‘non-CFD models’, in the frame of COST Action 732 is presented in Schatzmann et 
al. [2010]. 
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Figure C.4 – Scatter plots: non-CFD model results against wind tunnel measurements for the -45° 
MUST case [Schatzmann et al., 2010].  
Considering the resemblances with equivalent Class II models results it is possible to conclude 
that, EFRHA modelled concentrations from ETM-EDM results can be assumed consistent and 
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quite similar to equivalent Class II models and configurations outputs. Taking into account 
the more ‘realistic’ configuration of ADMSa and Lasatc runs [Schatzmann et al., 2010], it is is 
also visible that IOMC1 and IOMC2 modelled results show a comparable variability from run 
to run. Moreover, the inclusion of buildings shows the most severe overestimations as 
observed in the results of ADMSa and Lasatc [Schaztmann et al., 2010]. Therefore, it is clear 
that the most complex and ‘realistic’ way to define the presence of obstacles generates better 
results, than just varying the value of z0. 
Aiming to evaluate the consistency between observations and the modelled results previously 
presented, in terms of spatial distribution, the residuals (ratios between modelled results and 
observations) were estimated for the set of measured points and presented in Figure C.5. 
                         IOMC1                                                  IOMC2                                           IOMC3 
 
                         IOMC4                                                  IOMC5                                          IOMC6 
 
Figure C.5 – Comparison of plume shape based on residuals concentrations 
modelled/measurements for the -45º MUST test case (with obstacles: IOMC1-3; without obstacles: 
IOMC4-6).  
Dark red points show areas of overestimation, dark blue points identify areas of 
underestimation and green points correspond to the best agreements between IOMC runs 
results and observations. In general, IOMC runs show a strong overestimation of 
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concentrations along the x-axis and a strong underestimation south-east of the source, where 
the plume really is. This spatial distribution of residuals reflects the typical Class II models 
near straight-line plume propagation behaviour. Clear divergences are observed in IOMC 
runs with and without obstacles. These results corroborate previously observed scatter plots.  
As regards to potential effects of z0 values on modelled results, it is possible to detect different 
trends on results from IOMC runs with and without obstacles. In case of IOMC runs with 
obstacles, a minor augment of the number of points with larger deviations is observed for 
higher z0 values, with the uppermost deviations observed in IOMC3. In contrast, IOMC runs 
without any obstacles show a more prominent reduction of concentration deviations for 
higher z0 values, with the wider number of points with slight to strong overestimations 
observed in IOMC6 and the lowest in IOMC2. As expected, the most obvious deviations occur 
between IOMC runs with ‘extreme’ values for z0 (0.3 m and 0.035 m). This is mainly due to the 
combined influence of obstacles integration technique and z0 values. 
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Appendix D. CASE STUDY: ESTARREJA 
 
F.1 – Definition of ERPG limits 
The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) generally 
used to predict the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The 
ERPGs were developed by the ERPG committee of the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The 
ERPGs were developed as planning guidelines, to anticipate human adverse health effects caused by 
exposure to toxic chemicals. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines for exposure up to 60 minutes of 
duration of contact.  
ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals 
could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health 
effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odour. 
ERPG 2: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals 
could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious 
health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action. 
ERPG 3: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals 
could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects. 
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F.1 – Spatial distribution of Portuguese Seveso-establishments 
 
Figure D.1 – Spatial distribution of natural and technological risk at Portuguese national level 
[Gaspar, 2005]  
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F.1 – Estarreja Municipality 
Table D.1 – Types of vulnerable spots considered in the municipality of Estarreja [SMPC, 2006; URL5.3]. 
Code Type Covered structures 
VS1 Administrative services 
Estarreja city hall 
- Courthouse 
- Parish administrative centres 
VS2 Education 
- Kinder gardens 
- 1
st
 cycle schools 
- High school 
VS3 Health 
- Hospital 
- Parishes health centres 
VS4 Safety 
- Police station  
- Firefighters headquarter 
VS5 Social & Public 
- Elder retirement centres 
- Social and occupational activities centres 
- Fair park 
- Cinema 
- Library 
- Sports hall  
- Swimming pool  
- Soccer and athletics camps 
- Public parks 
- Train station 
VS6 Industrial - Industrial establishments 
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